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Voorwoord 
 
Dit proefschrift presenteert de studie van het belastingarbitrage gedrag van bedrijven en 
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Mijn jaren in Rotterdam zouden een pak minder aangenaam geweest zonder de Aio’s van 
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Nederlanders onderdoen. Keimpe, Job, Roy, Jeab, Robert, Jean-Paul, Joost, Peter, Aart 
Willem; ik reken erop dat jullie meevieren. Bedankt, Miguel; ik koester de herinneringen aan 
onze tijd in Barcelona. Ook een extra “dankjewel” voor Machiel; ik wens je het allerbeste.  
 
Ook dank ik de collega’s van het departement handels- en bestuurswetenschappen van de 
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prettige werkomgeving. In het bijzonder dank ik Sabine (nu is het aan jou!). 
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is ook een beetje dat van jou!  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1  Introduction 
The tax authorities in the Netherlands introduced the new Income Tax Act 2001 (Wet 
Inkomstenbelasting 2001)1, effective on January 1, 2001.  
The most significant component of the Dutch tax reform is the change in the tax levied on 
income from savings and investments (Meussen (2000)). The actual return on personally 
held wealth, in the form of dividend, interest or rental payments, is no longer taxed. Instead, 
the progressive personal income tax on dividend, interest and rental payments has been 
replaced by a presumptive capital income tax on the value of the assets net of liabilities. The 
tax code assumes that all personally held assets – such as deposits, stocks, bonds and real 
estate (except owner-occupied property) – earn a return of 4%, which is taxed at a 
proportional tax rate of 30%. Actual income is therefore no longer relevant under the new 
capital-income-tax system and the presumptive capital income tax replaces the old net 
wealth tax. However, because of the assumed 4% yield on personal wealth, the presumptive 
capital income tax is in fact a net wealth tax of 1.2%. 
The household’s borrowed funds (except mortgage loans on owner-occupied property) are 
deductible from personal wealth that is taxed under the presumptive capital income tax. 
Another feature of the Dutch tax reform, then, is that the interest payments on these 
borrowed funds (except interest paid on home mortgage loans) are no longer deductible from 
(labour and capital) income at high marginal income-tax rates (Cnossen and Bovenberg 
(2001)). 
 
The Dutch reform of capital income taxation might be seen as a response to the distortions 
that were prevalent in the capital-income-tax system in the Netherlands before the tax reform 
of January 1, 2001.  
This thesis evaluates the reform of capital income taxation of January 1, 2001. The analysis 
explores whether the capital-income-tax reform reduced distortions and/or resulted in 
additional distortions.  
 
Section 1.2 reviews the distortions created by the capital-income-tax system before the tax 
reform and analyses the Dutch tax reform on the basis of the general principles of tax policy. 
Section 1.3 defines the main objectives of this thesis, together with the methods used by this 
study. Finally, section 1.4 presents the outline of the thesis. 
 
                                                 
1 Published in the Official Gazette (Staatsblad) of May 30, 2000, no. 215. 
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1.2  Tax-arbitrage behaviour and the Dutch tax reform 
This section first reviews the distortions under the capital-income-tax system in the 
Netherlands before the tax reform. Such distortions actually caused the firms’ and 
households’ ‘tax-arbitrage behaviour’. Afterwards, the general concept and the effects of ‘tax-
arbitrage behaviour’ are analysed in terms of the general principles of sound tax policy: 
efficiency, horizontal equity, vertical equity, tax enforcement and the need to collect tax 
revenues. These principles are then applied to analyse the Dutch capital-income-tax system 
and the tax-arbitrage opportunities before the Dutch tax reform. This analysis will point out 
the need for tax reform. Finally, also the new Dutch capital-income-tax system of January 1, 
2001 will be described in terms of the general tax principles.  
 
 
• Distortions as a result of capital income taxation before the Dutch tax reform 
The Dutch capital-income-tax system before the reform taxed distributed corporate equity 
income twice and retained corporate equity income and interest payments only once. At the 
corporate level, earnings net of interest payments were taxed at the corporate tax rate. The 
distributed after-tax dividends and interest payments were subsequently taxed at the 
household’s progressive personal income-tax rate. Capital gains, however, were not taxed at 
the household level.  
Because of the differences in the tax treatment of interest payments, dividends and capital 
gains, the Dutch tax code before the reform distorted the choice between the investment’s 
sources of finance (newly issued equity, retained earnings or debt). The tax code distorted 
also the choice between the uses of the investment’s earnings. Corporate firms were able to 
choose between dividend distributions, reinvestment of retained earnings, share 
repurchases, interest payments or debt redemption (this choice also depended on whether a 
corporate firm preferred either debt or equity as the source of finance). The analysis in this 
thesis will demonstrate that the differences in tax treatment of interest payments, dividends 
and capital gains also affect the entry of new entrepreneurs and the dynamics of the market. 
 
The closely held corporation presents a special case. A controlling shareholder of the closely 
held corporation owns a substantial amount of shares (at least 5%) of that corporation. The 
return on the controlling shareholder’s equity-financed investment is taxed at the corporate 
tax rate. The dividends and realised capital gains are subsequently taxed at a special 
uniform rate, as opposed to the taxes on (publicly held) corporate equity. Interest payments 
on bonds of the closely held corporation purchased by the controlling shareholder can be 
deducted from taxable earnings at the business level, but are taxed at the controlling 
shareholder’s progressive personal income-tax rate at the household level.  
In contrast to the tax treatment of returns from the (publicly held) corporate firm and the 
closely held corporation, the return on equity-financed investment in the proprietorship is 
taxed only once at the income-tax rate of the proprietor. Interest payments in the 
proprietorship are not taxed at the proprietor’s income-tax rate, but were taxed at the 
investor’s marginal income-tax rate. 
The Dutch tax code before the tax reform thus distorted the choice between the sources of 
finance of investments in the closely held corporation (newly issued equity, retained earnings 
or debt) and it distorted the choice between the sources of finance of investments in the 
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proprietorship (equity or debt). The Dutch tax code also distorted how these businesses 
chose to use the investment’s earnings. 
Because of the differences in the tax treatment of (publicly held) corporate firms, closely held 
corporations and proprietorships, the Dutch tax code before the tax reform distorted the 
choice of businesses regarding their legal form. 
 
This situation was compounded by the existence of institutional investors. Households may 
save directly in corporate debt and equity (by buying bonds or shares of the corporate firm). 
However, households attempting to avoid the progressive marginal income-tax on interest 
payments and dividends under the old tax regime could save indirectly in corporate debt and 
equity through a mutual fund or a pension fund. The mutual fund’s earnings, which are 
retained and reinvested, were therefore taxed at the fund’s (low) tax rate. A household selling 
its participation in the fund realised the capital gains tax-free. Households may save for 
pensions through a pension fund. These pension savings can be deducted from taxable 
personal income. The pension, however, is taxed at the household’s personal income-tax 
rate at retirement. The pension fund is not taxed on its investment income. Because of the 
low imputed rental values that are taxed under the income tax, investment in owner-occupied 
property is taxed favourably as well.  
Because of the differences in the tax treatment of direct household savings, indirect 
household savings through a mutual fund or a pension fund and owner-occupied property, 
the Dutch tax code before the tax reform distorted considerably the choices that households 
could make regarding saving opportunities2. 
 
Households were able to borrow funds to finance investment instead of financing a particular 
investment with their own funds. Households might have preferred this saving strategy 
because the interest payments on the borrowed funds could be deducted from taxable 
income (which was not restricted only to capital income, but also included labour income) at 
high marginal income-tax rates.   
Consequently, the Dutch tax code before the tax reform distorted the choice between debt-
financed and equity-financed household investments. 
 
 
• Tax-arbitrage behaviour 
Taxes on capital income induce agents to change their saving and investment strategies. 
The effects of tax rules, however, extend beyond the level of savings and investments. 
Because tax rules can differ across saving and investment opportunities, agents that attempt 
to minimise their tax liabilities will change the allocation of their savings and investments. 
 
The Dutch capital-income-tax system before the reform distorted considerably the saving and 
investment decisions of agents. Before the tax reform, capital income taxes distorted the 
choice between the investment’s sources of finance and uses of earnings, the businesses’ 
                                                 
2 The analysis in this thesis abstracts from some additional tax-favoured saving opportunities as, for 
instance, options, employee and premium savings schemes, life insurances and home-related 
endowment insurances (Meussen (2000)). 
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legal form, and the households’ (either debt-financed or equity-financed) saving vehicles. 
Such distortions imply that agents that seek to minimise their tax liabilities will change the 
allocation of their savings and investments. These allocative changes are then referred to as 
the tax-arbitrage behaviour of households, firms or intermediaries (mutual funds and pension 
funds). 
 
The next section analyses the general concept and effects of tax-arbitrage behaviour in 
terms of the general principles of sound tax policy. 
 
 
• Tax-arbitrage behaviour and the principles of sound tax policy 
Besides the need to raise tax revenues, (capital income-) tax policy is shaped by 
considerations of efficiency, horizontal equity, vertical equity and enforceability. 
 
Efficiency 
The efficiency loss of a tax refers to the reduction in the taxpayers’ welfare above the welfare 
loss as a result of the income reduction due to payment of the tax (Zee (1995a)).  
Efficiency losses are caused by reductions in the (total amount of) savings and investments 
of households and firms, because some of these savings and investments are no longer 
profitable as a result of the taxes on capital. 
Because capital income taxes alter rates of return on savings and investments, taxpayers are 
compelled to change their saving and investment choices in order to offset the impact of the 
capital income taxes. This tax-arbitrage behaviour suggests that taxpayers are making 
saving and investment decisions that, in the absence of taxes, would be considered inferior. 
These inferior taxpayer decisions also cause efficiency losses (excess burdens) of the capital 
income taxes (Watson (1999)).  
If the main concern of tax policy is to minimise efficiency losses, then capital income taxes 
should not affect the saving and investment decisions of taxpayers. A neutral tax policy 
should therefore minimise the opportunities for tax-arbitrage behaviour. 
Neutrality of the capital-income-tax system may be undesirable (OECD (2001)), however, if 
the tax code is used to correct market failure or to achieve equity goals, or if departures from 
the neutrality principle enhance the tax code’s simplicity.  
 
Horizontal equity 
Under the horizontal equity principle, taxpayers in ‘similar circumstances’ should pay the 
same amount of taxes (OECD (2001)). Horizontal equity is a principal dimension of the 
ability-to-pay principle. Horizontal equity means that taxpayers with the same income have 
the same ability to bear the tax burden and should therefore pay the same amount of taxes 
(Zee (1995b)). 
The tax code may offer taxpayers incentives to save through tax-favoured saving vehicles, 
which implies that agents will engage in tax-arbitrage behaviour. This tax-arbitrage behaviour 
arguably violates the horizontal equity principle because it produces differences in taxes 
paid, not on the basis of the taxpayers’ ability to pay, but on the basis of their deliberate 
saving decisions (OECD (2001)).  
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However, the opportunity to engage in tax-arbitrage behaviour not necessarily violates the 
horizontal equity tax principle, as long as these opportunities are available to all taxpayers. 
Hagemann, Jones and Montador (1987) therefore argue that horizontal inequity arises only if 
the ability to choose tax-favoured saving vehicles is restricted ex-ante (for certain types of 
taxpayers or in particular situations), as opposed to the ex-post differences in tax treatment 
(which are not necessarily inequitable). Horizontal inequity then arises, for instance, if the tax 
burden is shifted to agents that engage less actively in tax-arbitrage behaviour: not because 
they decide to do so, but because they possess less knowledge about the legal tax-
avoidance possibilities or because they possess fewer financial resources to pay for the legal 
and financial tax-avoidance assistance. 
 
Vertical equity 
Under the vertical equity principle, taxpayers in ‘better circumstances’ should bear more of 
the tax burden (Bradford (1986)). In this case, the ability-to-pay principle requires taxpayers 
with higher incomes to pay a higher proportion of their income as taxes (OECD (2001)). It 
can be argued that vertical equity, as evaluated by the taxpayers’ ability-to-pay, then implies 
that capital income should be taxed together with labour income at progressive marginal 
income tax rates (Hagemann, Jones and Montador (1987)). (Although intuitively appealing at 
first sight, this assumption can be criticised on several grounds. For a detailed discussion: 
see Bradford (1986)). 
Tax-arbitrage behaviour then violates vertical equity because it reduces the progressivity of 
the capital-income-tax system. For instance, the gains of tax-favoured saving opportunities 
and tax allowances (e.g., the mortgage interest rate deduction from taxable income) are 
often increasing at the marginal income-tax rate, which implies that tax-arbitrage behaviour is 
of greater benefit to more affluent taxpayers. Or, tax-favoured saving opportunities are 
beneficial just because they allow the taxpayer to circumvent the progressive income taxes. 
As a result of tax-arbitrage behaviour, progressive capital income taxes then turn out to be 
less progressive in effective terms.  
 
Tax enforcement 
Because individuals are reluctant to pay taxes, the government requires an efficient system 
of tax administration and tax enforcement (e.g., audits and penalties in case of non-
compliance) for raising tax revenues (OECD (2001)). However, tax enforcement in a 
narrower sense implies that taxpayers find no opportunity to transform taxed into untaxed 
capital income (e.g., by transforming dividends into untaxed capital gains), to defer the 
moment of taxation or to save through untaxed saving vehicles (e.g., mutual funds) (Cnossen 
and Bovenberg (1999)). 
Loopholes in the tax code provide taxpayers with an opportunity to engage in tax-arbitrage 
behaviour. In fact, tax-arbitrage behaviour makes use of legal opportunities and loopholes in 
the tax code to reduce tax liabilities. Tax enforcement in a narrow sense then implies capital-
income-tax rules that leave no opportunity for tax-arbitrage behaviour. Neutrality of the 
capital-income-tax system is thus important not only with regard to efficiency and horizontal 
equity, but also from the point of view of tax enforcement. 
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Tax revenues  
Tax authorities seek to raise revenues by taxing capital income. However, tax revenues 
decline as a result of tax-arbitrage behaviour. This might induce tax authorities to raise tax 
rates. This increases the incentives of households and firms to minimise the tax liabilities 
even further. In order to solve the problems due to tax-arbitrage behaviour, tax authorities 
may try to adjust the tax code. Small adjustments often increase the tax code’s complexity, 
however, which then aggravates tax-arbitrage efforts. The presence of severe tax-arbitrage 
behaviour, thus, might call for profound changes in the capital-income-tax system. 
 
 
• Why a tax reform in the Netherlands? 
Under the Dutch capital-income-tax system before the reform, the level of the taxpayer’s 
labour income influenced the tax burden on capital income. Dividend, interest and rental 
payments were taxed together with labour income at progressive marginal income tax rates. 
Consequently, the vertical equity tax principle, as evaluated by the taxpayers’ ability-to-pay, 
seemed to be at the centre of the Dutch capital-income-tax system before the reform of 
January 1, 2001. 
 
However, the Dutch capital-income-tax system before the tax reform was not entirely in 
accordance with the taxpayers’ ability-to-pay. First, corporate debt was taxed at lower rates 
than corporate equity because only interest payments were deductible from the firm’s 
earnings that fall under the corporate tax. Second, only corporate equity income that was 
distributed as dividends was taxed at high rates, but retained earnings were taxed at the 
(lower) flat corporate tax rate (because of the absence of a capital gains tax). Moreover, 
because the Dutch tax authorities wanted to stimulate taxpayers to save for a pension and 
for an owner-occupied property, savings through a pension fund and investment in owner-
occupied housing were (and continue to be) taxed favourably.  
The capital-income-tax system before the Dutch tax reform thus only partly implemented the 
ability-to-pay principle. Taxpayers with corporate income in the form of capital gains, and 
who saved through tax-favoured saving vehicles, paid less taxes than taxpayers who 
possessed the same before-tax income but obtained it as dividends or (to a lesser extent) as 
interest payments. This partial implementation of the ability-to-pay principle undermined the 
tax system’s vertical equity. 
 
Taxpayers before the Dutch tax reform faced considerable incentives and opportunities to 
engage in tax-arbitrage behaviour (e.g., with respect to the investments’ sources of finance 
and the uses of earnings, the businesses’ legal form, and the households’ debt-financed or 
equity-financed saving vehicles). In fact, some of these tax-arbitrage opportunities existed (or 
were so stringent) because the Dutch tax code implemented only partially the ability-to-pay 
tax principle.  
 
Consequently, the attempt to implement vertical equity was not successful for two reasons. 
First, the tax code before the reform contained too many exceptions to the ability-to-pay tax 
rule. Second, the agents’ engaged extensively in tax-arbitrage behaviour in order to profit 
from the tax-minimising opportunities.  
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As explained earlier, the agents’ tax-arbitrage behaviour provoked efficiency losses, 
undermined the horizontal and vertical equity of the Dutch tax system and reduced the 
government’s tax revenues. Under the old system, the household might, for instance, have 
chosen to save through a mutual fund (in order to transform highly taxed dividends into tax-
free capital gains). This saving strategy would cause efficiency losses because taxpayers 
chose to save through mutual funds for tax reasons and not (for instance) because of the 
funds’ high return on past investments. This saving strategy undermined horizontal equity, 
because only households that engaged less actively in tax-arbitrage behaviour continued to 
pay the high dividend taxes. This saving strategy also undermined vertical equity because it 
reduced the actual progressivity of the tax system. Finally, this saving strategy reduced the 
government’s tax revenue because of the absence of a capital gains tax in the Dutch tax 
code. 
 
To deal with these violations of the general tax principles of sound tax policy, the Dutch tax 
authorities then decided to change drastically the tax treatment of capital income. Starting 
from January 1, 2001, the capital-income-tax system no longer attempts to be in accordance 
with the vertical equity tax principle.   
 
 
• The Dutch tax reform of January 1, 2001 
The Dutch tax reform of January 1, 2001, did not change the tax treatment of debt and equity 
at the (publicly held) corporate firm, the closely held corporation or the proprietorship (except 
for the decrease in the top marginal income-tax rates and some minor other changes). The 
Dutch tax code continues to favour pension savings and investments in owner-occupied 
property favourably.  
Dividends and interest payments are, however, no longer taxed under the income tax, and 
the wealth tax has been abolished. (Imputed rental values of owner-occupied property and 
pensions continue to be taxed under the income tax.) At the household level, capital is then 
taxed only under the presumptive capital income tax, which is in fact a net wealth tax. 
 
The Dutch tax authorities introduced the presumptive capital income tax as an attempt to halt 
the excessive tax-arbitrage behaviour of households (for instance, by saving through mutual 
funds).  
This tax reform attempts to stem the efficiency losses of capital income taxation. By limiting 
the tax-arbitrage opportunities, the Dutch tax authorities have strengthened the tax code’s 
horizontal equity, as households that engage less actively in tax-arbitrage behaviour no 
longer pay more taxes. The tax reform attempts to ensure that the Dutch government is able 
to raise revenues from taxing capital income at the household level (even though debt-
financed investment in owner-occupied property and pension savings are still taxed 
favourably). 
 
The Dutch tax reform of January 1, 2001, thus aims at improving efficiency and horizontal 
equity, and at ensuring government revenues; these aims, however, seem to be pursued at 
the expense of the tax code’s vertical equity. 
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Violation of the vertical equity tax principle 
The presumptive capital income tax violates the vertical equity principle, as evaluated by the 
taxpayers’ ability-to-pay, because capital is taxed irrespective of taxpayer’s labour income. 
Moreover, the presumptive return of 4% is taxed at a proportional rate of 30%, in contrast to 
the progressive income tax rates before the tax reform. 
Moreover, the presumptive capital income tax violates the vertical equity principle because 
actual income is no longer taxed. On the one hand, the authorities tax a presumptive return 
of only 4%. The government thereby exempts the above normal returns of taxpayers 
possessing superior investment insight and information advantages (Cnossen and 
Bovenberg (2000)). On the other hand, a presumptive return as high as 4% is taxed, 
irrespective of whether the taxpayer has actually earned a return of 4% on his savings. The 
presumptive capital income tax also violates the ability-to-pay principle because the tax is 
levied irrespective of the good or bad luck of the investors on their investments (Cnossen 
and Bovenberg (2000)).  
 
 
1.3  Aims and scope 
This purely theoretical thesis explores the incentives provided by the Dutch capital-income-
tax system to engage in tax-arbitrage behaviour. The analysis, which is restricted to a closed 
economy, discusses the tax-arbitrage behaviour of firms, households and intermediaries 
(mutual funds and pension funds) before and after the Dutch tax reform of January 1, 2001. 
The analysis explores whether the capital-income-tax reform reduced tax-arbitrage 
opportunities and/or created additional tax-arbitrage opportunities. Does the presumptive 
capital income tax better fulfil the general principles of sound tax policy (as opposed to the 
capital-income-tax system before the tax reform)? This thesis thus explores whether the tax 
reform mitigates the distortions that were prevalent in the capital-income-tax system before 
the Dutch tax reform of January 1, 2001. 
 
At the firm level, tax-arbitrage behaviour is distinguished with respect to the following: 
 
• type of investment project (buildings, machinery, equipment, means of 
transportation, and intangible assets), 
• sources of finance (external or internal funds, debt or equity, provided by a 
household or an intermediary), 
• uses of profits (retentions, dividend distributions, share repurchases, debt 
redemption),  
• timing of the investment decision, and 
• the business’s legal form (the publicly held corporate firm, the closely held 
corporation, the proprietorship). 
 
At the household level, tax-arbitrage behaviour is distinguished with respect to the following: 
 
• type of saving vehicles (direct household saving, saving through an intermediary 
(mutual fund and pension fund) or investment in owner-occupied housing), and 
• sources of finance (own funds or borrowed funds, including mortgage debt). 
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Tax-arbitrage behaviour can be studied in several ways. The tax burden on saving and 
investment can be derived without taking into account the agents’ optimal response to the 
capital-income-tax system. The agents’ incentives for tax-arbitrage behaviour can then be 
derived from the comparison of the tax burden across saving and investment opportunities.  
The agents’ behaviour depends not only on the tax rules defined in the capital-income-tax 
system, but also on other relevant characteristics, such as the availability of sources of 
finance, adjustment costs and financial imperfections. How these characteristics influence 
the agents’ optimal tax-arbitrage behaviour may be studied as well. 
In addition to the tax analysis, this thesis adjusts and extends the methods typically used to 
infer tax-arbitrage behaviour. In particular, the analysis extends the well-known method of 
King and Fullerton (1984) for deriving marginal effective tax rates. The analysis also extends 
the dynamic finance and investment model of the firm as introduced by Sinn (1991a) in order 
to derive the agents’ optimal tax-arbitrage behaviour. 
 
 
1.4  Outline of the book 
In order to explore tax-arbitrage behaviour, the first part of this thesis (chapters 2, 3 and 4) 
studies the tax burden on saving and investment opportunities. The analysis in these 
chapters derives the agents’ tax-arbitrage behaviour by extending the methods of King and 
Fullerton (1984) and Sinn (1991a). 
The second part of the thesis (chapters 5 and 6) studies the tax-arbitrage behaviour of firms, 
households and intermediaries before and after the Dutch tax reform of January 1, 2001. In 
order to assess the Dutch tax reform, the analysis applies the methods that are studied in the 
first part of the thesis.  
 
Chapter 2 determines the tax burden by deriving marginal effective tax rates, which measure 
the tax burden on marginal saving and investment opportunities. Marginal effective tax rates 
will depend on the type of investment project and the corresponding tax treatment of 
depreciation. Also the legal form of the business, the saving strategy, the source of finance 
(debt, newly issued equity and retained earnings) and the use of earnings (interest payments 
and dividends) play a role. 
The analysis in chapter 2 extends the King and Fullerton (1984) method by explicitly 
modelling the stream of benefits and costs of the investment over time. The analysis carefully 
distinguishes between the investment’s source of finance and the use of the investment’s 
earnings. The method also includes the value of the firm’s equity (Tobin’s q).  
The extended King – Fullerton method suffers from a number of shortcomings. The method 
fails to link the investment’s cost of capital to the firm’s capital accumulation. Instead of 
paying interest and dividends, the firm might prefer to retain earnings, to repurchase shares 
or to redeem its debt level. Moreover, not all sources of finance are always available to the 
firm.  
 
In order to discuss the shortcomings of the extended King-Fullerton method, chapters 3 and 
4 derive the agents’ tax-arbitrage behaviour in a (partial equilibrium) dynamic framework of a 
young, newly founded firm that invests until it becomes a mature firm (Sinn (1991a)). The 
firm can finance investment with debt, newly issued equity or retained earnings. The firm’s 
 10 
earnings may be retained and reinvested, or used to repurchase shares or to redeem debt. 
This model allows for alternative household saving strategies and may incorporate 
adjustment costs and financial market imperfections. 
Specifically, chapter 3 introduces debt financing in Sinn’s (1991a) dynamic model. The 
analysis derives the cost of capital along the entire optimal path and determines the optimal 
source of finance and use of earnings.  
Chapter 4 studies the effect of additional financial market imperfections on the firm’s finance 
and investment decisions. The first part of chapter 4 surveys the literature. The second part 
integrates some of the financial market imperfections in the dynamic finance and investment 
model. The analysis focuses on adverse selection, and discusses the ‘traditional’ view of 
dividend taxation. It incorporates a minimum dividend constraint in the dynamic finance and 
investment model, and explains the difference between the ‘traditional’ and ‘new’ view of 
dividend taxation in relation to the underlying production process. 
 
Chapter 5 presents the tax burden on marginal saving and investment opportunities, and 
discusses the firm’s and household’s tax-arbitrage behaviour in the Netherlands before the 
tax reform of January 1, 2001.  
The chapter first presents the capital-income-tax system in the Netherlands before the tax 
reform. Afterwards, the analysis applies the extended King-Fullerton method, simulates 
Sinn’s life-cycle model of the firm and presents the firm’s optimal finance and investment 
path, and discusses tax-arbitrage behaviour in light of financial market imperfections. 
Chapter 6 presents the tax burden on marginal saving and investment opportunities in the 
Netherlands after the tax reform of January 1, 2001. Applying the same methods as in 
chapter 5, the analysis in chapter 6 discusses the firm’s and household’s tax-arbitrage 
behaviour and evaluates the tax reform.  
 
Chapter 7 contains the final conclusions with respect to tax-arbitrage behaviour before and 
after the Dutch tax reform, and presents the final evaluation of the reform of the Dutch 
capital-income-tax system of January 1, 2001. This chapter also describes some alternative 
tax reforms.  
 
The glossary and the list of symbols of chapter 2 and chapters 3 and 4 can be found at the 
end of this thesis. The numerical values of the tax rates and parameters that are applied in 
chapters 5 and 6 are presented there as well. 
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Chapter 2 
The King-Fullerton Method 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Non-uniform taxation of capital income creates tax-arbitrage opportunities. Economic agents, 
such as firms and households, face incentives to change their saving and investment 
behaviour in order to maximise the tax advantages offered by the tax authorities. Because 
agents are assumed to minimise their tax liabilities, they will save and invest in the 
opportunities characterised by the lowest tax burden. Consequently, a comparison of the tax 
burden across these saving and investment opportunities permits the inference of the agents’ 
tax-arbitrage behaviour. In order to compare the tax burden, this chapter presents a method 
to derive marginal effective tax rates.  
 
Marginal effective tax rates measure the tax burden on marginal saving and investment 
opportunities. These saving and investment opportunities yield a return that is just sufficient 
to persuade the agent (household, firm or intermediary) to undertake the investment. Hence, 
a marginal investment opportunity yields a return equal to the investor’s opportunity cost, 
which is the return the agent could realise if he would invest in an alternative project. 
 
The method presented in this chapter to derive marginal effective tax rates employs the 
method of King and Fullerton (1984). These authors focus on domestic corporate investment 
financed by savings of domestic households, who save directly or through intermediaries 
(tax-exempt pension funds and insurance companies). The firm can finance the investment 
with debt, newly issued equity or retained earnings. Earnings are distributed as interest 
payments or as dividends.  
Bovenberg and ter Rele (1998) and the OECD (1994) extend the method of King and 
Fullerton in a number of ways. Bovenberg and ter Rele (1998) incorporate investments by 
the closely-held corporation and the proprietorship. They consider both traditional and 
innovative opportunity returns (see below), and model investments in owner-occupied 
housing. The OECD (1994) method models the after-tax returns on the household’s savings 
explicitly over time. These extensions are incorporated in this chapter’s method. 
 
In order to derive the investment’s after-tax return, this chapter’s method explicitly models the 
stream of benefits and costs over time of an investment financed by the household. This 
approach features a number of advantages. First, it permits the detailed study of the effect of 
capital income taxes, particularly those that have to be paid only once (transaction tax, 
capital gains tax, etc.). In contrast to King and Fullerton, the analysis includes a wealth tax 
when it compares alternative returns. Second, this chapter’s method clearly distinguishes 
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between the investment’s source of finance and the use of the investment’s earnings. Third, 
the increase in value of the firm’s equity as a result of a marginal investment is derived 
endogenously. In case of retained earnings as the source of finance, for instance, the 
method demonstrates that dividend taxes are capitalised in share values. Fourth, the method 
permits the calculation of the return of savings that are reinvested for a number of periods. 
Finally, this chapter’s method permits the derivation of expressions for the cost of capital if 
households face a tax incentive to borrow funds instead of financing investment out of their 
own funds. 
 
 
2.2 Outline of the method 
In order to study the agents’ tax-arbitrage behaviour, marginal effective tax rates are 
compared across saving and investment opportunities, which consist of combinations of the 
characteristics outlined in table 1. The analysis focuses on corporations (owned by ordinary 
shareholders), closely-held corporations (owned by shareholders who hold a controlling 
amount of shares of the firm), proprietorships (the self-employed) and owner-occupied 
housing. The method allows for different sources of finance and different uses of earnings. 
The savings are controlled directly by households or indirectly by intermediaries.  
 
 
Table 1: characteristics of saving and investment opportunities 
 
 
Legal form:   corporation      closely-held   proprietorship        owner-occupied  
     corporation            housing  
 
Source of finance: debt    equity  
• newly issued equity 
• retained earnings 
 
Use of earnings: interest payments  dividends  
 
Saving strategy: direct household savings indirect household savings  
• mutual fund  
• pension fund 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 presents the method to derive marginal effective tax rates on corporate investments. 
The marginal effective tax rates on investments in the closely-held corporation, the 
proprietorship and owner-occupied housing are derived similarly. 
 
Debt-financed investment of corporations 
The analysis, as illustrated in table 2, assumes an internationally fixed real interest rate r . 
Accordingly, firms can borrow at the nominal interest rate π+r  (π  represents the 
exogenous inflation rate). Households can realise the before-tax gross rate of return π+r  on 
their savings in debt. A household’s after-tax real rate of return s  on savings in debt depends 
on r  and π  and on the household’s and the saving vehicle’s tax treatment (section 2.4.1 
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and section 2.5). The minimum required real rate of return (cost of capital p ) that the debt-
financed corporate investment must earn in order to be profitable depends on r , π , the 
corporate tax τ  (section 2.3.1), the tax treatment of depreciation (section 2.3.2) and the 
interest deductibility (section 2.3.3). 
 
 
Table 2: methodology for a given saving strategy and corporate business project               
 
   DEBT        EQUITY 
 
 
),( πrp  cost of capital (§ 2.8 )    ),( πrp   cost of capital   (§ 2.8 )  
 
corporate tax and tax treatment of    corporate tax and tax treatment 
depreciation   (§ 2.3.1-2)    of depreciation   (§ 2.3.1-2) 
 
),( πρ rb  firm’s discount rate   ),( πρ rb  firm’s discount rate   
 
interest deductibility  (§ 2.3.3)   ),(),( πρπρ rrb =   (§ 2.3.3)     
 ρτπρ )1(),( −=rb  
          
                                      ρ   shareholder's before-tax 
         nominal rate of return 
πρ += r  (fixed r , inflation rate π )  ),( πρ r                 
                  the household’s and the 
         saving vehicle’s tax 
the household's and the saving vehicle's             treatment   (§ 2.4.2-3, § 2.5)  
 tax treatment   (§ 2.4.1, § 2.5)           § 2.8              
 
 
),( πρ rH household after-tax nominal rate of return        Hρ   
 πρ −= Hs    (§ 2.4.1, § 2.5)     πρ −= Hs   (§ 2.4.2-3, § 2.5) 
 
),( πrsdebt      ),( πrsdebt       =       equitys  
 
household's after-tax real            equality due to  
rate of return s                   arbitrage  
       
           
 
 
Equity-financed investment of corporations 
The derivation of the cost of capital on equity-financed corporate investment is more 
complicated. First, it is assumed that an equity-financed investment at the household level 
yields a before-tax rate of return equal to ρ . The household’s after-tax real rate of return s  
on savings in equity then depends on ρ  and on the household’s and the saving vehicle’s tax 
treatment (section 2.4.2, section 2.4.3 and section 2.5). 
However, households put their savings in an asset only if it yields at least the same s  as 
debt. Households require an after-tax real rate of return on the equity-financed investment 
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equitys  equal to the after-tax real opportunity return that could be earned if the investment 
would be financed with debt debts . This arbitrage behaviour permits the derivation of the cost 
of capital on equity-financed investment as a function of r  (and possibly π ). Moreover, the 
cost of capital depends on τ  (section 2.3.1), on the tax treatment of depreciation (section 
2.3.2), and on the household’s and the saving vehicle’s tax treatment (section 2.4.2, section 
2.4.3 and section 2.5).  
 
Arbitrage strategies 
For a given saving strategy, the household that invests in equity requires the after-tax real 
rate of return on debt. The household that directly invests in corporate equity requires the 
after-tax return on a direct investment in debt, which is referred to as the traditional 
opportunity return. In case of indirect household savings in equity through an intermediary 
(pension fund or mutual fund), the rate of return on an equity-financed investment is linked to 
the rate of return on a debt-financed investment through the same saving vehicle.  
Households save for a pension through a pension fund. Contributions to the fund can be 
deducted from the household’s taxable personal income. The pension, however, is taxed 
under the personal income tax. In order to avoid the personal income tax on direct household 
savings, the household may save through a mutual fund as well. Because the fund retains 
the earnings on corporate investments, the earnings are taxed at the mutual fund’s tax rate, 
which is lower than the personal income tax rate. Consequently, an indirect investment in a 
pension fund or a mutual fund might save tax.  
Saving through a mutual fund is an alternative to direct household savings, as opposed to 
saving for a pension that is received only at retirement. As a result, the investment in debt 
through a mutual fund is referred to as the innovative opportunity return. 
The after-tax return on equity-financed investment in owner-occupied housing, in a closely-
held corporation and in a proprietorship is linked to the traditional or to the innovative 
opportunity return. 
 
Marginal effective tax rates 
The tax wedge w  is the difference between p  and s . The marginal effective tax rate equals 
p
sp
te
−
=  1.  
 
Structure of the chapter 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Given the household’s before-tax 
nominal rate of return, section 2.3 focuses on the cost of capital on debt-financed and equity-
financed investment in the corporate firm. Sections 2.4 and 2.5 then determine the 
household’s after-tax real rate of return on the corporate investment. Direct investment is 
                                                 
1 The corporate marginal effective tax rate 
p
ptc
)( πρ −−
=  measures the tax burden at the firm level. 
Similarly, the marginal effective tax rate at the household level 
)(
)(
πρ
πρ
−
−−
=
sth  measures the tax 
burden at the household level. et  satisfies )1( chce tttt −+= . 
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financed with debt, newly issued equity or retained earnings in section 2.4. Households 
invest indirectly in the firm through a mutual fund or a pension fund in section 2.5.  
Taxes on the closely-held corporation and the proprietorship deviate from the taxes on the 
corporate firm. Section 2.6 discusses the controlling shareholder’s after-tax real rate of return 
on the investment financed with newly issued equity or retained earnings. Section 2.7 
discusses the p  and s  on a debt and an equity-financed investment in the proprietorship. 
Section 2.8 derives the cost of capital and the marginal effective tax rates in case of 
declining-balance economic depreciation at replacement costs. The analysis focuses on 
more general depreciation allowances as well.  
Section 2.9 focuses on a debt-financed and an equity-financed investment in owner-occupied 
housing. An expression for the financial gain is derived if the household prefers to finance 
investment with borrowed funds.  
Finally, section 2.10 discusses the fixed- r  assumption. The shortcomings of this chapter’s 
method are analysed, which leads to suggestions for an alternative method. 
 
 
2.3 Investment in the corporate firm 
This section studies the cost of capital of debt-financed and equity-financed investments in a 
corporate firm. Section 2.3.1 establishes the link between the firm’s nominal discount rate bρ  
and the before-tax real rate of return p . Section 2.3.2 discusses the tax treatment of 
depreciation. Given the deduction of interest payments from taxable earnings, section 2.3.3 
establishes the link between bρ  and ρ . 
 
2.3.1 The cost of capital 
The net present value of the corporate firm's investment V  amounts to 
 
(2.1) [ ]∫∞
=
−+−
⋅−+−+−+−=
0
)())(1()1(
t
t
c dtewpABV
b πδρδτ . 
 
In every period the firm earns a real return δ+p , which is the sum of the investment’s pre-
tax real return p  and a return to pay for the depreciation δ  of the investment. The total 
return δ+p  is taxed at the corporate tax rate τ . The firm pays a local property tax cw  on the 
value of the asset in every period. The value of the asset (and therefore the return the 
investment generates) increases at the rate of inflation π , drops in value at the rate of 
depreciation δ  and is discounted at the rate bρ . τ , π  and δ  are assumed to be constant 
over time. 
 
The cost of the project is unity, which equals the initial payment for the asset, net of the 
present discounted value of any grants and/or tax allowances A . Tax authorities levy a tax 
on the value of the newly attracted source of finance sft , and levy a transaction tax pt  when 
the firm buys real property. These taxes psf ttB +=  increase the project’s cost. 
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For any given discount rate bρ , the value of p  that solves 0=V  is the pre-tax real rate of 
return (cost of capital) that the project must earn in order to be undertaken:  
 
(2.2) ( ) δ
τ
πδρ
τ
−
−
+−+
−
−+
=
)1()1(
)1( cb wABp . 
 
The firm’s discount rate can be expressed as a function of the cost of capital: 
 
(2.3) )(
)1(
))(1(
πδδτρ −−
−+
−+−
=
AB
wp cb . 
 
The project generates a cash flow δ+p , which is taxed at the corporate tax rate. After 
paying cw , the investor realises the after-tax cash flow cwp −+− ))(1( δτ . In present value 
terms, the cost of the firm’s project is )1( AB −+ , which permits the calculation of the firm's 
after-tax cash flow per unit cost of investment. The term δ  must be subtracted. π  is added 
to obtain nominal returns. In the absence of taxes, the firm's discount rate amounts to π+p . 
 
 
2.3.2 The tax treatment of depreciation 
The depreciation rate δ , as part of the cash flow, is remuneration for the depreciation of the 
initial investment as a result of production. This remuneration can be viewed as a return to 
offset the cost of depreciation. However, δ  is taxed under the corporate tax. To offset this 
tax, the government allows the firm to deduct the depreciation of the investment, computed in 
one way or another, from taxable earnings. This reduction in corporate taxes, together with 
possible investment subsidies, is represented (in present value terms) by A . Thus, A  
represents the present discounted value of grants and/or tax allowances given by the 
government: gffAfA d 321 ++= τ . 
 
1. dAf1  represents the net present value of the reduction in corporate taxes due to 
depreciation allowances. 1f  denotes the proportion of the cost of an asset that is 
entitled to depreciation allowances. dA  represents the net present value of tax 
savings on a unit of investment2. 
2. τ2f  represents the tax gain as a result of immediate expensing or free depreciation. 
2f  denotes the proportion of the cost of the project qualifying for immediate 
expensing at the corporate tax rate τ . 
3. gf3  represents the investment subsidies. 3f  denotes the proportion qualifying for 
investment subsidies and g  stands for the rate of the investment subsidy. 
                                                 
2 It is assumed that the firm’s earnings are sufficiently large to take advantage of the depreciation 
allowances. 
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The net present value of depreciation allowances in case of straight-line depreciation equals 
L
edte
L
A
b
LL
t
t
d
b
b
ρ
τ
τ
ρ
ρ )1(1
0
)(
−
=
−
−⋅
=⋅


⋅= ∫ . The tax code specifies a lifetime L  for the asset. 
The historical cost of the asset is written down for tax purposes during L  years by L/1  per 
unit in each year.  
The net present value of tax savings on a unit of investment as a result of declining-balance 
depreciation at historical cost at rate a  equals 
b
t
ta
d
a
adteaA
b
ρ
τ
τ ρ
+
⋅
=⋅⋅= ∫∞
=
+−
0
)(  3.  
 
2.3.3 The deduction of interest payments from taxable earnings 
With equity financing, the household's (intermediary's) nominal rate of return before personal 
taxes equals the firm's nominal rate of return after corporate taxes: bρρ = .  
In case of debt financing, the firm can deduct the interest payments from its taxable earnings. 
Because no corporate taxes have to be paid on distributed interest payments, ρ  can be 
expressed as  
 
(2.4) 
)1()1( τ
ρρ
τ
τρρτρρρ
−
=
−
+=+=
bb
bb or . 
 
Per percentage of bρ , the government implicitly pays the household or intermediary an extra 
)1/( ττ −  percentage, as a result of the interest deductibility.  
 
 
 
2.4 Direct household savings in the corporate firm 
Given the nominal interest rate and the shareholder’s before-tax nominal rate of return, this 
section derives the household’s after-tax real rate of return of direct investment in the 
corporate firm. The household finances investment with debt in section 2.4.1. Investment is 
financed with newly issued equity in section 2.4.2 and with retained earnings in section 2.4.3. 
 
2.4.1 Debt 
The net present value V  of direct household investment in debt amounts to   
 
(2.5) dnedtetrteV
n
nt
n
t
wy
n HH∫ ∫∞
=
−−
=
−




+−+−+−=
0 0
1)))(1((1 ρρλ πλ . 
                                                 
3 If declining-balance depreciation allowances are computed at replacement cost, the net present 
value of tax savings on a unit of investment due to depreciation at rate a  equals 
πρ
τ
τ πρ
−+
⋅
=⋅⋅= ∫∞
=
−+−
b
t
ta
d a
adteaA
b
0
)( . The depreciation allowances increase with the inflation rate 
because replacing the asset becomes more expensive over time. 
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In the first period, the household buys a bond at the price of 1 euro. This investment yields in 
every period a return equal to the nominal interest rate π+r , which is taxed under the 
income tax. Consequently, in every period the household receives after-tax income equal to 
))(1( π+− rt y . The bond of 1 euro increases the wealth of the household. The household 
therefore pays every year a wealth tax wt . After n  periods, the household sells its bond (or 
the bond expires) and recovers the original investment4. The traditional household’s s  can 
be expressed as5 
 
(2.6) ππ −−+−= wy trts ))(1( . 
 
The after-tax real rate of return is equal to the nominal interest rate after income tax, net of 
the wealth tax and the inflation rate.  
 
 
2.4.2 Newly issued equity 
The net present value V  of investment financed with newly issued equity (the return of the 
investment is distributed as dividends) amounts to 
 
(2.7) dnqedteqtteV
n
nt
n
t
wy
n HH∫ ∫∞
=
−−
=
−




+−−+−=
0 0
))1((1 ρρλ ρλ . 
 
The household initially buys a newly issued share of the corporate firm at the price of 1 euro6. 
In every period, the household earns dividends ρ , which are taxed under the personal 
income tax yt . The 1 euro of newly issued equity increases the value of the firm's equity by 
q . The household has to pay a wealth tax wt  on the increase in value of the firm's equity. 
After n  periods, the household sells its share and recovers its value q .  
The increase in value of the firm's equity equals the present value of after-tax dividends net 
of the wealth tax on the increase in value of the firm’s equity: 
 
(2.8) [ ]∫∞
=
−
−−=
0
)1(
t
t
wy dteqttq H
ρρ . 
                                                 
4 It is assumed that the household’s holding period of the asset follows an exponential distribution with 
parameter λ , where λ/1  represents the expected holding period. 
5 0=V  in (2.5) is solved for the household’s after-tax nominal rate of return wyH trt −+−= ))(1( πρ . 
Because πρ −= Hs , (2.6) follows immediately. 
6 Hρ  can be interpreted as the (required) rate of return on an ‘alternative’ investment that makes the 
household indifferent between the firm’s project and the alternative investment. Instead of buying 
newly issued equity, the household can invest its funds in the alternative investment. This opportunity 
investment yields a stream of benefits equal to dnedtee
n
nt
n
t
H
n HH∫ ∫∞
=
−−
=
−




⋅+
0 0
1 ρρλ ρλ , which equals 1. 
The cost of the investment financed with newly issued equity thus equals 1 euro.  
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The household's after-tax real rate of return and the increase in value of the firm's equity are 
as follows:7  
 
(2.9) 1)1( =−−−= qandtts wy πρ . 
 
Because the return of the investment is distributed as dividends, the household's after-tax 
dividends are equal to the before-tax return ρ  that is taxed under the income tax, net of the 
wealth tax on the increase in value of the firm's equity. q  equals 1 euro because the 
household buys newly issued equity at price 1 only if the value of the firm's equity increases 
by the same amount. 
 
 
2.4.3 Retained earnings 
The net present value V  of investment financed with retained earnings (the return of the 
investment is distributed as dividends) amounts to 
 
(2.10) [ ] dnqetdteqttetV
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Because the investment of 1 euro is financed with retained earnings, the investment costs 
the household only )1( yt−  euro
8. The household receives )1( yt−  euro if the firm distributes 
the profits of 1 euro, because dividends are taxed under the personal income tax (dividend 
tax). If the firm reinvests the retained earnings, it realises in every period a return 
qtt wy −− ρ)1( . After n  periods, the household sells the asset and realises the capital gain q . 
Realised capital gains are taxed under the capital gains tax ct .  
 
The increase in value of the firm's equity q  equals the present value of after-tax dividends 
generated by the 1 euro investment financed with retained earnings net of the wealth tax on 
the increase in value: 
 
(2.11) [ ]∫∞
=
−
−−=
0
)1(
t
t
wy dteqttq H
ρρ . 
                                                 
7 Calculate the integral of (2.8) and solve the result for q  as a function of Hρ : 
wH
y
t
t
q
+
−
=
ρ
ρ)1(
. This 
result is used to solve (2.7) for Hρ  (solving 0=V ): wyH tt −−= ρρ )1( , which implies that 1=q . 
8 The analysis of the cost of the investment is similar to the analysis presented in footnote 6. However, 
the household invests only )1( yt−  euro instead of 1 euro in case of investment financed with newly 
issued equity. Hence, the stream of benefits of the opportunity investment in footnote 6 must be 
multiplied with the term )1( yt− . 
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The real after-tax rate of return and the increase in value of the firm’s equity9 (in the 
remainder of the text, 
H
ct
ρλ
λ
+
 is represented by cT ) amount to 
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q  and s  are linked: s  equals the after-tax real rate of return on the investment distributed as 
dividends, and q  equals the present value of these after-tax dividends. At the margin, the 
household is indifferent between retaining 1 euro of profits and distributing that euro as 
dividends. In case of retention, the value of the equity increases by q , which results in an 
after-tax capital gain equal to ( )qTc−1 . If the profits are distributed, the household receives 
)1( yt− . Hence, dividend taxes do not affect the household’s after-tax real rate of return, but 
are capitalised into the value of the firm's equity. )1()1( yc tqT −=−  can be written as 
 
(2.13) Hywyc tqttT ρρ )1(])1)[(1( −=−−−   11. 
 
The household is indifferent between the rate of return realised when the profits are retained 
and reinvested (left-hand side), and the rate of return realised when the after-tax dividends 
are invested in the alternative project (right-hand side). If the profits of 1 euro are distributed, 
the household will invest the )1( yt−  dividends in the alternative project, which yields a rate of 
return Hρ . The investment project financed with retained earnings will yield a rate of return 
qtt wy −− ρ)1(  (see (2.10)). Capital gains taxes are due on the increase in value of the firm's 
equity. However, a tax on capital gains in the last period at the rate ct  is equivalent to a tax 
on the return in every period at the rate cT . Subtracting the inflation rate from the solution of 
(2.13) yields the household’s after-tax real rate of return of condition (2.12). 
                                                 
9 Calculate the integral of (2.11) and solve the result for q  as a function of Hρ : 
wH
y
t
t
q
+
−
=
ρ
ρ)1(
. This 
result is used to solve (2.10) for Hρ  (solving 0=V ): ( ) wcH tT −−= ρρ 1 , which is used to calculate that 
( )c
y
T
t
q
−
−
=
1
)1(
.  
10 If the average holding period drops to zero: ( ) ∞→⇔→ λλ 01 , the increase in the value of the 
firm's equity reduces to 
)1(
)1(
c
y
t
t
q
−
−
= . An average holding period that drops to zero implies that the 
household realises its capital gain almost immediately. This can be interpreted as if the capital gains 
tax is a tax on accrual, instead of a tax on realisation. 
11 From (2.11): 
H
wy qttq
ρ
ρ −−
=
)1(
. The substitution of q  into ( ) )1(1 yc tqT −=−  implies condition (2.13). 
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2.5 Indirect household savings in the corporate firm 
This section derives the household’s after-tax real rate of return s  on indirect investment in 
the corporate firm. A mutual fund (section 2.5.1) or a pension fund (section 2.5.2)12 controls 
the household savings in corporate debt or equity. 
 
 
2.5.1 Mutual fund 
A household buys a share of a mutual fund that invests in debt or equity. The fund’s earnings 
are retained and reinvested and are therefore taxed at the mutual fund’s tax rate. When the 
household sells its participation in the fund, the return is subject to the capital gains tax. The 
net present value V  of investment through a mutual fund amounts to 
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In the first period, the household buys a share of the mutual fund at the price of 1 euro. The 
mutual fund invests these funds in debt or equity. Investment in equity yields the nominal 
return ρ , and investment in debt yields πρ += r . The tax on the mutual fund mfτ  is due on 
the fund’s earnings. Consequently, the fund will reinvest in every period the return 
ρτ )1( mf− . After n  periods, the household sells its share in the mutual fund. It realises the 
capital gain and recovers the original investment. The increase in value of the asset is taxed 
under the capital gains tax ct . This is represented in the first term in the square brackets of 
condition (2.14). Moreover, in every period the tax authorities levy a wealth tax wt  on the 
value of the asset in that particular period, as shown in the last term. The household’s real 
after-tax return is 
 
(2.15) πρτ
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Taxing the capital gains in the last period at the rate ct  is equivalent to taxing the return in 
every period at the rate 
H
ct
ρλ
λ
+
. Consequently, the effect of the capital gains tax on s  will be 
lower the longer is the holding period. 
 
 
                                                 
12 It is assumed that the return of the intermediary’s investment is taxed irrespective of whether the 
return is received as dividends, unrealised capital gains or interest payments. The intermediary's 
capital gains are taxed when they accrue and not when they are realised. It otherwise introduces a 
difference between the intermediary's investment financed with retained earnings and newly issued 
equity. This additional complexity is not studied here. 
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2.5.2 Pension fund 
The net present value V  of household investment in a pension fund amounts to 
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The household has 1 euro (before income tax), which it saves for a pension through a 
pension fund. Even though the intermediary receives savings of 1 euro, the cost for the 
household equals only )1( dt−  euro because pension savings can be deducted from taxable 
personal income. dt  is the household's marginal income tax rate at the time of saving. The 
pension fund invests in debt or equity. This investment yields in every period a return ρ  
( πρ += r  in case of debt), which is taxed at the pension fund’s tax rate pfτ . After n  years, 
the total return, which equals the original contributions augmented with the return of the 
investment, is distributed and entirely taxed at the household's personal income tax rate yt . 
It is assumed that wealth taxes are due yearly on the value of the pension savings in that 
particular year. The household’s real after-tax rate of return amounts to 
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ρ  in (2.17) is not taxed under the income tax. The household is indifferent between investing 
1 euro for n  years at the nominal return ρ  (after which the entire sum is taxed at the rate 
yt ), and investing )1( yt−  euro for n  years at the nominal return ρ  (no additional taxation 
after n  years). Consequently, the investment in a pension fund is interpreted as if the 
household in (2.16) actually invests )1( yt−  euro, which yields a return ρτ )1( pf− . This 
investment costs the household only )1( dt−  euro. The difference between the cost and the 
actual investment equals )( yd tt − . This additional return )( yd tt −  per unit cost of investment 
)1( dt−  is spread over the asset's expected holding period, which implies that the household 
realises an additional return in every period equal to 
)1(
)(
d
yd
t
tt
−
−λ
. 
 
 
2.6 The closely-held corporation 
Controlling shareholders of a closely-held corporation might transfer highly taxed labour 
income into lower taxed capital income. The tax authorities, in response, tax the return on the 
equity-financed investment in the closely-held corporation at special (higher) rates. Dividends 
and capital gains are taxed, respectively, at the rate cyt  and 
c
ct . Business wealth is taxed 
under the wealth tax cwt  at the personal level.  
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The controlling shareholder can finance investment with newly issued equity or retained 
earnings (the return is distributed as dividends). The real after-tax rate of return and the 
increase in value of the equity are respectively (see section 2.4.2 – 2.4.3) 
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2.7 The proprietorship 
This section derives the cost of capital and the after-tax real rate of return on investment in 
the proprietorship. In contrast to the corporation, the proprietorship is characterised by the 
absence of a legal entity that is taxed separately. Earnings are not taxed at the corporate tax 
rate, but are taxed at the income tax rate of the proprietor syt . A  in section 2.3.2 is 
determined by replacing τ  by syt . B  reduces to pt . The cost of capital amounts to 
( ) δπδρ −
−
+−+
−
−+
=
)1()1(
)1(
s
y
cb
s
y t
w
t
ABp . The proprietor can finance the investment out of own 
funds (equity) or with debt. 
 
 
Debt-financed investment 
)1( sy
b
t−
=
ρρ  in case of debt financing because interest payments are deductible from the 
proprietorship’s taxable earnings. 
 
 
Equity-financed investment 
The proprietor can finance investment with own funds. The net present value of an equity-
financed investment (the return of the investment is distributed as dividends), amounts to 
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The proprietor earns in every period the return ρ  ( bρρ = ), but has to pay a wealth tax swt  on 
the value of the asset. The increase in value of the equity q  as a result of the equity-financed 
investment equals 
 
(2.21) [ ]∫∞
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w dteqtq H
ρρ . 
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The after-tax real rate of return and increase in value of the equity amounts to 
 
(2.22) 1=−−= qandts sw πρ . 
 
 
2.8 Applying the method 
This section applies the King-Fullerton method. It presents values for the cost of capital and 
marginal effective tax rates for declining-balance economic depreciation at replacement 
costs, and for more general depreciation allowances.   
 
• Declining-balance economic depreciation at replacement costs 
In case of declining-balance depreciation at the economic rate of depreciation based on 
replacement costs (and if 0== cwB ), the firm's after-tax nominal rate of return amounts to 
πτρ +−= pb )1( . The depreciation allowance that can be deducted from taxable earnings 
equals the return the firm receives to pay for the depreciation of the asset. Consequently, 
only the pre-tax real return is taxed at the corporate tax rate.  
Table 3 presents the expressions for the cost of capital and marginal effective tax rates if the 
investment is financed with debt.  
 
Table 3: debt financing in case of economic depreciation at replacement costs 
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Table 4 presents the expressions for the cost of capital and marginal effective tax rates if the 
marginal investment is financed with equity.  
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Table 4: equity financing in case of economic depreciation at replacement costs  
 
Direct saving in equity of the corporate firm  πτρρ +−== pb )1(  τ=ct   
Newly issued equity 
)1( τ−
=
rp     
p
tt
tt wyye
+
+−+=
π
ττ )1(  
Retained earnings  
)1)(1(
)(
)1)(1(
)1(
c
yc
c
y
T
tT
T
rt
p
−−
−
+
−−
−
=
τ
π
τ
  
p
tT
Tt wcce
+
+−+=
π
ττ )1(  
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Equity of the closely-held corporation   πτρρ +−== pb )1(  τ=ct   
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• Innovative controlling shareholder 
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Equity of the proprietorship     πρρ +−== pt syb )1(  
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• General results 
Depreciation allowances A  can be written as the sum of declining-balance depreciation 
allowances at the economic rate of depreciation based on replacement costs and an 
additional term A . Hence, A  is the difference between the cost of the investment in case of 
declining-balance economic depreciation based on replacement costs and the actual cost of 
the investment A−1 . If 0== cwB , 
bρ  amounts to 
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The firm’s cash flow, which is taxed under the corporate tax, consists of a return to pay for 
the cost of depreciation. To offset these taxes, the government allows the firm to deduct the 
depreciation of the investment from taxable earnings. This strategy is equivalent to the 
strategy that does not tax the return to pay for the cost of depreciation and gives a cost (tax) 
reduction in the initial period net of the present value of corporate taxes on the return to pay 
for the cost of depreciation. Consequently, the cost of the investment differs from unity in so 
far as the depreciation allowances differ from the allowances in case of declining-balance 
economic depreciation based on replacement costs. The cost of capital equals 
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If 0=A , the return to pay for the cost of depreciation is sufficient to replace the decrease in 
value due to depreciation. Consequently, the cost of capital does not depend on δ . If 0<A , 
the firm has to earn a higher p . In order to receive the return to pay for the cost of 
depreciation in every period tax-free, (2.24) can be interpreted as if the tax authorities levy 
initially an additional amount 0>− A . The firm then actually invests 11 >− A  units. 
 
The general cost of capital Ap  in (2.24) is linked to the cost of capital in case 0=A  ( 0=Ap )  
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The marginal effective tax rates in the general case amount to 
 
(2.26) [ ]
A
Ae
A
A
Ae p
AAt
p
p
t
)1(0
0
τ
δ
−
−−=
=
= . 
 
Because 0=Ap  and 0=Aet  are described in table 3 and table 4, the general expressions for 
the cost of capital and marginal effective tax rate can easily be derived from condition (2.26). 
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2.9 Owner-occupied housing 
Instead of investing in the (closely-held) corporation or the proprietorship, the household can 
invest in owner-occupied housing. The household finances the investment with equity (own 
funds) in section 2.9.1 and borrows funds in section 2.9.2. Given the household’s opportunity 
return s , the analysis discusses the cost of capital. If the household prefers to finance 
investment with borrowed funds, the financial gain is derived as well. 
 
2.9.1 Equity-financed investment 
The net present value V  of an equity-financed investment in owner-occupied housing equals 
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Equity-financed investment costs the household 1 euro augmented with a transaction tax 
(property transfer tax) pt
13. The investment yields a pre-tax real return p  and a return to pay 
for the depreciation of the house δ . The value of the house is increasing at the inflation rate 
π  and is decreasing at δ . Earnings are discounted at the nominal rate Hρ . The imputed 
rental values ( irv ) are added to the household’s income and are taxed under the personal 
income tax yt . Moreover, the value of the asset is taxed under a local property tax cw  and is 
subject to the wealth tax hwt . After n  years, the household sells the house and recovers the 
value (of 1 euro). The household’s after-tax rate of return Hρ  equals 
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Hρ  consists of the cash-flow δ+p  net of the capital taxes on owner-occupied housing, per 
unit cost of investment. The transaction tax pt  is spread over the expected holding period. 
The depreciation rate δ  has to be subtracted. π  is added to obtain nominal returns.   
 
The investment’s cost of capital is the minimum value of the housing services net of 
economic depreciation that the household would have to pay if it were to rent a similar house 
on the market in order to be indifferent between the investment opportunities. If the rental 
costs net of economic depreciation on the housing market are lower than the cost of capital, 
then the household has an incentive to rent a house and invest its funds alternatively.  
 
A traditional household requires that savings yield at least the opportunity return of a direct 
investment in debt (condition (2.6)). The cost of capital amounts to  
 
                                                 
13 Income- and household-dependent government subsidies of investment in owner-occupied housing 
are not studied. 
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(2.29) )()1(}))(1){(1( λδππ +++−++⋅+−+−+= pphwcywypT tttwtirvtrttp . 
 
The household requires its traditional opportunity return14 on the cost of the investment 
)1( pt+ . The capital taxes that are due (personal income tax, local property tax and wealth 
tax) increase the minimum required rate of return. The value of the )1( pt+  euro of 
investment is increasing at π , which decreases Tp . δ)1( pt+  represents the depreciation of 
the )1( pt+  units of investment. The household receives only δ  as part of the cash flow. The 
difference δpt  increases the cost of capital. Finally, the transaction tax is spread over the 
expected holding period, which increases the cost of capital by λpt . This cost of capital can 
be written as 
 
(2.30) )(})1({)})(1({)1( λδπ +++−++++−++= pwphwcpypT ttttwrtirvtrtp    . 
 
The first term represents the real interest rate on the invested amount )1( pt+ . r  would be 
the required real rate of return in the absence of capital income taxes. If the imputed rental 
values are lower than the household’s before-tax opportunity return (nominal interest rate) on 
the invested amount, then the household receives a subsidy on owner-occupied housing that 
increases with the income tax. A similar reasoning holds for the wealth tax. The local 
property tax and the term )( λδ +pt  increase the cost of capital. 
 
 
2.9.2 Debt-financed investment 
The household might invest its own funds in an alternative investment while it borrows to 
finance the investment in owner-occupied housing15. The return on the alternative investment 
is used to pay for the borrowing costs. The present value V  of a debt-financed investment in 
owner-occupied housing equals the gains net of the financing costs:  
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14 In case of an innovative investment in debt through a mutual fund, the cost of capital amounts to 
)()1(}))(1)(1){(1( λδππτ +++−++⋅+−+−−+= pphwcywmfcpI tttwtirvtrTtp , which can be written as 
)(})1({)}))(1()(1({)1( λδπττ +++−+++−++−⋅++= pwphwcmfcmfpypI ttttwrTttirvrtp .  
15 This possible household preference of financing investment with borrowed funds is not limited to 
household investment in owner-occupied housing. It holds for all household savings. 
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The first term reflects the financing costs FC . The household borrows )1( pt+  euro. Interest 
payments have to be paid, but are deductible from the household’s taxable personal income. 
Moreover, the debt can be deducted from the household’s taxable wealth, which reduces the 
yearly cost by dwt . After n  years, the originally borrowed funds must be paid back. It is 
assumed that the holding period of the owner-occupied house and therefore of the loan 
follows an exponential distribution with parameter λ , where λ/1  represents the expected 
holding period.  
The financing costs can be written as )1)(1( FtFC p −+=
16. 
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denotes the financing gains (or losses) and depends on the difference between the 
household’s opportunity return Hρ  and the borrowing costs.  
Hρ  represents the required rate of return on the alternative investment that equalises the 
benefits with the financing costs of an investment in owner-occupied housing17. This return, 
which makes the household indifferent between investing and not investing in owner-
occupied housing financed with borrowed money, amounts to 
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Hρ  consists of the cash-flow δ+p  net of the capital taxes per unit cost of investment. The 
investment of 1 euro in owner-occupied housing costs the household )1)(1( ptF +−  euro of 
own funds that must be invested in the alternative project in order to pay for the borrowing 
costs. After n  years, the household sells the house and recovers the invested euro. The 
difference between the invested euro and the costs of the investment )1)(1( ptF +−  is an 
additional gain (or loss) ))1(( FtF p −− , which is spread over the expected holding period. 
The term )( πδ −  must be subtracted.  
 
Traditional opportunity return 
Because the traditional opportunity return equals the borrowing costs dwy trt −+− ))(1( π , the 
household that requires a traditional opportunity return does not realise a gain (or loss) when 
it borrows: 0=F . The financing costs reduce to )1( pt+ , which equals the cost in case of an 
equity-financed investment. Consequently, this household is indifferent between an equity-
financed and a debt-financed investment in owner-occupied housing. The cost of capital is 
presented in condition (2.29).  
                                                 
16 Hρ  is the return that solves 0=V . The solution of (2.31) with respect to the financing costs 
amounts to 
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)1( , which simplifies to the condition presented above. 
17 The financing costs are written as )1)(1( FtFC p −+= . The analysis assumes that w
d
w tt = . 
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Innovative opportunity return 
It is assumed that the innovative opportunity return of an investment in debt (condition (2.15)) 
exceeds the borrowing costs18. Instead of investing its own funds in the owner-occupied 
housing, the household has an incentive to invest its funds innovatively in market debt and to 
borrow in order to finance the investment. The additional gain reduces the cost of capital on 
the debt-financed investment below the cost of capital on an equity-financed investment. The 
finance gain F  amounts to 
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F  depends positively on the difference between the personal income tax yt  and the tax 
burden on an innovative investment in debt )1( mfcmf T ττ −+ . The cost of capital can be 
solved from (2.32) and equals 
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The investment costs the household )1)(1( ptF +−  euro, which implies that the household 
must invest )1)(1( ptF +−  euro of its funds innovatively in market debt in order to pay for the 
debt-financed investment in owner-occupied housing. Ip  in (2.34)19 can be interpreted 
similarly as the cost of capital in (2.29).  
 
 
2.10 Challenges and conclusions 
In order to study the agents’ tax-arbitrage behaviour, this chapter extends the King-Fullerton 
method. The net present value of the household savings depends explicitly on the costs and 
benefits of these savings over time.  
 
As described in table 2, this chapter’s method assumes a fixed real interest rate. By way of 
conclusion, this section criticises this fixed-r assumption. Alternative approaches (in 
particular the so-called fixed-p or fixed-s assumptions) also suffer from serious shortcomings. 
This section criticises the King-Fullerton method on several grounds. This criticism calls for a 
dynamic finance and investment model. 
                                                 
18 For simplicity, we do not insist that formula (2.14) (and therefore (2.15)) should be adjusted to 
incorporate the fact that, in every period, the household sells part of the innovative investment in debt 
in order to pay for the interest payments on the borrowed amount. 
19 Or: ))(1()()1(}))(1){(1( πδλδππ −+−+++−++⋅+−+−+= ppphwcywypI tFtttwtirvtrttp . The cost 
of capital covers the borrowing costs }))(1){(1( wyp trtt −+−+ π  and the capital income taxes on 
owner-occupied housing. The inflation rate on the borrowed amount is subtracted from Ip  because 
the inflation rate erodes the real value of the mortgage. The finance gain appears in the last term.  
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Fixed-s 
The fixed-r assumption implies that different saving strategies feature different values of s . 
The household then invests only in the lower taxed saving opportunities yielding the highest 
s . Arbitrage at the household level then might lead to an equilibrium outcome where a 
particular saver requires the same s  on all savings (fixed-s assumption).  
In reality, however, households do not save only through the vehicles that offer the highest s  
up to the point where the after-tax rates of return are equalised. One reason is that the tax 
code often restricts the total amount of tax-favoured household savings. Another reason may 
be that these tax-favoured savings imply that the household must commit the savings for a 
longer period, which reduces liquidity. Furthermore, the saver may want to diversify savings 
in order to reduce risk.  
 
Fixed-p 
The fixed-r assumption results in a cost of capital that varies with the source of finance for a 
given saving strategy. This creates arbitrage opportunities for the firm. Competition may lead 
to an equilibrium outcome where the firm requires the same p  on all sources of finance 
(fixed-p assumption).  
Although firms have an incentive to finance the investment entirely with the cheapest source 
of finance, both debt and equity can be observed in reality because of financial market 
imperfections and the desire to reduce the risk of bankruptcy.  
 
International capital market 
Finally, the fixed-r assumption implies that the real interest rate is determined on the 
international capital market. In our formulas, therefore, the cost of capital in case of debt-
financed investment does not depend on Dutch taxes at the household level. The cost of 
capital in case of equity-financed investment, in contrast, depends on the tax treatment of 
Dutch shareholders. A possible justification for this differential approach is that the capital 
market for equity is less internationally integrated than the market for debt. Indeed, equity-
financed investment requires knowledge of the specific circumstances in a country.  
 
Call for a dynamic model 
The King-Fullerton method can be criticised on several grounds. First, the method described 
by King and Fullerton deals only with dividends and interest payments as uses of earnings, 
and abstracts from retentions as a possible use of the firm’s earnings. A method that allows 
for retentions must model the investments financed with these earnings. This requires a 
dynamic model.  
Second, firms do not always have sufficient retained earnings to finance investment. In 
particular, young (newly founded) firms must issue new equity or attract debt. If retained 
earnings are thus the preferred source of finance, young firms must finance the initial 
investment with more expensive sources of finance than older, mature firms with plenty of 
earnings on old capital. Afterwards, however, they can retain the earnings of the prior 
investment and finance additional investment with retained earnings. Again, modelling this 
interaction process requires a dynamic model. 
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Finally, the marginal effective tax rates reflect the firm’s and household’s incentives to 
change their saving and investment behaviour as a result of the capital income tax system. 
The optimal tax-arbitrage behaviour and the effects on the firm’s capital accumulation are not 
explicitly derived, however. Again, analysing the impact of capital income taxes on actual 
investment behaviour requires a dynamic model of the firm’s finance and investment 
decisions. This model will be introduced in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3 
Sinn’s Life-Cycle Model of the Firm 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Sinn (1990, 1991a, 1991b) studies a dynamic life-cycle model of the firm. If retained earnings 
are a cheaper source of finance than newly issued equity, a young firm according to Sinn 
issues only a nucleus of new equity. The return on the investment financed with newly issued 
equity is retained and reinvested. Afterwards, the return on the investment financed with 
retained earnings is retained and reinvested as well. The firm eventually stops investing and 
starts distributing dividends. Sinn's work not only shows the effect of the capital income tax 
system on the cost of capital, but also derives the effect of the differential tax treatment of 
newly issued equity and retained earnings on the length of the internal growth path.  
Sinn shows that the cost of capital of newly issued equity, under some conditions, exceeds 
the cost of capital derived by King and Fullerton. The higher the amount of newly issued 
equity, the lower is the amount of investment that can be financed with the cheaper retained 
earnings. This opportunity cost of newly issued equity should be added to King and 
Fullerton's cost of capital on an investment financed with newly issued equity. Moreover, 
Sinn derives an expression for the cost of capital during the internal growth phase that is not 
derived by King and Fullerton. During the internal growth phase, the return on an investment 
financed with retained earnings is retained and reinvested and is not (as assumed by King 
and Fullerton) distributed as dividends. The cost of capital on an investment financed with 
retained earnings as derived by King and Fullerton is correct only when the firm reaches 
maturity and starts distributing dividends.  
 
Instead of distributing highly taxed dividends, the firm might repurchase its shares. Sinn 
(1991c) studies the effect of share repurchases on the steady-state cost of capital and the 
steady-state value of the firm’s equity. Sinn demonstrates that the cost of capital on the 
marginal investment financed with retained earnings does not change if the tax code allows 
the firm to use a fixed and predetermined percentage of the earnings to repurchase shares. 
However, the steady-state marginal value of capital does increase because highly taxed 
dividends are transformed into lower taxed capital gains.  
 
Also van Schijndel (1986, 1988) studies the impact of corporate and personal taxes on the 
firm’s financial, investment and dividend decisions in a dynamic setting. In contrast to Sinn 
(1991a), van Schijndel focuses on a finite horizon model and assumes that the firm owns an 
exogenous initial amount of equity and debt that is not endogenously determined (as it is in 
Sinn). Moreover, the firm is not allowed to issue new equity. Van Schijndel's dynamic model 
does, however, include debt financing. The analysis shows that if debt is more expensive 
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than retained earnings, the firm finances investment with debt and retained earnings until the 
marginal revenue of an investment equals the interest rate. Afterwards, the firm uses its 
earnings to redeem its entire debt. The firm subsequently finances investment only with 
retained earnings. When the optimal amount of capital is reached, the firm starts distributing 
dividends. Due to the model's finite horizon and the differential tax treatment of capital gains 
and dividends, the firm might find it optimal at the end of the time interval to stop distributing 
dividends and to retain the earnings.   
 
The model presented in this chapter introduces debt and share repurchases in Sinn’s 
dynamic life-cycle model of the firm. As in Sinn’s model (1991a, 1991b), the model in this 
chapter derives the cost of capital along the entire optimal path and determines the optimal 
sources of finance (debt, newly issued equity or retained earnings) and the optimal use of the 
investment’s earnings (dividends, retentions, share repurchases, interest payments or debt 
redemption) throughout the life cycle of the firm. Marginal effective tax rates are calculated 
along the entire optimal path. Moreover, the analysis focuses on direct household saving in 
the equity of the firm and on indirect household saving through a mutual fund.  
The optimal path extends the results derived by van Schijndel (1986, 1988). The mature firm 
distributes dividends forever (because the model features an infinite horizon). Moreover, the 
firm endogenously determines the optimal amount of initial equity or debt-financed capital. 
The firm might issue new equity along the entire path. This extension is essential in order to 
study the effects of the capital income tax system. Moreover, the model analyses the effect 
of taxes on the increase in value of the firm’s equity, interprets the results in terms of the cost 
of capital, and studies the influence of share repurchases.  
 
The firm issues new equity and debt during the initial period. On the one hand, the firm is 
discouraged from issuing new equity in order to take advantage of the cheaper retained 
earnings as a source of finance. This opportunity cost might increase the cost of capital on 
investment financed with newly issued equity above the value of King and Fullerton, as 
demonstrated by Sinn. On the other hand, the firm faces an incentive to issue a sufficiently 
large amount of new equity so that it can invest as quickly as possible. This gain of newly 
issued equity might reduce the cost of capital below the value of King and Fullerton.  
These results are not carried over to debt financing. As long as the investment’s return 
exceeds the interest rate, the firm wants to attract as much debt financing as possible. The 
possibility of financing initial investment with debt allows the firm to accumulate more rapidly 
earnings that can be distributed or retained and reinvested.  
Share repurchases increase the cost of an additional unit of debt, which is a weighted 
average of the present value of foregone dividends and foregone share repurchases. The 
firm might even prefer newly issued equity to debt in the steady state. In the initial period, the 
firm continues to issue a nucleus of new equity. Because the cost of capital of newly issued 
equity decreases with the amount of share repurchases, the firm might decide completely 
against financing investment with debt. Moreover, an increase in the amount of share 
repurchases shortens the firm’s internal growth phase. 
 
Section 3.2 introduces the life cycle of the firm. The model’s solution is then discussed when 
retained earnings are the least preferred source of finance (section 3.3). Section 3.4 explores 
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the firm’s finance and investment behaviour if retained earnings are preferred to debt and if 
newly issued equity is the least preferred source of finance. Instead of directly investing in 
the firm, the household can save indirectly through a mutual fund (section 3.5). Section 3.6 
includes share repurchases in the life-cycle model. Section 3.7 concludes. 
 
 
3.2 The life-cycle model of the firm 
Section 3.2.1 introduces the life-cycle model of the firm. Section 3.2.2 focuses on the steady-
state cost of debt, and studies the firm’s preferred sources of finance. 
 
3.2.1 The model 
As in Sinn (1991a)1, the firm produces output with capital K  as production factor, which is 
assumed not to depreciate. Commodity prices are constant and are normalised to unity. The 
firm's revenue and output are described by the function )(Kf , which satisfies 
0)('',0)(' <> KfKf  and ∞==∞= )0(',0)(')0( fff . The firm finances the investment I  with 
newly issued equity Q , with new debt fS  or with retained earnings. fD  is the firm’s total 
debt. The model allows for a corporate tax on distributed profits dτ  and on retained profits 
rτ . pτ  is the personal income tax on dividends and interest income. Capital gains are taxed 
on an accrual basis. The tax rate on realised capital gains is transformed into an equivalent 
tax rate cτ  on accrued capital gains
2. 
 
As in Sinn (1991a), the firm's financial and investment decisions are determined by the 
(representative) shareholder who wants the firm to maximise the initial value of the shares 
net of the originally injected equity. The shareholder is a price-taker who looks through the 
corporate veil and perfectly foresees all variables in the model. The shareholder can lend at 
the exogenous interest rate r .  
The market value of the shares M  is implicitly determined by the arbitrage condition (3.1). 
The wealth-owners are indifferent between retaining shares at a value of M  or exchanging 
these shares for bonds. This implies that the current net return on shares equals the potential 
net returns rMpθ  from holding bonds 
 
(3.1) rMQmzzm pcc
d
dp θθθπθθ =−++
••
)( . 
 
The left-hand side of (3.1) represents the net return on shares (m  is the price of a share and 
z  is the number of outstanding shares). It consists of three components: ddp πθθ  is the net 
dividend paid out to shareholders, czm θ
•
 is the capital gain from the existing stock of shares 
                                                 
1 The model's notation is borrowed from Sinn (1987). Optimal control theory is used to solve the model 
analytically. The solution procedure of van Loon (1983) is used (see appendix B), as applied in van 
Schijndel (1986, 1988), van Hilten et al (1993) and Kari (1999).  
2 dτ−1  is represented by dθ . A similar notation applies to the taxes rτ , pτ  and cτ . 
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net of the capital gains tax, and cQmz θ)( −
•
 represents the net-of-tax capital gain from 
issuing new shares at a price below the market value.  
The gross dividends dπ  in expression (3.2) consist of the firm's revenue net of the firm's 
interest payments plus the attracted newly issued debt and equity net of the firm's investment 
and the corporate tax on retained profits. It is assumed that the firm’s taxable earnings are 
high enough such that interest payments are deductible from taxable corporate earnings.  
 
(3.2) ))(()( dfrff
d rDKfIQSrDKf πτπ −−−−++−=  
 
The firm's problem is condition (3.3) – (3.11)3. The objective function represents the firm's 
initial period's market value of the shares )( 1tM , net of the originally injected equity. This last 
term equals the first-period invested capital )( 1tK  minus the first-period debt )( 1tD f . The 
capital stock K  and the debt fD  are the state variables. The investment I , the newly issued 
equity Q  and the newly issued debt fS  are the control variables.  
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The change in the capital stock equals the investment IK =
•
, and the change in the debt 
equals the newly issued debt ff SD =
•
. At most, )%100( ⋅α  of the investment can be 
financed with newly issued debt IS f α≤ , where α  is the maximum debt-capital ratio. The 
same condition holds during the initial period: )()( 11 tKtD f α≤ . These conditions imply that 
the debt will never exceed %α  of the capital stock. The amount of newly issued equity is 
non-negative: 0≥Q . This condition prohibits the firm from repurchasing its shares. 
Moreover, 0≥ddp πθθ  excludes negative after-tax dividends4.  
The model’s solution will satisfy three additional conditions that are not explicitly considered. 
The first condition excludes a negative debt 0≥fD . Second, the amount of retained 
earnings should be non-negative: IQS f ≤+ . Finally, 0)()( 01 =≥ tKtK , where )( 0tK  is the 
stock of capital available from the firm's past history, and )( 1tK  is the capital reached at 1t  
after the initial issue of equity and debt. 
 
3.2.2 Preferred sources of finance 
This section determines the firm's steady-state preference relations with respect to the 
sources of finance. Because it is assumed that the firm possesses 1 euro of before-tax 
earnings, the firm can finance an additional unit of investment with debt, newly issued equity 
or retained earnings.  
 
Retained earnings or newly issued equity 
Given values for fS  and I , the firm prefers retained earnings (RE) to newly issued equity 
(NE) (or the other way around), if capital gains are taxed less than dividends: 
 
(3.12) rcdpRENE θθθθ
<
=
>
⇔≈
π
φ
 . 
 
The firm prefers to reinvest the 1 euro of before-tax earnings (which yields rcθθ  after taxes) if 
reinvestment is more profitable than distributing the earnings as dividends (which yields dpθθ  
after taxes) and financing additional investment with newly issued equity at unit cost. Hence, 
the firm prefers retained earnings to newly issued equity if 01 >−
rc
dp
θθ
θθ
. (3.12) then follows.  
 
Retained earnings or newly issued debt 
Similarly, the firm chooses between retained earnings and newly issued debt. The steady-
state cost of an additional unit of debt equals the present value of foregone dividends as a 
                                                 
4 If the firm is allowed to finance the investment entirely with debt 1=α , and if no shares are issued 
until that moment, the founder of the firm collects the firm’s dividends. 
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result of the additional interest payments. Because the foregone after-tax dividends are 
discounted at the after-tax return on debt, the steady-state cost of debt amounts to 
d
p
dp
r
r
θ
θ
θθ
=  euro (see appendix C). The debtholder, in present value terms, is repaid the 
invested funds. As opposed to dividends, the interest payments are deductible from taxable 
earnings, which yields a gain equal to the corporate tax rate on distributed profits dτ . 
Consequently, the decrease in value of the firm’s equity as a result of the additional interest 
payments is equal to dτ−1  euro. The firm then prefers retained earnings (RE) to newly 
issued debt (DF) (or the other way around), given values for Q  and I , if 0>−
rc
dp
d θθ
θθ
θ , 
which implies that capital gains are taxed less than interest payments, 
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Newly issued equity or debt 
The firm in the steady state prefers newly issued debt (DF) to newly issued equity (NE) (or 
the other way around), given the amount of retained earnings and the investment I , if 
interest payments are taxed less than dividends 
 
(3.14) dppNEDF θθθ
<
=
>
⇔≈
π
φ
 . 
 
The firm maximises the value of the current shareholders’ equity. If the firm finances 
additional investment with debt, shareholders can invest their private funds in their 
opportunity investment (market bonds). Shareholders earn not only their opportunity return 
on debt but also the investment’s return above the interest rate, which must be paid as a 
reward for the debt financing. Whether the firm finances the investment with debt or with 
newly issued equity, the shareholder earns a similar before-tax return. Consequently, if the 
steady-state cost of debt is lower than the unit cost of newly issued equity, 1<
p
dp
θ
θθ
, current 
shareholders prefer to finance steady-state investment with debt instead of newly issued 
equity. Condition (3.14) then follows.  
 
 
3.3 The model’s solution if rcdpp θθθθθ ≥≥  
In order to provide intuition that helps to understand the economics of this chapter, this 
section assumes that rcdpp θθθθθ ≥≥ . The firm has an incentive to distribute its before-tax 
earnings and to finance additional investment with external sources of finance. Moreover, 
debt is preferred to newly issued equity.  
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During the initial period the firm attracts immediately the optimal amount of debt and equity-
financed capital and starts distributing dividends. The steady state is characterised by the 
steady-state marginal value of capital and cost of capital. 
 
• The marginal value of capital 
The firm invests until the marginal increase in value of the firm's equity Kq  as the result of a 
unit increase in the capital stock equals the cost of an additional unit of investment, 
 
(3.15) ατ dKq −= 1  . 
 
The firm prefers to finance the additional investment entirely with debt, which costs dθ  euro 
in the steady state. However, the firm is allowed to finance only %α  of the investment with 
debt. Consequently, the firm will have to finance the remaining )%1( α−  with newly issued 
equity at unit cost. The cost of the marginal investment is then a weighted-average of the 
costs of debt and newly issued equity. Condition (3.15) then follows. It can be written as 
 
(3.16) ])1[( αταα dKq −−+=  . 
 
The firm invests until the benefit of the investment Kq  equals the cost, which consists of two 
parts. In present-value terms, the debtholder has to receive back the originally invested α  
euro. The cost of issuing )1( α−  euro of new equity is lower than the originally issued )1( α−  
euro, because the shareholder is entitled to the corporate tax savings due to the deductibility 
of the interest payments from taxable corporate earnings. These tax savings equal the 
corporate tax rate dτ  times the present value of interest payments paid to the debtholder α . 
 
• The cost of capital 
The firm invests until the after-tax return on a marginal investment is equal to the after-tax 
opportunity return on a direct investment in debt rpθ . Because the firm finances %α  of the 
investment with debt and )%1( α−  with newly issued equity, the investment’s minimum 
required before-tax return (cost of capital) )(' Kf  amounts to 
 
(3.17) 
d
rrKf
θ
αα )1()(' −+=  . 
 
The marginal investment financed with newly issued equity yields a return )(' Kf , which is 
distributed as dividends. This return is taxed under the corporate and income tax. 
Consequently, the household's after-tax income equals )(' Kfdpθθ . This investment has to 
yield a return equal to the household's opportunity return rpθ . The cost of capital on 
investment financed with newly issued equity then amounts to 
d
rKf
θ
=)(' . Similarly, a 
marginal debt-financed investment yields a return )(' Kf , which is taxed under the income 
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tax. The household's after-tax interest payments )(' Kfpθ  have to be equal to the opportunity 
return rpθ . The cost of capital on debt-financed investment then amounts to rKf =)(' . The 
weighted-average cost of capital on investment partly financed with debt and newly issued 
equity (condition (3.17)) then follows5. 
 
 
3.4 The model’s solution if dpprc θθθθθ >>  
If dpprc θθθθθ >> , the firm prefers retained earnings to debt and newly issued equity as a 
source of finance. In order to defer the dividend taxes )1( dpd τττ −+ , the firm prefers to 
retain and reinvest the profits instead of distributing them and then financing additional 
investment with newly issued equity or debt. If external sources of finance must be attracted, 
the firm prefers debt to newly issued equity. The solution of the problem consists of five 
successive phases. The capital stock along the optimal path over time is presented in figure 1.  
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5 A similar steady state is reached if interest payments and dividends are no longer taxed under the 
personal income tax, and capital gains are not taxed under the capital gains tax. However, tax 
authorities levy a wealth tax wt  on the value of the equity and debt in every period (as under the tax 
reform discussed in chapter 6). The market value of the shares M  is then implicitly determined by the 
arbitrage condition [ ]MtrMtQmzzm wwdd −=−−++
••
)(πθ . If rd ττ = , the firm is indifferent between 
newly issued equity and retained earnings. Due to the deductibility of interest payments from taxable 
earnings, debt is the most preferred source of finance. The firm immediately attracts the optimal 
amount of capital, which is financed with debt and newly issued equity. The steady state is 
characterised by (3.15) and (3.17). 
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Because a newly founded firm does not yet possess retained earnings to finance investment, 
the firm has to attract external sources of finance during phase I. The firm has an incentive 
to finance the initial investment with debt until the cost of capital )(' Kf  equals the interest 
rate r . Because the firm is allowed to finance only %α  of the investment with debt, the firm 
will also have to issue new equity. The firm will issue only a nucleus of new equity in order to 
take advantage of the cheaper retained earnings as source of finance. Section 3.4.1 
demonstrates that the initial capital stock satisfies 
d
rrtKf
θ
αα )1())((' 1 −+>  if the relative 
share of total product accruing to capital in the (Cobb-Douglas) production function β  is 
sufficiently small. During phase II (section 3.4.2), the firm finances additional investment with 
debt and retained earnings until rKf =)(' . At this point, it is no longer optimal to finance 
additional investment with debt. Subsequently, the firm redeems its entire debt (phase III, 
section 3.4.3) because the increase in value of the firm's equity as a result of the reduction in 
interest payments exceeds the gain of additional investment. In order to defer the taxes on 
distributed dividends, and because capital gains are taxed less than interest payments, the 
firm continues to finance the investment with retained earnings, even though the return on 
the investment is lower than the interest rate (phase IV, section 3.4.4). The shareholder 
realises a higher return if the firm retains and reinvests its earnings than if the firm distributes 
its earnings as dividends and the household invests the after-tax dividends in market bonds. 
The firm invests until the return on the investment is reduced to rKf
rc
p
θθ
θ
=)(' . During 
phase V (section 3.4.5), the firm stops investing and starts distributing dividends because 
the shareholder prefers to invest the after-tax dividends in market bonds. Section 3.4.6 
discusses the optimal path over time. Section 3.4.7 derives the marginal tax burden. 
 
 
3.4.1 Phase I: starting the firm 
The initial capital stock is financed partly with debt and partly with newly issued equity 
because the newly founded firm does not possess retained earnings and can finance only 
%α  of the investment with debt: )()( 11 tKtD f α= .  
 
This section studies the marginal value of capital. The value of the cost of capital is 
discussed if 0=α  and if 1=α . The general cost of capital ( 10 <≤ α ) then follows.  
 
• The marginal value of capital 
The firm invests until the marginal benefit, which is the marginal increase in value of the 
firm’s equity )( 1tqK , equals the marginal cost of the investment. The marginal investment is 
)%1( α−  financed with newly issued equity at unit cost and %α  with debt, which costs more 
than dτ−1 . Consequently, the cost of the marginal investment is higher than 
dd ατταα −=−+− 1)1()1( . The optimal initial investment therefore satisfies 
 
(3.18) ατ dK tq −>1)( 1  . 
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If the firm faces additional profitable investment opportunities, the cost of debt is higher than 
the steady-state value derived in section 3.2.2. An additional unit of debt implies additional 
interest payments, which not only implies a reduction in the earnings that can be distributed 
as dividends, but also implies a reduction in the funds available for investment. The foregone 
gain of the additional investment should be added to the net present value of the reduction in 
distributed dividends, which implies that the cost of an additional unit of debt is higher than 
dτ−1 . Put differently, the gain of an additional unit of debt given the level of investment is 
lower than dτ . 
 
 
• The cost of capital if 0=α  
This section studies the cost of capital on investment financed only with newly issued equity 
0=α . If dividends are taxed less than capital gains (see section 3.3), the firm issues new 
equity until 
d
rKf
θ
=)(' . If capital gains are taxed less than dividends, this result changes as 
a result of two opposite effects. According to the first effect (the ‘internal versus external 
equity-cost’ effect), the firm faces an incentive to issue initially less new equity in order to 
finance investment with the ‘cheaper’ retained earnings. According to the second effect (the 
‘time to maturity’ effect), the firm issues initially more new equity in order to shorten the firm’s 
internal growth phase. The remainder of this section discusses these two effects and 
introduces a condition that determines when the ‘internal versus external equity-cost’ effect 
dominates the ‘time to maturity’ effect. 
 
The ‘internal versus external equity-cost’ effect 
Because dprc θθθθ > , the firm prefers retained earnings to newly issued equity as a source 
of finance. Instead of financing investment directly with newly issued equity at unit cost, the 
firm faces an incentive to postpone the investment until it possesses earnings that can be 
retained. For instance, the firm might wait to invest until it has 



rcθθ
1  of before-tax earnings. 
The additional unit of investment financed with retained earnings costs the household in 
terms of foregone dividends only 



rc
dp
θθ
θθ
, which is lower than the unit cost of the investment 
financed immediately with newly issued equity. As a result of the difference in investment 
costs, the firm will issue initially less new equity in order to exploit the tax advantages. 
 
As pointed out by Sinn (1991a), this preferential tax treatment of retained earnings as a 
source of finance increases the cost of initially issued new equity. An additional unit of 
investment financed with newly issued equity implies that the firm foregoes the opportunity to 
use the cheaper retained earnings as a source of finance. This opportunity cost must be 
added to the cost of capital in case of no-deferral (section 3.3). Consequently, the cost of 
capital on investment financed with newly issued equity might amount to 
d
rKf
θ
>)(' . 
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The ‘time to maturity’ effect 
It takes more time to obtain a substantial amount of retained earnings if the firm issues 
initially less new equity. The firm then requires more time to become mature and to start 
distributing dividends. Consequently, the value of the firm’s equity, which equals the present 
value of the after-tax dividends, declines if the firm issues initially too little new equity. This 
second effect explains not only why the firm does not issue an infinitesimally small amount of 
initial new equity, but also why the firm might issue a substantial amount of initial new equity 
such that the marginal return on the investment is lower than 
d
r
θ
.  
The higher amount of new equity reduces the firm’s internal growth phase. The gain of 
receiving dividends in an earlier stage is an opportunity return of newly issued equity, which 
might reduce the cost of capital below the conventional value 
d
rKf
θ
<)(' 6.  
 
General condition 
As in Sinn (1991a), the pure profit implied by the concave production function )(Kf  is the 
return to a hidden fixed factor of production. Moreover, output is assumed to be linearly 
homogeneous in capital and the hidden factor of production7. ω  is the hidden factor’s partial 
production elasticity, β  is the partial production elasticity of capital and σ  is the Hicksian 
elasticity of substitution between capital and the hidden production factor. A sufficient 
condition for the cost of capital of investment financed with newly issued equity to be higher 
than 
d
r
θ
 is 
σ
βω
θθ
θθ
<


−
rc
dp1  8. 
 
 
Condition on β  
This condition can be expressed as a requirement only on the relative share of total product 
accruing to capital β  if output, in addition to the assumed linear homogeneity, is described 
by a constant-returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas production function, which implies that 1=σ  
                                                 
6 Due to this second effect, it theoretically cannot be excluded that the cost of capital of initially issued 
new equity is lower than the interest rate. It would imply that the firm would not issue new debt. The 
firm would issue only new equity during the initial phase and jump immediately to phase IV, during 
which investment is financed only with retained earnings. However, simulation exercises provided no 
evidence that this actually would occur. 
7 Assume that the firm’s production function (.)F  is linearly homogeneous in its two arguments, capital 
K~  and another production factor N . The assumption of linear homogeneity allows working with the 
production function in intensive form. Consequently, ),~(1)1,
~
( NKF
NN
KF = . Moreover, 
N
K
K
~
=  and 
)1,
~
()(
N
KFKf = . Therefore, output/revenue per unit of hidden factor is written as a function of capital 
per unit of hidden production factor. 
8 The proof, which is similar to the proof in Sinn (1991a), is presented in appendix D. 
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and 1=+ βω . The ‘internal versus external equity-cost’ effect dominates the ‘time to 
maturity’ effect, which implies a value of the cost of capital higher than 
d
r
θ , if β  satisfies 
 
(3.19) 
11
1))((' 1
+


−
<⇔>
rc
dpd
rtKf
θθ
θθ
β
θ
   .  
 
The analysis in appendix E demonstrates that the length of the internal growth phase is 
increasing in β . For a given difference in investment costs 



−
rc
dp
θθ
θθ
1 , the length of the 
internal growth phase as a result of the value of the share of capital should not be too large 
in order for the ‘internal versus external equity-cost’ effect to dominate the ‘time to maturity’ 
effect. If 
11
1
+



−
<
rc
dp
θθ
θθ
β , the effect of the difference in investment costs is larger than the 
effect of the time needed to reach maturity. The cost of capital on investment financed with 
newly issued equity then satisfies 
d
rtKf
θ
>))((' 1
9. However, if it takes very long to reach the 
steady state as a result of the value of β , the firm offers the cost advantage of retained 
earnings in order to move more quickly to the steady state. 
 
 
• The cost of capital if 1=α  
If 1=α , the cost of capital on a marginal investment financed entirely with debt satisfies 
 
(3.20) rtKf =))((' 1  . 
 
As opposed to newly issued equity, debt does not compete with retained earnings. Even 
though retained earnings are the most preferred source of finance, the firm will issue debt as 
long as the investment’s return is higher than the interest rate.  
The firm does not want to wait to invest until it possesses retained earnings. In fact, once the 
firm has obtained retained earnings, they can be used to redeem the debt. In terms of 
foregone dividends, it makes no difference whether the firm uses the retained earnings as 
source of finance or as funds that are used to redeem the firm’s debt. Moreover, both 
strategies imply that the firm will be entirely equity-financed once the debt is redeemed. 
However, immediate debt-financed investment shortens the time needed by the firm to reach 
the stage of maturity. Consequently, the firm has an incentive to issue new debt as long as 
the investment’s return exceeds or equals the interest rate.  
 
                                                 
9 Simulation exercises support this result, except for very high values of β . 
 45 
• The cost of capital if 10 <≤ α  
However, %α  of the marginal investment is financed with debt, and )%1( α−  is financed with 
newly issued equity. Given the condition on β , the cost of capital during the initial period 
satisfies 
 
(3.21) 
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3.4.2 Phase II: internal growth phase (debt and retained earnings) 
During phase II, the firm finances additional investment with debt and retained earnings. The 
firm continues to issue debt because the before-tax return on the investment exceeds the 
interest rate. Because IS f α= , the firm will attract )1( α
α
−
 units of debt for every euro of 
retained earnings. Because the firm owns ))(( fr rDKf −θ  units of retained earnings, I  and 
fS  are equal to )1(
))((
α
θ
−
−
=
fr rDKfI  and ))((
1 frf
rDKfS −


−
= θ
α
α . The firm's profits are 
retained and reinvested. The cost of capital amounts to 
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• Cost of capital if 0=α  
Every euro of retained and reinvested before-tax profits ( rcθθ  euro of after-tax profits) must 
yield the household’s opportunity return rpθ . Because the capital gains can be realised and 
invested in market bonds, the household requires the return prc rθθθ . However, if the firm 
reinvests the retained profits and the return on this investment is also retained, the 
household realises the return 








+
•
K
K
rc q
qKf )('θθ . The direct return on the investment is taxed 
at the level of the firm at the rate rτ . However, the household realises a capital loss (
K
K
q
q
•
 
is negative) because the investment financed with the retention of the return on a prior 
investment yields a return lower than the originally retained return. The increase in the firm's 
market value is then taxed under the capital gains tax. The household's total return (because 
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only rcθθ  euro are invested) amounts to 








+⋅⋅
•
K
K
rcrc q
q
Kf )('1 θθθθ . Given the household’s 
required opportunity return prc rθθθ , the cost of capital amounts to 
 
(3.23) 
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• Cost of capital if 10 <≤ α  
The firm faces an incentive to issue debt because the before-tax return on the investment 
exceeds the interest rate. Put differently, the gain of an additional unit of (debt-financed) 
capital exceeds the cost of an additional unit of debt DK qq −> , which yields an additional 
return 0>
+
K
DK
q
qq  for debt-financed investment. The cost of capital in condition (3.22) takes 
into account this additional gain on the 
)1( α
α
−
 units of debt-financed investment. Compared 
to (3.23), this additional gain decreases the investment's required return that ensures that the 
household is indifferent between an investment in the firm's project and in an alternative 
investment in market debt. Moreover, an increase in α  implies that the cost of capital 
converges faster to r , and that the gain of additional debt converges faster to zero.  
 
 
3.4.3 Phase III: debt redemption 
During phase III, the firm neither invests nor distributes dividends. The firm uses its earnings 
to redeem the debt ))(( frf rDKfS −−= θ  until 0=fD , which might take several periods.  
 
The firm stops issuing new debt because the investment’s return equals the interest rate 
rKf =)('  and because DK qq −= . The increase in value of the firm's equity as a result of a 
unit increase in the capital stock Kq  equals the decrease in value of the firm's equity as a 
result of an additional unit of debt Dq . 
Moreover, it is optimal to redeem the entire debt10. If 1 euro of before-tax retained earnings 
( rθ  euro after corporate taxes) is employed for debt redemption, then the value of the firm's 
equity increases because the firm has to pay fewer interest payments. An additional unit of 
debt costs 0<Dq . Consequently, a unit decrease of the firm’s debt increases the value of 
                                                 
10 The co-state variable πµ  measures the increase in value of the firm's equity if the firm would 
redeem an additional unit of debt. It satisfies 0
)(
>
−−
=
dp
dpDrc
c
q
θθ
θθθθ
µθ π . Debt redemption is 
profitable if 0)( >−− dpDrc q θθθθ . This condition is satisfied because dDq θ−≤  and prc θθθ > . 
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the firm's equity by 0>− Dq . Because the household has to pay capital gains taxes on the 
increase in value of the firm's equity, the gains for the household due to a reduction in the 
firm's debt equal )( Drc q−θθ . The opportunity costs of debt redemption for the household are 
the postponed dividends that otherwise could have been distributed dpθθ . The gains for the 
household when the debt is reduced )( Drc q−θθ  exceed the costs dpθθ , as retained 
earnings are preferred over debt as a source of finance prc θθθ > . Because the gains and 
costs are constant, the firm will redeem debt until fD  is reduced to zero. 
 
 
3.4.4 Phase IV: internal growth phase (retained earnings) 
During phase IV, the firm continues to invest. The investment )(KfI rθ=  is financed only 
with retained earnings. The profits of the investment are retained and reinvested. The cost of 
capital during this internal growth phase amounts to (see also section 3.4.2) 
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In order to defer the taxes on distributed dividends and because capital gains are taxed less 
heavily than interest payments, the firm finances additional investment with retained earnings, 
even though the return on the investment is lower than the interest rate. The shareholder 
realises a higher return if the firm retains and reinvests the earnings than if the firm distributes 
the earnings as dividends and the household invests the after-tax dividends in market bonds. 
 
 
3.4.5 Phase V: distribution of dividends 
During phase V, the firm no longer invests and distributes the profits as dividends, which are 
equal to )(Kfd =π 11.  
 
• The marginal value of capital 
The firm invests until the marginal increase in value of the equity Kq  equals the cost of the 
additional investment, which are the net dividends foregone: 
 
(3.25) 1<=
rc
dp
Kq θθ
θθ
  . 
                                                 
11 In order to continue to defer dividend taxes, the firm can invest in financial capital (market bonds) 
instead of physical capital. Moreover, the firm faces an incentive to buy equity of another firm, even if 
the unit cost of the purchase of this other firm’s share is higher than the increase in value of the firm’s 
equity. In order to defer dividend taxes, the firm faces an incentive to acquire shares of another firm as 
long as the loss is lower than 
rc
dp
θθ
θθ
−1 . 
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If the firm retains and reinvests an additional euro, the after-tax increase in value of the firm’s 
equity equals Krc qθθ . If the firm distributes the additional euro, the household receives after-
tax dividends dpθθ . The firm invests until the household is indifferent between retaining and 
distributing the firm's earnings. Because capital gains are taxed at lower rates than 
distributed dividends, the increase in value of the equity is lower than 1. 
 
• The cost of capital 
During phase V, the cost of capital amounts to  
 
(3.26) rrKf
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The household is indifferent between the after-tax return on the investment financed with 
retained earnings and the return that it realises if the earnings are distributed and invested in 
market debt. If the firm retains 1 euro of before-tax profits, it can reinvest rcθθ  of after-tax 
retained earnings. This investment yields a return )(' Kf , which is distributed as dividends. 
Consequently, the household's after-tax income equals )(' Kfdpθθ . Because the firm only 
invested rcθθ , the household realises an after-tax return dprc Kf θθθθ )(' . Instead, the firm 
can distribute the 1 euro as dividends. The household realises an after-tax opportunity return 
pdp rθθθ  if the dividends are invested in market bonds. The cost of capital, which is lower 
than the interest rate, then follows. 
 
 
3.4.6 Optimal path over time 
Figure 2 presents the change in Kq  with the capital stock over time. During the initial phase, 
the firm immediately attracts IK  units of capital, which are )%1( α−  financed with newly 
issued equity and %α  financed with debt. The increase in value of the firm's equity satisfies 
ατd
I
Kq −> 1 . Afterwards, the firm enters an internal growth phase. Investment is financed 
with retained earnings and debt, and satisfies DK qq −> . At the end of this second phase, the 
firm has accumulated IIIK  units of capital. Moreover, rKf =)('  and DK qq −= . During phase 
III, the firm redeems its entire debt. During the second internal growth phase, the firm 
finances investment only with retained earnings. The firm will accumulate VK  units of 
capital. When 1<=
rc
dpV
Kq θθ
θθ
 (phase V), the firm stops investing and distributes all profits as 
dividends. The marginal productivity of capital is decreasing in K  due to the concavity of the 
production function. Consequently, Kq  is decreasing in K .  
 
If 1=α , the firm’s initial capital stock is entirely financed with debt. The firm initially issues 
debt until rKf =)(' . In fact, the firm issues debt and jumps immediately towards phase III. 
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Hence, the firm will not issue new equity and will not pass through phase II. The firm does, 
however, pass through phases IV and V. If the firm is not allowed to attract debt financing 
0=α , then it issues new equity during the initial phase such that 1)( 1 =tqK . As discussed in 
Sinn (1991a), the firm enters an internal growth phase during which investment is financed 
with retained earnings (phase IV). The mature firm starts distributing dividends when it 
reaches phase V. 
 
Figure 2: 
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The firm’s optimal path depends on the value of the corporate tax on distributed earnings dτ . 
If 0=α , as derived in Sinn (1991a), an increase in dτ  decreases the final phase's value of 
Kq  but does not change the final capital stock (because rKf
rc
p
θθ
θ
=)('  is not affected). 
Moreover, the accumulation process of capital, as presented by the downward-sloping curve 
in figure 2, is not affected and the initial condition 1)( 1 =tqK  does not change. An increase in 
dτ  consequently results in a lower initial capital stock )( 1tK , which increases the total 
amount of capital IV KK −  that must be accumulated over time. Hence, an increase in dτ  
increases the time required by the firm to become mature. These results become less 
important if α  increases, however. If the firm can finance the investment entirely with debt, 
for example, it will attract debt during the initial period such that rtKf =))((' 1  (
IIIK  is not 
affected). The final capital stock VK  will not change and the optimal accumulation process of 
capital (slope of curve in figure 2) is not affected. Consequently, an increase in dτ  does not 
change the accumulation of capital if 1=α . The length of the internal growth phase is thus 
entirely driven by the difference between rcθθ  and pθ . 
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3.4.7 The marginal tax burden 
This section derives marginal effective tax rates along the optimal path of the dynamic 
finance and investment model. The cost of capital p  equals )(' Kf , and the household after-
tax rate of return s  equals rpθ . The marginal effective tax rate et  amounts to 
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Table 1 presents the marginal effective tax rates along the firm’s optimal finance and 
investment path. 
 
Table 1: marginal effective tax rates along the optimal finance and investment path 
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The cost of capital of marginal investment in Phase I (condition (3.21)) exceeds the cost of 
capital in case of no-deferral (condition (3.17)) if the share of capital in the production 
function β  is sufficiently small. In that case, the marginal effective tax rate on marginal 
investment in Phase I exceeds the marginal effective tax rate on investment financed with 
debt and newly issued equity in case of no-deferral. The no-deferral marginal effective tax 
rate is a weighted average of the marginal tax burden on newly issued equity 
)1( dpdet τττ −+=  and debt pet τ= . The weight corresponding to the marginal effective tax 
rate on newly issued equity equals 
Kq
1)1( α− , which represents the )1( α−  units of capital 
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financed with newly issued equity at unit cost per unit of increase in value of the firm’s equity 
Kq . The weight corresponding to the marginal effective tax rate on debt equals 
K
D
q
q )(−
α , 
which represents the α  units of capital financed with debt at cost dDq θ=−  per unit of 
increase in value of the firm’s equity Kq  (condition (3.15)). 
 
The marginal effective tax rate during phase II consists of the taxes on capital gains 
augmented with a term arising as a result of the capital loss on the investment financed with 
retained earnings. The third term reflects the gain due to the permitted debt financing, which 
decreases the marginal effective tax rate. 
The marginal effective tax rate on the marginal investment financed with retained earnings in 
phase V equals the taxes on capital gains. 
Because the marginal product of capital decreases along the optimal path due to the 
concavity of the production function, the marginal effective tax rates are characterised by 
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Link with King and Fullerton 
King and Fullerton introduce a formula (3.29) to derive marginal effective tax rates if the firm 
is allowed to use a combination of different sources of finance. kα  is the exogenously 
determined weight of the thk source of finance (‘ k ’ refers to newly issued equity, retained 
earnings or debt). kp  and kt  are, respectively, the cost of capital and the marginal effective 
tax rate of a marginal investment financed with thk  the source of finance, given that the 
returns of the investment are distributed as dividends. In case of a fixed interest rate, the 
marginal effective tax rate (according to King and Fullerton) amounts to 
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This formula applies only to the marginal effective tax rate during the steady state of the life-
cycle model when the firm distributes dividends. It cannot be applied to derive marginal 
effective tax rates along the optimal finance and investment path. Moreover, the weights kα  
are determined endogenously in the dynamic finance and investment model. However, King 
and Fullerton fix the weights kα  exogenously. Sinn rightly observes that the firm in the King 
and Fullerton method does not minimise the cost of capital across sources of finance when 
the weights are chosen wrongly12 13.  
                                                 
12 If dprcp θθθθθ >> , the firm immediately issues debt until rKf =)(' , and then starts distributing 
dividends and interest payments. If only %α  of the investment can be financed with debt, the firm 
issues a nucleus of new equity and debt if the share of capital β  is sufficiently small. During the 
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3.5 Indirect household saving through a mutual fund 
Instead of directly buying equity or debt of the firm, the household can buy a share of a 
mutual fund that invests in equity or debt of the firm. This firm can distribute (to the fund) the 
return on the investment as dividends or interest payments or it can retain and reinvest the 
earnings such that the firm's equity, which is controlled by the fund, increases. The fund can 
distribute its earnings as dividends or it can retain its earnings. The household can sell its 
participation in the fund and realise the possible capital gains, which are taxed at the 
household level under the capital gains tax ct . In order to avoid the household's income tax 
on dividends, mutual funds have an incentive to retain their earnings instead of distributing 
the fund's earnings as dividends. It is assumed that the mutual fund is taxed on the dividends 
and interest payments it receives at the corporate tax rate mfτ . The fund’s realised or 
unrealised capital gains are assumed to be untaxed at the level of the mutual fund. 
 
Given that the firm anticipates that household savings are controlled by the fund, the firm 
determines its optimal finance and investment behaviour on behalf of the shareholder 
(household) that invests indirectly in the firm. The arbitrage condition amounts to 
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If it is assumed that mfrd τττ == , the firm is indifferent between retained earnings and debt 
as a source of finance. Newly issued equity is the least preferred source of finance. The 
firm’s optimal finance and investment path then consists of three successive phases. Given 
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the cost of the source of finance (in the numerator) and by the increase in value of the firm’s equity Kq  
(in the denominator). 
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1 . The 
marginal effective tax rate of investment financed entirely with equity 0=α  amounts to the corporate 
tax rate in addition to the wealth tax rate per percentage of the cost of capital dr θ . If the investment 
is entirely financed with debt, then the marginal effective tax rate equals the wealth tax rate per 
percentage of the cost of capital r . The firm finances the investment partly with newly issued equity 
and partly with debt. The weights are explained in footnote 12. 
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the condition on β , the firm issues initially a nucleus of new equity and debt. The initial 
phase is characterised by 
 
(3.31) 
dd
rrtKf
τ
β
θ
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1)1())((' 1   and ατ dK tq −> 1))( 1   . 
 
Afterwards, the firm enters an internal growth phase during which investment is financed with 
debt and retained earnings. In phase III, the firm no longer invests, and uses its earnings as 
interest payments and as dividends. The equilibrium is characterised by d
SS
Kq θ=  and 
SS
D
SS
K qq −= . The steady-state cost of capital amounts to  
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3.6 Share repurchases 
This section introduces share repurchases, which are denoted by R , into the life-cycle model 
of the firm. The market value of shares M  is implicitly determined by the arbitrage condition 
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The firm’s gross profits Rd +π  amount to 
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The firm’s dynamic finance and investment problem amounts to 
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   + (3.6), (3.7), (3.8), (3.9) and (3.11) 
 
Condition (3.39) limits the amount of share repurchases. By assumption, capital gains are 
taxed less heavily than dividends, which implies that the firm prefers to repurchase as many 
 54 
shares as possible. The steady-state dividends and share repurchases are then equal to 
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• Preferred sources of finance in the steady state 
As a result of interest payments, the household foregoes both dividends ( %



+ γθ
θ
r
r ) and 
share repurchases (capital gains) ( %
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). Hence, the steady-state cost of debt equals 
the present value of foregone dividends and foregone share repurchases 
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The firm in the steady state prefers retained earnings (RE) to newly issued equity/debt 
(NE/DF) if capital gains are taxed less than dividends/interest payments 
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The firm in the steady state prefers debt (DF) to newly issued equity (NE) if the cost of an 
additional unit of debt is lower than the unit cost of newly issued equity  
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The firm prefers newly issued equity to debt if the tax cost as a result of the additional 
dividends compared to the interest payments pddpp θτθθθ =−  is lower than the tax gain as 
a result of the additional share repurchases prc θθθ − . Consequently, if rcp θθθ > , the firm 
always prefers debt to newly issued equity. However, if prc θθθ > , the firm might prefer 
newly issued equity to debt for sufficiently large values of γ  in the steady state: 
 
(3.43) 
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• The model’s solution if dpprc θθθθθ >>  
Retained earnings are the preferred source of finance if dpprc θθθθθ >> . It is assumed that 
the firm prefers to finance initial investment with debt instead of newly issued equity. The 
optimal path consists of five phases similar to the solution discussed in section 3.4. This 
analysis briefly focuses on the initial phase and the steady state. 
 
Initial phase: starting the firm 
In the initial phase, the firm invests until the benefit )( 1tqK  equals the cost of the investment, 
which is financed partly with debt and partly with newly issued equity. The cost is higher than 
)(1)1( SSDq−⋅+⋅− αα , which implies 
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The debtholder receives back the originally invested α  euro. Because of the α  units of debt, 
the cost of issuing )1( α−  euro of new equity depends negatively on the corporate tax 
savings as a result of the foregone dividends, and depends positively on the additional taxes 
)1( rcrp ττττ −−−  as a result of the foregone share repurchases. The cost of capital satisfies 
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The cost of capital on debt-financed investment equals the interest rate. Because the firm 
foregoes the use of the cheaper retained earnings, the cost of capital on investment financed 
with newly issued equity might be higher than the cost of capital in case of no-deferral, as 
defined in rKf prc
r
dp
r
r θθθ
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γθθ
γθ
θ
=







+
+



+
⋅)(' . The difference between the unit cost of 
newly issued equity and the cost of retained earnings 



+
+



+ γθ
γ
θθ
θθ
γθ
θ
rrc
dp
r
r , which 
represents the foregone dividends and foregone share repurchases, determines the first term 
in the denominator of the condition on β .  
If 
prc
rpd
θθθ
θθτ
γ
−
> , the cost of capital on investment financed with newly issued equity in case 
of no-deferral is lower than r , which implies that the firm will prefer newly issued equity to 
debt in the steady state (condition (3.43)). However, given the condition on β , the cost of 
capital on initial investment financed with newly issued equity is higher than the value in case 
of no-deferral (the cost of capital includes the opportunity cost of the foregone retained 
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earnings as a source of finance). Consequently, even if 
prc
rpd
θθθ
θθτ
γ
−
> , the firm faces an 
incentive to issue debt during the initial phase as long as the cost of capital on investment 
financed with newly issued equity exceeds the cost of capital on debt-financed investment r . 
 
 
Steady state: dividends and share repurchases 
As discussed in Sinn (1991c), the firm finances investment with retained earnings until the 
after-tax increase in value of the firm’s equity equals the opportunity cost of foregone 
dividends and share repurchases 
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At the margin, the household is indifferent between the return on an investment financed with 
retained earnings that is partly distributed as dividends and partly used to repurchase shares, 
and the opportunity return on an investment in market bonds: 
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The cost of capital on marginal investment financed with retained earnings then equals 
 
(3.48) rrKf
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θθ
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Sensitivity analysis with respect to γ  
The cost of capital on investment financed with newly issued equity thus includes the 
opportunity cost resulting from the foregone retained earnings as a source of finance. 
Because highly taxed dividends are replaced by lower taxed capital gains, the possibility of 
repurchasing shares decreases this opportunity cost. Consequently, an increase in γ  
decreases the cost of capital on investment financed with newly issued equity. The cost of 
capital on marginal investment financed with retained earnings does not change, however. 
The firm will thus not accumulate more capital as a result of an increase in γ . Given the 
increase in the initially attracted capital and the constant steady-state capital stock, the 
length of the internal growth phase decreases with γ . 
 
If dprc θθθθ > , and if the firm may use all its profits to repurchase shares ( ∞→γ ), the firm is 
indifferent between newly issued equity and retained earnings as a source of finance. 
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Because the steady-state cost of debt amounts to 
p
rcSS
Dq θ
θθ
−= , the firm prefers equity to 
debt if prc θθθ > . Under these assumptions, the firm immediately attracts the optimal amount 
of capital, which is entirely financed with newly issued equity. The firm will not finance 
investment with debt. In fact, the firm directly jumps towards the steady state that is 
characterised by 1=Kq  and rrKf
rc
p
<=
θθ
θ
)(' . 
If dprc θθθθ > , an increase in γ  decreases the cost of capital on investment financed with 
newly issued equity. Moreover, if γ  becomes very large and if dpprc θθθθθ >> , then the 
cost of capital on investment entirely financed with newly issued equity converges to a value 
that is lower than the interest rate. Under these assumptions, the firm will not finance 
investment with debt during the entire life cycle. 
 
 
3.7 Challenges and conclusions 
This chapter introduces debt and share repurchases in Sinn’s dynamic life-cycle model of the 
firm. The model derives the cost of capital along the entire optimal path and determines the 
firm’s optimal sources of finance and the optimal use of the investment’s earnings. 
The firm faces an incentive to defer the dividend taxes if dprc θθθθ > . As a result, the firm 
issues only a nucleus of new equity. Moreover, the firm faces an incentive to retain and 
reinvest the earnings until rKf
rc
p
θθ
θ
=)(' . The steady-state cost of capital might be lower or 
higher than the interest rate, which depends on prc θθθ <
>
. The incentive to defer dividend 
taxes does not change if the firm finances investment with debt. However, the firm faces an 
incentive to attract debt as quickly as possible until rKf =)(' . The different tax treatment of 
dividends and capital gains becomes less important if the firm can repurchase shares.  
 
The model features a number of shortcomings. The firm’s production is represented by a 
concave function. Capital is assumed to be homogeneous, investment is assumed to be 
continuous and reversible, and production is assumed to be deterministic. Moreover, the 
firm’s equity is owned by one type of shareholder, and risk is not incorporated in the model. 
 
The model can be extended in several ways. The model could allow for technology shocks, 
or could incorporate adjustment costs or financial market imperfections. 
 
Technology shock 
The model could allow for unexpected technology shocks. If an unanticipated technology 
shock enhances the firm’s productivity, the firm might want to issue additional new equity or 
might want to employ its retained earnings to finance the new investment opportunities. If 
retained earnings are the preferred source of finance, then a mature firm will not issue new 
equity if its retained earnings are large enough to finance the new investment. In fact, the 
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firm will take into account not only this year’s available earnings that can be retained, but 
also the earnings in years to come. The problem becomes even more complex if the 
technology shock occurs during the firm’s internal growth phase. The firm might decide to 
wait until it becomes mature before financing the new investment opportunities. However, the 
firm optimally issues debt as long as the return on the additional investment opportunity 
exceeds the interest rate. 
 
Adjustment costs 
Another interesting extension of this chapter’s dynamic finance and investment model is the 
introduction of convex adjustment costs as a result of the installation of new capital (convex 
in the investment). In the presence of adjustment costs, the nucleus theory of the firm allows 
for dividends to be paid during the initial part of the life cycle of the firm. Investing too many 
funds in the same period might be too costly, due to the adjustment costs. Consequently, the 
firm might find it optimal to use only part of its internal sources to finance investment; the 
remainder of the funds will be distributed as dividends. The steady state of the model 
corresponds to the steady state of this chapter’s model even though dividends are distributed 
along the firm’s optimal finance and investment path. The analysis shows that in addition to 
the feasible paths discussed in this chapter, the solution might consist of two additional 
feasible phases. First, the firm might pass through a phase of investment (financed with 
retained earnings) while it distributes dividends. Second, the firm may pass through a phase 
during which investment is financed with both newly issued equity and retained earnings. 
Due to adjustment costs, the firm might not issue the optimal amount of new equity initially, 
but instead spread out the issue of new equity over different phases. 
 
Financial market imperfections 
This chapter’s life-cycle model of the firm assumed that the capital markets function perfectly. 
In reality, however, the firm’s finance and investment behaviour and its distribution policy are 
influenced by financial market imperfections due to adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems in the debt and equity market. The effects of these financial market imperfections 
on the firm’s tax-arbitrage behaviour will be studied in the next chapter. 
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Mathematical appendix 
A. The Hamiltonian and the first-order conditions 
The Lagrangian of the model (3.3) – (3.11) is 
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(A.2) – (A.17) + the constraints (3.5) – (3.10) are the problem’s first-order conditions: 
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From (A.2) and (A.3): λαµ −−= QKq 1  (A.5). From (A.3) and (A.4): 1−+= QDq µλ  (A.6). Moreover, 
from (A.2) and (A.4): )1( αλ −+−= DK qq  (A.7).  
 
(A.8)  
K
Hqrq K
c
p
K ∂
∂
−=



−
θ
θ.
 
(A.9)  
f
D
c
p
D D
Hqrq
∂
∂
−=



−
θ
θ.
 
 
(A.10) is the solution of (A.8). Given (A.2), this condition is written as (A.11) 
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(A.12) is the solution of (A.9). Given (A.4), this condition is written as (A.13) 
 
(A.12)  rqrq dp
c
D
c
p
D θθµθθ
θ
π 



+=



−
1.    
(A.13)  rrqq r
c
prc
DD λθθ
θθθ
=


 −
+
.
 
 
The sum of (A.10) and (A.12), with (A.7) yields (A.14): 
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The firm's initial conditions are 
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The transversality constraints are equal to 
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B. The solution procedure of van Loon (1983) 
This section briefly describes the solution procedure of van Loon (1983) (the actual derivations are 
available upon request). The first step determines the phases, which are characterised by the values 
of f
d SIQ ,,,π . Given the first-order conditions and (for instance) the assumption dpprc θθθθθ >> , the 
second step determines the feasible phases. The third step of the procedure characterises the 
feasible phases, which implies that the values of the control variables, the state variables, the cost of 
capital and the co-state variables are determined (if possible). The next step determines the final 
phase(s), which have to satisfy the transversality conditions. The chain(s) of feasible phases are 
obtained if the LaGrange multipliers, the co-state variables and the state variables are continuous. The 
final step checks whether the first phase of the optimal solution satisfies the initial condition.    
 
 
C. The steady-state value of SSDq    
The derivative of )(tM  with respect to the firm's debt )(tDf , given the value of )(t
dπ , yields  
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The firm distributes dividends in the steady state, which implies 0=πµ . Thus, 
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D. The initial cost of capital: 
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• 1=α  
If 1=α , the firm finances the investment entirely with debt. Because λ  is the gain of an additional unit 
of debt, the firm stops to issue debt when 0=λ . It can be derived that 
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• 0=α  
This section proves that the cost of capital of investment financed with newly issued equity is 
d
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>))((' 1 . 
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Moreover, it can be proven that 
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The remainder proves that 1)( 1 <KqK . The capital stock 1K  is characterised by 
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• Conclusion 
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E. The length of the internal growth phase 
Given that βAKKf =)( , rKf
rc
pSS
θθ
θ
=)('  (condition (3.26)), and under the assumption that the initial 
period’s capital stock satisfies 
d
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θ
=)~(' , the steady-state capital stock and the initial period’s 
capital stock amount to 
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If 0=α , condition (3.5) simplifies to βθ )(tKA
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IK~  as initial condition, the solution of 
the differential equation equals 
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From (E.2), it can easily be derived that (if )dprc θθθθ >   
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This result proves that the length of the internal growth phase is increasing in β .  
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Chapter 4 
Financial Market Imperfections 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The analysis in chapter 2 and chapter 3 assumes that capital markets function perfectly. In 
reality, however, the firm’s finance and investment behaviour and distribution policy are 
influenced by financial market imperfections as a result of adverse selection and moral 
hazard. For instance, firms may be constrained in issuing new equity or attracting debt as a 
result of adverse selection. Firms may also want to distribute dividends in order to address 
adverse selection or moral hazard problems.  
 
In order to study the agents’ tax-arbitrage behaviour and evaluate different capital income 
tax systems, this chapter incorporates some financial market imperfections. The analysis 
thus studies simultaneously the effects of capital income taxes and financial market 
imperfections. 
The first part of this chapter surveys various financial market imperfections and reviews their 
effects on the firm’s finance and investment decisions and distribution policy. Section 4.2 
discusses tax-arbitrage models, static trade-off models, adverse selection and moral hazard 
models. The second part of the chapter integrates some of the financial market imperfections 
surveyed in section 4.2 into Sinn’s life-cycle model of the firm. Section 4.3 studies adverse 
selection in the debt and equity markets. Section 4.4 analyses the ‘traditional’ view of 
dividend taxation. 
 
Adverse selection in the debt and equity markets gives rise to an implicit tax wedge between 
the cost of internal and external sources of finance, which implies a ‘finance pecking order’. 
In the absence of explicit taxes, retained earnings are then preferred to debt, while newly 
issued equity is the least preferred source of finance. Section 4.3 incorporates this ‘finance 
pecking order‘ in Sinn’s life-cycle model of the firm. This ‘finance pecking order’ may be 
similar to the agents’ preference relations with respect to the sources of finance as a result of 
the capital income tax system. The ‘finance pecking order’ then strengthens the ‘tax pecking 
order’. Hence, the firm will issue even less new equity and possibly attract less debt. 
Moreover, the length of the firm’s internal growth phase will grow with the adverse selection.  
 
The ‘traditional view’ in section 4.4 assumes that dividends are valued higher than capital 
gains and that newly issued equity is the firm’s marginal source of finance. The analysis 
studies the effect on the firm’s steady-state investment behaviour. Moreover, a minimum 
dividend constraint is included in Sinn’s model. This analysis demonstrates that newly issued 
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equity is the ‘traditional’ view’s key assumption, while it implies an implicit assumption on the 
firm’s available investment opportunities.  
 
 
4.2 Financial market imperfections: literature review 
This section reviews the literature of financial market imperfections1. Section 4.2.1 (tax-
arbitrage models) studies the interaction between different households/firms minimising their 
tax liability. In section 4.2.2 (static trade-off models), the firm considers capital income taxes, 
tax losses and bankruptcy costs in determining optimal leverage. Agents in the imperfect 
information models have access to different amounts of information, which results in adverse 
selection (section 4.2.3) and moral hazard (section 4.2.4).     
 
4.2.1 Tax-arbitrage models 
Given the capital income tax system, tax-arbitrage models study saving and investment 
decisions of households and firms that seek to minimise their tax liability.  
 
Progressive capital income taxes 
Miller (1977) assumes a progressive personal income tax on interest payments, which are 
deductible from taxable corporate earnings. The return on equity is implicitly defined as a 
weighted average of the return on investment financed with newly issued equity and retained 
earnings, while the return is distributed as dividends or is retained. This return on equity is 
taxed under the corporate tax and under a proportionate household tax. Moreover, 
households can earn a fully tax-exempt return on government bonds. Tax-exempt 
households will want to invest in corporate bonds if the interest rate exceeds the return on 
government bonds. However, additional debt will have to be purchased by households with 
positive personal income tax rates. If firms issue more debt, then the interest rate will have to 
rise in order to compensate these households for the progressive income tax on debt. If the 
interest rate rises above the required return on equity, then the corporate sector will not find it 
worthwhile to issue more bonds and will start to finance additional investment with equity. 
Consequently, at the equilibrium interest rate some marginal investor is indifferent between 
holding equity or debt. The capital income taxes and the available funds of households in the 
different personal income tax brackets determine the equilibrium debt-equity ratio for the 
corporate sector as a whole, but not the optimal amount for a particular firm. In fact, there is 
no optimal debt-equity ratio for an individual firm. Because households seek to minimise their 
tax liability, firms with a low (high) degree of leverage will find a tax clientele among investors 
in high (low) personal income tax brackets. An increase in the corporate tax rate or an 
increase in the proportionate tax on equity will increase the corporate sector’s debt-equity 
ratio. An increase in the progressive personal income tax will decrease the corporate sector’s 
debt-equity ratio. 
Black and Scholes (1974) construct a similar tax clientele effect for equity. Firms with a low 
(high) degree of profits that are distributed as dividends will find a tax clientele among 
investors in high (low) tax brackets on equity income. In equilibrium, there is no optimal 
dividend payout rate for an individual firm.  
                                                 
1 See also Brealy and Myers (1991) and Harris and Raviv (1991). 
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Tax-exempt saving 
Miller and Scholes (1978) argue that there are opportunities for investors to reduce (or even 
avoid) the tax penalty on dividends relative to capital gains. Interest payments that are due 
on the household’s borrowed funds can be deducted from the household’s taxable income. 
Taxes on dividends can be avoided if the interest payments offset the taxable dividend 
income and if the household invests the borrowed funds in tax-free saving opportunities that 
yield a return high enough to pay for the borrowed funds. Consequently, shareholders might 
prefer to receive dividends because the dividend tax can be neutralised. Along the same 
lines, Gordon and Slemrod (1988) demonstrate that tax-arbitrage opportunities strongly 
reduce government revenue from taxing capital income. 
 
4.2.2 Static trade-off models 
Static trade-off models suggest that firms in search of the cheapest source of finance trade 
off the relative benefits and costs of debt with respect to equity financing (Mintz (1995)). At 
the optimal leverage, the firm is indifferent between marginal debt and equity-financed 
investment. Besides focussing on the corporate tax advantage and the personal income tax 
disadvantage of debt, static trade-off models examine tax losses and bankruptcy costs.  
 
Tax losses 
Debt is preferred to equity as long as the corporate tax benefit is higher than the personal 
income tax cost of debt. However, the interest payments might not be entirely deductible 
from the corporate tax base, because the firm’s earnings are low or because the firm 
possesses a large amount of tax shield substitutes for debt (such as investment grants and 
depreciation allowances). The corporate tax advantage of debt is then lost, and the personal 
tax cost discourages the firm from financing the investment with debt. Consequently, the 
optimal amount of debt financing decreases with the available non-debt tax shields 
(DeAngelo and Masulis (1980))2. Corporate tax shields are less likely to be lost in case of tax 
loss carrybacks or carryforwards.  
 
Bankruptcy costs 
A rise in the firm’s leverage increases the probability that the firm goes bankrupt. Creditors 
are aware of the increased probability that they will have to pay the corresponding 
bankruptcy costs (Brealy and Myers). Direct bankruptcy costs are the legal, accounting and 
administrative costs as a result of the firm’s bankruptcy. Indirect bankruptcy costs refer to the 
decrease in expected profits as a result of the increased probability of bankruptcy3. Additional 
debt will be supplied only if the interest rate (as the reward for the additional debt financing) 
increases. The firm finances additional investment with debt until the corporate tax benefit is 
balanced by the increased bankruptcy costs included in the interest rate.  
                                                 
2 See Dammon and Senbet (1988) for a similar model with an endogenous level of investment. 
3 Altman (1984) discusses indirect bankruptcy costs. He explores the higher cost of credit and the 
firm’s costs as a result of its inability to obtain credit or issue securities. He also mentions costs due to 
lost sales because potential buyers perceive that default is likely. Suppliers of materials will deliver 
goods under cost increasing conditions (for instance, cash on delivery). Altman also discusses the 
costs due to management’s preoccupation with staying alive and the replacement and reorganisation 
costs because some employees leave the firm. 
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4.2.3 Adverse selection 
Managers may have private information about the characteristics of the firm’s return stream 
and/or investment opportunities. This gives rise to adverse selection (Harris and Raviv 
(1991)). The market’s perception of the value of the firm and/or its investment opportunities 
may deviate from the management’s information. Managers may use the firm’s capital 
structure in order to mitigate the inefficiencies in its investment decisions as a result of 
asymmetric information. The firm’s capital structure and payout policy may also be used to 
signal the private information. 
 
• Capital structure mitigates inefficiencies 
Asymmetric information may distort the firm’s optimal finance and investment decisions. 
Firms may adjust the way they finance investment, however, in order to minimise the 
efficiency losses due to asymmetric information. Distortions may result from adverse 
selection in either the credit market or the equity market4.  
 
External debt finance 
Adverse selection occurs in the credit market if lenders are unable to discriminate between 
different types of borrowers. Since contracts that are optimal only if offered exclusively to 
high quality borrowers also attract lower quality borrowers, lenders will offer a contract that is 
profitable if all types of borrowers accept. Compared to the perfect information case, firms 
with good (bad) projects have to pay a higher (lower) interest rate in case of adverse 
selection in the credit market. In this way, asymmetric information might drive a wedge 
between the firm’s costs of internal and external finance.    
Jaffee and Russell (1976) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) show that asymmetric information 
may lead to under-investment because credit will be rationed. In Jaffee and Russell (1976), 
all borrowers receive a loan smaller than the one they had asked for, which implies that 
fewer borrowers default. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) model asymmetric information about the 
risk of a project. The maximum interest rate on debt that a firm can afford to pay is lower for 
low-risk firms than for high-risk firms (it is assumed that high-risk firms are willing to borrow at 
high interest rates because their profits are increasing with the riskiness of the project). 
Banks have an incentive to increase the interest rate they ask for as long as the low-risk 
borrowers continue to participate. Because the supply of funds is an increasing function of 
the interest rate, it may well be that (at the maximum interest rate the bank wants to charge) 
the total demand for credit by the firms is higher than the households’ supply of credit. The 
lender will thus deny loans to some borrowers without observing whether each borrower is a 
high- or low-risk type of firm. While Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) assume that different projects 
have the same expected return, De Meza and Webb (1987) assume that expected returns 
differ across projects. The authors show that adverse selection in the credit market might 
lead to over-investment because good projects draw in bad projects. The firm then prefers 
debt to newly issued equity as the source of finance. However, in case of asymmetric 
information about risk (which implies credit rationing, as in Stiglitz and Weiss), DeMeza and 
                                                 
4 A discussion of adverse selection that occurs simultaneously in the credit and the equity markets 
goes beyond the scope of this survey (see Hellmann and Stiglitz (2000)). 
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Webb demonstrate that the firm prefers newly issued equity to debt, and that there will be 
neither credit nor equity rationing.  
 
External equity finance 
In adverse selection models of the equity market, investors who buy the firm’s newly issued 
equity have less information than the firm’s current shareholders. Investors in Myers and Majluf 
(1984) do not observe the quality of the firm. They therefore pay less for shares of good firms 
in order to compensate for the losses that arise when shares of bad firms have been 
purchased. If the true value of the new shares exceeds the price that new equityholders are 
prepared to pay, there is a wealth transfer from the old to the new shareholders. If this transfer 
is not compensated by the investment’s return to which the old equityholders are entitled, then 
the old equityholders lose if the investment is financed with newly issued equity. Myers and 
Majluf show that old equityholders may thus prefer that a firm does not undertake investment 
projects with positive net present value. In fact, issuing new equity is a ‘bad’ signal that the 
firm’s equity is over-valued, because high quality firms will prefer not to issue new equity.  
 
The under-investment problem can be circumvented if the firm finances investment with 
internal funds or risk-free debt. Even (less) risky debt is preferable to newly issued equity. 
Myers (1984) refers to this as a ‘pecking order’ theory of financing. Before issuing new 
equity, the firm should try to finance the investment first with retained earnings, second with 
risk-free debt and third with risky debt. Moreover, the firm faces an incentive to build up 
internal funds during periods in which investment requirements are modest, for instance, by 
distributing less dividends.  
 
Krasker (1986) maintains that investors must interpret larger issues of new equity more 
negatively than smaller issues. He shows that the larger is the issue of new equity, the larger 
will be the decrease in the firm’s stock price. Cooney and Kalay (1993) demonstrate that 
firms with growth opportunities are less likely to be equity-constrained. The market does not 
perceive the equity issue as a ‘bad’ signal, but anticipates a valuable new investment project. 
Greenwald, Stiglitz and Weiss (1984) focus on imperfect information in the equity market but 
perfect information in the credit market. Only low-quality firms will issue new equity rather 
than debt because additional interest payments could cause financial problems for the firm. 
The market, which realises that firms that issue new equity are of low quality, reacts by 
decreasing the market value of the shares.  
 
Some authors cast doubt on the Myers and Majluf finance pecking order. Brennan and Kraus 
(1987), Constantinides and Grundy (1989) and Noe (1988) show that firms do not necessarily 
prefer to issue debt rather than equity, and that the under-investment problem can be resolved 
through signalling with a richer set of financing options (e.g. convertible bonds). 
 
• Signalling private information 
The firm might use its capital structure and dividend policy to signal private information to 
outsiders. This signal prevents low-value firms from mimicking high-value firms because 
signalling imposes higher costs on the lower value firms, which thus do not signal. The 
review focuses on signalling through the capital structure and the firm’s distribution policy. 
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Signalling through the capital structure 
In Ross (1977), managers’ compensation depends positively on the market valuation of the 
firm. The managers are penalised in case of bankruptcy. The debt level is used as a signal of 
the firm’s quality. Low-quality firms do not increase the debt level in order to imitate high-
quality firms because the higher debt level heightens the probability of bankruptcy. Profitable 
firms are thus more likely to issue debt. In Leland and Pyle (1977), managers are risk-averse 
and therefore prefer to finance investment with newly issued equity. However, managers can 
signal the high quality of their project by financing part of the investment with own funds. The 
debt level may also signal project quality, because an increase in leverage allows managers 
to retain a larger proportion of the firm’s equity. Kale and Noe (1991) study the firm’s finance 
decision under asymmetric information regarding the quality of the firm’s investment 
opportunities. The authors derive the required tax advantage of debt with respect to equity 
such that high-quality firms issue equity, and low-quality firms issue debt (as opposed to 
Myers’ (1984) pecking order). Low-quality firms will not mimic high-quality firms because the 
tax advantages of debt are higher than the mispricing gains of issuing overvalued equity. 
High-quality firms will issue equity because the tax benefits of debt are lower than the cost of 
the increased interest rate (which is due if the low-quality firm is mimicked). 
 
Signalling through the distribution policy 
The firm’s payout policy can signal the firm’s quality. The firm in Bhattacharya (1979) 
commits to a certain amount of dividends, regardless of the realised profits. The dividend 
level thus provides a positive signal of profitability. Low-quality firms will not distribute the 
high-quality firm’s large amount of dividends because the probability that the low-quality firm 
cannot distribute these dividends is too high. In Miller and Rock (1985), dividends reveal 
information about the firm’s realised cash flow. A larger-than-expected dividend reveals a 
larger-than-expected cash flow. However, dividends in Miller and Rock (1985) are not 
optimal if dividend taxes are introduced (John and Williams (1985)). 
 
In John and Williams (1985), shareholders might prefer to receive cash. The firm's earnings 
are private information. Given the possible under-valuation of the firm’s shares, the model 
derives the firm’s optimal source of finance (retained earnings or newly issued equity) and 
use of profits (dividends or share repurchases). No dividends are distributed if the firm's 
retained earnings are large enough to finance the investment and to provide the household 
with cash (through share repurchases). If the shareholders have no liquidity needs and the 
firm's retained earnings are too small to finance the investment, it is optimal to sell new 
equity only to the existing shareholders (again, no dividends are distributed). In these cases, 
the under-valuation of the firm's equity is not a problem. However, if the firm’s retained 
earnings are too small (given the stockholders liquidity needs and the funds required for 
reinvestment), both the firm and the shareholders would sell under-valued equity. 
Shareholders and the firm both have an incentive to signal the firm's true earnings in order to 
increase the price of the firm's shares. Dividends will be used as a signal, although they are 
taxed unfavourably. The larger the under-valuation (and thus the larger the gain of a correct 
valuation of the firm's equity), the more dividends will be distributed, as it will be worthwhile to 
pay the cost of the dividend taxes. Dividends are thus distributed only if the shareholders' 
demand for cash on corporate and personal account is higher than the firm's retained 
 69 
earnings. Thus, some firms distribute dividends while others do not. Moreover, some firms 
distribute dividends while they simultaneously issue new equity.  
 
Other authors question the results of John and Williams. Bernheim (1991) argues that the 
model cannot explain why firms simultaneously pay dividends and issue new equity to 
'incumbent' shareholders. If the firm's profits do not change over time, and once the firm has 
distributed dividends in order to signal its type, Allen, Bernardo and Welch (1999) argue that 
the firm does not continue to distribute costly dividends because it has already signalled its 
type. If the market obtains information about the firm's earnings, the potential under-valuation 
problem vanishes. Given the households’ and the firm's need for cash, the firm will issue new 
equity and will use part of the proceeds to repurchase shares instead of distributing highly 
taxed dividends. If the firm's prospects change continuously, dividends will constantly change 
if they are used as signal of profitability. Ambarish, John and Williams (1987) demonstrate 
that, although the firm can signal its quality only with its investment level, it might be cheaper 
to signal with dividends and the investment level at the same time.  
 
Bernheim (1991) proves that dividends might be distributed, even though share repurchases 
are taxed more favourably. A high quality firm signals its type at minimum cost with the 
amount of taxes it pays. The firm's manager controls the amount of taxes by adjusting the 
proportions of (highly taxed) dividends and (lower taxed) share repurchases. In fact, some 
firms will pay dividends and then retrieve a portion of these payments by issuing new equity. 
 
Risk-averse managers in Ofer and Thakor (1987) face an incentive to signal with dividends 
instead of share repurchases, in order to avoid the increase in the manager's undiversified 
holding of his firm's stock. Dividends (share repurchases) are used if the firm is slightly 
(highly) under-valued. The results remain intact in case of different taxes on dividends and 
capital gains. In Kumar (1988), managers face no incentive to reveal fully their private 
information about the firm's productivity (this would induce outside shareholders to invest too 
much, from the manager's point of view). Managers do have an incentive, however, to partly 
reveal their private information using the amount of distributed dividends. Different types of 
firms, within an interval of productivity, will cluster at a corresponding dividend level (which 
implies smooth dividends over time and over firms of similar productivity). 
 
 
4.2.4 Moral hazard 
The firm's decisions are influenced by agency costs (i.e. costs due to conflicts of interest). 
This section discusses shareholder-bondholder conflicts, shareholder-management conflicts 
and shareholder-shareholder conflicts.  
 
• Shareholder-bondholder conflicts 
Shareholders can undertake actions unobserved by the bondholders. This conflict arises 
especially when the firm faces financial problems. Because shareholders attempt to increase 
their wealth at the expense of bondholders, the latter will demand a higher return on their 
bonds. As a result, shareholders may have an incentive to mitigate the conflict with the 
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bondholders. This section examines three types of shareholder-bondholder conflicts: direct 
wealth transfers, asset substitution, and under-investment. 
 
Direct wealth transfer 
Wealth from bondholders is transferred to shareholders if an increase in the distributed 
dividends increases the probability that the firm cannot fulfil its debt repayments. In the 
extreme case, the firm distributes the entire value of the firm as dividends, such that the 
bondholders are left with an empty shell. As a result, bondholders require a limitation to the 
dividends that the firm is allowed to distribute. A direct wealth transfer also occurs if the firm 
issues debt with higher priority than the firm's existing debt level (Smith and Warner (1979)).  
 
Asset substitution 
If the firm is largely debt-financed, shareholders face an incentive to attract additional debt 
financing and to invest these funds in projects that are riskier than was agreed upon with the 
agents who provide the debt financing. Since bondholders are compensated according to the 
risk of the projects agreed upon by the agents, the asset substitution may transfer wealth 
from bondholders to shareholders (Jensen and Meckling (1976)). If the high-risk investment 
turns out well, shareholders capture almost all the gains. If the investment sours, creditors 
bear almost all of the costs. However, if debtholders realise that the firm will invest the funds 
in riskier projects, they will pay less for the firm's debt (in order to pay for the additional 
monitoring costs). The costs of the asset-substitution effect are consequently paid by the 
firm's equityholders. The firm's borrowing costs will decrease, however, if the firm builds a 
reputation of investing only in low-risk projects. In Diamond's (1989) model, the firm improves 
its reputation the longer it does not default on its debt. Mature firms invest only in safe 
projects because they want to avoid losing their valuable reputation (which might occur if 
they engage in asset substitution). Younger firms have built up less reputation and are thus 
more likely to choose risky projects. These firms will have to pay a higher borrowing rate. If 
they survive without default, these firms will eventually switch to safe projects. Diamond's 
results also imply that younger firms have lower leverage. Hirshleifer and Thakor (1992) 
focus on a manager who cares about his personal reputation of being successful. This 
manager will invest in a safe project if it increases his chances of being considered a 
successful manager even though the riskier project might maximise the equityholders’ return. 
The manager's conservative behaviour might therefore reduce the agency (asset 
substitution) costs of debt financing.  
 
Under-investment problem 
If shareholders take investment decisions before debtholders have to be paid, leverage can 
cause firms to under-invest because the gains from the investment must be shared with the 
firm's existing debtholders (Myers (1977)). If the return is higher than the cost of the 
investment, but lower than the sum of the cost of the investment and the sum that must be 
paid back to the debtholders, then equityholders will forego a profitable investment 
opportunity. Debtholders will clearly foresee this agency conflict and will demand a higher 
return, which will make debt a less attractive source of finance. Again, the firm may attempt 
to build a reputation of taking all future investment opportunities with positive net present 
value. This may result in lower borrowing costs.  
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• Shareholder-management conflicts 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) discuss the potential conflicts that arise between shareholders 
and managers as a result of the separation of ownership and control. Managers have an 
incentive to transfer firm resources for their personal benefit, for instance, by consuming 
"perquisites". Managers pay only part of the costs, while they receive the entire gain of these 
fringe benefits. Managers may consequently over-invest in non-pecuniary benefits. Jensen 
(1986) states that firms have an incentive to over-invest (causing their firms to grow beyond 
the optimal size) in order to increase the manager's power. The larger the firm's free cash 
flow is, and the smaller the growth opportunities are, the larger the over-investment problem 
will be. The shareholder-management conflict can be resolved if the firm distributes its 
excess cash flow. Financing additional investment with debt obliges the manager to pay 
interest, which restricts the amount of free cash flow. 
 
In Stulz (1990), the cash flow and investment opportunities become private information of the 
firm’s manager after the initial issue of new equity and debt. The opportunities for deviation of 
funds into (highly preferred) fringe benefits increase with the amount of investment. As a 
result, managers will want to invest as much as possible. If the firm’s cash flow turns out to 
be high, the firm will therefore over-invest instead of distributing the excess cash. If the firm’s 
cash flow is low, the managers will not be able to convince the shareholders that the cash 
flow is insufficient, and the firm will under-invest. Additional initially issued new equity may 
resolve the under-investment problem, but will aggravate the over-investment problem. 
Additional new debt may resolve the over-investment problem, but may also aggravate the 
under-investment problem. This yields an optimal debt-equity ratio. 
Harris and Raviv (1990) assume that managers prefer to continue the firm’s operations, even 
though the firm’s investors might prefer liquidation of the firm. Debt financing may again 
resolve this agency conflict. 
 
If the firm is a take-over target, the manager (in Zwiebel (1996)'s model) voluntarily chooses 
debt financing because it credibly prevents him from investing in bad ('empire building') 
projects. The amount of debt financing and dividends is determined such that the firm goes 
bankrupt if the manager invests in a bad project. A raider will thus find it less worthwhile to 
purchase the firm. The manager voluntarily chooses to distribute dividends and attract debt 
in order to keep control of the firm (take-over defence). Moreover, the better (worse) the 
manager's investment opportunities are (and therefore the lower (higher) the take-over 
threat), the lower (higher) the firm's debt level and distributed dividends will be. When future 
control benefits in the absence of bankruptcy are very large, a small amount of debt (and the 
resulting increase in the probability of bankruptcy) is sufficient to prevent the manager from 
investing in a bad project. The debt and dividend level are thus a decreasing function of the 
future control benefits. Managers from growing firms stand to lose more gains if they lose 
control than do managers of declining firms. As a result, growing firms will have a lower debt 
and dividend level than declining firms. The model uses the optimal path of 'net' debt (debt 
net of retained earnings) over time to explain why firms choose to distribute earnings through 
regular dividends instead of irregular share repurchases (regular share repurchases are 
assumed to be taxed as dividends).  
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• Shareholder-shareholder conflicts 
In Brennan and Thakor (1990), some shareholders are better informed than others about the 
firm's prospects (and therefore the firm's 'true' share price). Because uninformed 
shareholders do not know when or when not to sell (part of) their shares, nonproportionate 
share repurchases may result in a wealth transfer from uninformed to informed shareholders. 
Given fixed costs of collecting information, larger shareholders find it more worthwhile to 
obtain information than do smaller shareholders. As a result, wealth is most likely transferred 
from small to large shareholders. Uninformed shareholders prefer to receive highly taxed 
dividends. Informed shareholders prefer share repurchases. The method of disbursement 
chosen by the firm will be determined by a majority vote of the shareholders. 
 
 
4.3 Adverse selection in Sinn’s life-cycle model of the firm 
In case of adverse selection, new investors may be imperfectly informed about the value of 
the firm and its investment opportunities. The firm might have to sell under-valued new 
equity, or it might have to pay a higher interest rate if it attracts debt. The cost of the external 
sources of finance may therefore exceed the cost of internal funds. As in Myers (1984), 
adverse selection in the debt and equity markets then implies a ‘finance pecking order’. 
Retained earnings are preferred to debt, and newly issued equity is the least preferred 
source of finance. 
Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988a, 1988b) incorporate adverse selection in the equity 
market in an investment model of the firm. In the presence of taxes, the authors demonstrate 
that the lemons premium Ω  demanded by new equity investors increases the wedge 
between the cost of retained earnings and the cost of newly issued equity. Firms will finance 
investment with external funds only if the investment’s q  is sufficiently high. Otherwise, the 
firm’s investment will be restrained by the available internal funds. 
 
In the absence of adverse selection, but in the presence of capital income taxes, section 3.4 
studied the effects of the ‘tax pecking order’, which is similar to the ‘finance pecking order’. 
Retained earnings are tax-preferred to debt, and newly issued equity is the least tax-
preferred source of finance if capital gains are taxed at lower rates than interest payments 
are and at the same time dividends are taxed at the highest rates: dpprc θθθθθ >> . 
 
In order to study the firm’s and household’s tax-arbitrage behaviour in more detail, this 
section introduces adverse selection in Sinn’s life-cycle model of the firm. The firm’s finance 
and investment behaviour is studied in the presence of the ‘finance pecking order‘ and the 
‘tax pecking order’.  
 
Adverse selection in the debt and equity markets further increases the wedge between the 
cost of internal and external funds. The newly founded firm will consequently issue even less 
new equity and debt. However, the firm’s steady-state capital stock and cost of capital are 
not affected by adverse selection. This implies that the length of the firm’s internal growth 
phase is increasing in the lemons premium on equity and debt. 
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The firm will immediately attract the optimal amount of capital if the personal income tax and 
the capital gains tax are replaced by a wealth tax. However, in the presence of adverse 
selection, the firm issues only a nucleus of new equity and passes again through an internal 
growth phase.  
 
Section 4.3.1 derives the lemons premia on debt and newly issued equity. Section 4.3.2 uses 
these premia to extend Sinn’s model and studies the firm’s optimal finance and investment 
behaviour. 
 
 
 
4.3.1 Adverse selection in the equity and debt markets 
This section introduces adverse selection: first, in the equity market and, second, in the debt 
market. This leads to a finance pecking order (Myers (1984)).  
 
• Adverse selection in the equity market 
Initial (incumbent) shareholders no longer want to invest in the firm. New shares are 
therefore sold to others, who are imperfectly informed about the value of the firm. 
Consequently, the market (new investors) has to form expectations about the correct market 
price of the firm's equity. The over- or under-valuation of the firm’s equity is temporary 
because private information becomes common knowledge after the issue of new equity.  
 
Before the issue of new equity, m  denotes the correct market value of the firm’s shares. Due 
to imperfect information in the equity market, the firm issues new equity at the expected price 
per share m , which can be higher or lower than m . Afterwards, the private information 
becomes common knowledge, and shares are traded at their correct (possibly adjusted) 
market value. If the firm issues under-valued equity to new shareholders mm < , the initial 
shareholders’ shares drop in value. In order to compensate for this capital loss, initial 
shareholders pay for the difference between the correct market value and the value paid by 
the new investors 0)( >−
•
zmm  ( z  reflects the total amount of shares and 
•
z  the amount of 
newly issued shares). The return for initial shareholders consists of not only dividends and 
capital gains, but also the capital loss due to the issue of under-valued new equity to others. 
Similarly, if the firm issues over-valued new equity mm > , initial shareholders realise a 
capital gain 0)( <−
•
zmm .  
 
The market value of the initial shareholders’ equity M  (see section 3.2.1) is implicitly 
determined by the arbitrage condition (4.1), which incorporates the additional cost (gain) for 
the initial shareholders of selling under-valued (over-valued) new equity:  
 
(4.1) rMQmzzm pc
e
c
d
dp θθθπθθ =


 Ω+−++ •• )1(    . 
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The new investors pay 
•
= zmQ  for the newly issued equity. The actual cost for the initial 
shareholders is 
•
=Ω+ zmQe )1( . The premium eΩ  then amounts to 
 
(4.2) 0
/
//
<
=
>
−
=
−
=Ω
m
mm
sharevaluexpectede
sharevalueectedexpsharevaluemarketcorrecte  . 
 
0>Ωe  implies that initial shareholders sell under-valued new equity ( mm > ). The possible 
gain for initial shareholders of selling over-valued new equity is studied if 0<Ωe  ( mm < ). 
 
According to Akerlof's (1970) lemons principle, low quality firms drive good quality firms out 
of the market. If the firm possesses debt or retained earnings as sources of finance, high 
quality firms will not issue new equity in order to avoid the costs of selling under-valued 
equity. The market, which anticipates this mechanism, adjusts downwards the expected 
value per share m . More firms will therefore be under-valued and will not issue new equity. 
Consequently, only low-quality firms will want to issue new equity. m  then reflects the value 
of the lowest quality firms, which rules out the case that firms issue over-valued new equity.  
 
Newly founded firms do not possess retained earnings as source of finance, however. The 
firm's retained earnings may be insufficient, for example, to finance additional investment 
opportunities that arise as a result of a productivity shock. Consequently, high quality firms 
may have to issue new equity in order to finance investment, despite the under-valuation of 
the equity (the reasoning abstracts from the possibility of financing investment with debt). 
This cost of selling under-valued equity 0>Ωe  can be seen as an 'implicit' tax on the issue of 
new equity for the current shareholders. Hence, newly issued equity may not only have a 
'direct' tax disadvantage (if dividends are taxed more than accrued capital gains), but may 
also offer an 'implicit' tax disadvantage compared to retained earnings.  
 
Because high-quality firms might decide to issue new equity, the market's expected value per 
share m  can be higher than the value of the lowest quality firm (the market's expectations 
are not explicitly modelled). This might give low-quality firms the opportunity to issue over-
valued new equity 0<Ωe . However, the remainder of the analysis focuses only on the case 
of under-valued newly issued equity 0>Ωe .  
 
 
• Adverse selection in the debt market 
In the absence of imperfect information, high-quality firms may borrow at the risk-free interest 
rate r . Low-quality firms, however, will be charged a higher interest rate rr >* . In case of 
asymmetric information in the credit market, lenders will have to form expectations about the 
quality of the firm. Given these expectations, they will charge the same interest rate to both 
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types of firms. Again, according to Akerlof's lemons principle, this interest rate will drive the 
high-quality firms out of the credit market. Lenders, who therefore anticipate that only low-
quality firms enter the credit market, demand the corresponding interest rate *r .  
 
Due to the preferential tax treatment of debt compared to newly issued equity, however, 
some high-quality firms do enter the credit market. These high-quality firms will have to pay 
the interest rate rd )1( Ω+ ; r  is the risk-free interest rate, and dΩ  is the premium due to the 
adverse selection in the credit market. This premium can be interpreted as an ‘implicit’ tax on 
debt financing. 
 
 
• Finance pecking order  
The cost for the initial shareholders of a marginal investment financed with retained earnings, 
newly issued equity or debt is (respectively) 1, eΩ+1  and dΩ+1  euro. Because 0, >ΩΩ de , 
the firm prefers to finance the investment with retained earnings. Moreover, it is assumed 
that adverse selection in the debt market is less severe than in the equity market ed Ω<Ω  
(for instance, because of the monitoring capacity of banks). Consequently, if the firm has to 
attract external sources of finance, it prefers debt to newly issued equity. 
 
As in Myers (1984), adverse selection in the equity and debt markets then yield a finance 
pecking order ed Ω+<Ω+< 111 ; retained earnings are preferred to debt, and newly issued 
equity is the least preferred source of finance. 
 
 
 
4.3.2 Adverse selection and the life-cycle model of the firm 
Given adverse selection in the equity and the debt markets, this section extends the firm’s 
finance and investment problem, as introduced in chapter 3.  
 
• The model 
The firm maximises the initial period’s market value of the shares )( 1tM  net of the originally 
injected equity. The new investors pay )()( 11 tDtK f−  for the newly issued equity. The cost 
for the initial shareholders5, however, amounts to ))()()(1( 11 tDtK f
e
−Ω+ . The value of 
)( 1tM , which is solved from the arbitrage condition (4.1), represents the present value of the 
after-tax dividends net of the cost to the initial shareholders of the newly issued equity. The 
interest rate rd )1( Ω+  on the firm’s debt decreases the firm’s gross dividends in condition 
(4.5). The firm’s problem amounts to condition (4.3) – (4.11):  
 
                                                 
5 Until now, the ‘initial’ shareholders have referred to the founders of the firm. From this point on, 
‘initial’ refers to the firm’s shareholders just before the new equity is issued. 
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• Preferred sources of finance 
The firm prefers to reinvest 1 euro of before-tax earnings ( rcθθ  after taxes) if such reinvestment 
is more profitable than distributing the earnings as dividends ( dpθθ  after taxes) and financing 
additional investment with newly issued equity, which costs the initial shareholders eΩ+1 : 
 
(4.12) rce
dpRENE θθ
θθ
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   . 
 
In the steady state, debt is preferred to retained earnings if the after-tax dividends per unit 
cost of debt6 are higher than the after-tax capital gains: 
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Debt is preferred to newly issued equity if the lemons premium on equity eΩ  is higher than 
the premium on debt dΩ  net of the corporate tax savings on the debt-financed investment: 
 
(4.14) )1( dd
deNEDF Ω+−Ω
<
=
>
Ω⇔≈ τ
π
φ
   . 
                                                 
6 The steady-state cost of debt equals ( ) ddpddpSSD rrtq θθθθ )1()1()( Ω+−=Ω+−= . 
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• The model’s solution if dpprc θθθθθ >>  and if ed Ω+<Ω+< 111  
This section presents the solution of the firm’s problem (4.3) – (4.11) if dpprc θθθθθ >>  and 
if ed Ω+<Ω+< 111 . These assumptions imply that retained earnings are preferred to debt 
and newly issued equity. If the firm must attract external sources of finance, it will prefer debt 
to newly issued equity in the steady state7.  
 
The solution strongly resembles the optimal path if 0=Ω=Ω de  (see section 3.4). As 
summarised in table 1, the firm finances initial investment partly with newly issued equity and 
partly with debt. During phase II, the firm finances investment with debt and retained 
earnings. When it is no longer optimal to attract debt, the firm redeems its entire debt. During 
phase IV, the firm finances investment only with retained earnings. The firm’s profits are 
distributed as dividends during phase V. 
 
Table 1: the optimal finance and investment path 
 
  
Phase I:  start-up of the firm   NE – DF / retentions – interest payments ( ) ( ))1(1)1()( 1 ddeK tq Ω+⋅+Ω+⋅−> θαα  
 
 
Phase II:  internal growth phase I   RE – DF / retentions – interest payments 
       )(' Kf : see condition (3.22) 
 
 
Phase III:  debt redemption   rrKf d >Ω+= )1()('  
 
 
Phase IV:  internal growth phase II   RE / retentions  
       )(' Kf : see condition (3.24) 
 
 
Phase V:  steady state     RE / dividends   
rKf
rc
pSS
θθ
θ
=)('  
rc
dpSS
Kq θθ
θθ
=  
 
 
 
The firm invests until the marginal benefit Kq  equals the marginal cost of the investment. 
The marginal cost for the initial shareholders of newly issued equity is eΩ+1 . If 0=α , the 
optimal investment financed with newly issued equity satisfies 
 
(4.15) 11 >Ω+= eKq   . 
 
                                                 
7 The analysis also assumes that during the initial phase the cost of capital on investment financed 
with debt is lower than the cost of capital on investment financed with newly issued equity.  
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In the presence of adverse selection in the equity market, the firm issues less new equity 
compared to the perfect-information case 0=Ωe . The cost of initially attracted debt is higher 
than the steady-state cost of debt )1( dd Ω+θ  (see section 3.4.1). Because debt is preferred 
to newly issued equity, the firm finances initial investment partly with newly issued equity 
( )%1( α− ) and partly ( %α ) with debt. The optimal initial investment is then a weighted-
average of the cost of newly issued equity and the cost of debt: 
 
(4.16) ( ) ( ))1(1)1()( 1 ddeK tq Ω+⋅+Ω+⋅−> θαα    8. 
 
During phase II, the firm finances the investment with debt and retained earnings. The cost of 
capital is presented in condition (3.22). The firm redeems its entire debt if financing 
investment with debt is no longer optimal. The cost of capital on debt-financed investment 
equals 
 
(4.17) rrKf d >Ω+= )1()('   . 
 
In the presence of adverse selection in the debt market, the cost of capital exceeds the 
interest rate. The firm attracts less debt, consequently, compared to the perfect information 
case. Moreover, the amount of debt financing is decreasing in the implicit tax on debt dΩ .  
Afterwards, the firm finances investment only with retained earnings. The cost of capital is 
presented in condition (3.24). The steady state is not affected by adverse selection in the 
equity and debt markets (conditions (3.25) – (3.26)).  
 
 
• Conclusion 
Retained earnings are the most tax-preferred source of finance if dpprc θθθθθ >> . The 
lemons premium in the equity market eΩ  increases the cost of newly issued equity. The 
lemons premium in the debt market dΩ  increases the cost of debt. Since the cost of retained 
earnings is not affected, the difference between the cost of external and internal sources of 
finance increases as a result of adverse selection in the equity and debt markets. Retained 
earnings thus become an even more preferred source of finance. 
Because the firm issues less new equity and debt, and because adverse selection does not 
affect the steady-state capital stock, the firm will finance a larger part of the capital stock with 
retained earnings. Moreover, the length of the firm’s internal growth phase is increasing in 
eΩ  and dΩ . In fact, the use of retained earnings resolves the under-investment as a result 
of the increased cost of newly issued equity and debt as sources of finance. 
                                                 
8 This condition can be written as ( ) ( ))1()1)(1(1)( 1 ddedK tq Ω+−Ω+−+Ω+> αταα . The debtholder must 
receive back the originally invested funds )1( dΩ+α . The cost of newly issued equity is lower than 
)1)(1( eΩ+−α  because the equityholder is entitled to the corporate tax savings due to the deductibility 
of the interest payments from taxable corporate earnings. 
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• Wealth tax 
This section presents the solution of the firm’s problem (4.3) – (4.11) if the personal income 
tax and the capital gains tax are replaced by a wealth tax on the household’s savings in 
corporate debt and equity (as under the tax reform discussed in chapter 6). In the absence of 
adverse selection and if rd ττ = , the firm is indifferent between newly issued equity and 
retained earnings. Debt is the most tax-preferred source of finance. The firm thus does not 
enter an internal growth phase, but immediately attracts the optimal amount of capital, which 
is financed with debt and newly issued equity. These results change in the presence of 
adverse selection in the equity and debt markets. The preference relations with respect to 
the sources of finance amount to 
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Solution if 0>Ω>Ω de   
The lemons premium on newly issued equity 0>Ωe  again drives a wedge between the cost 
of newly issued equity and retained earnings.  
If 
d
dd
τ
τ
−
<Ω
1
, then the lemons premium on debt is lower than the corporate tax advantage 
of debt, which implies that NEREDF φφ . The firm issues new equity and debt during the 
initial phase. Afterwards, the firm enters an internal growth phase, during which it finances 
investment with debt and retained earnings. The steady state is characterised by 
 
(4.21) rrKf d
d
SS )1()1()(' Ω++−= α
θ
α   ( ))1()1( ddSSKq Ω++−= θαα  . 
 
If 
d
dd
τ
τ
−
>Ω
1
, then retained earnings are the preferred source of finance ( NEDFRE φφ ). 
The firm issues new equity and debt during the initial phase, and enters an internal growth 
phase, during which it finances investment with debt and retained earnings. When the cost of 
capital amounts to rKf d )1()(' Ω+= , the firm redeems its debt. Afterwards, it finances 
investment with retained earnings. The steady state equals  
 
(4.22) 
d
SS rKf
θ
=)('    1=SSKq  . 
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4.4 The traditional versus the new view of dividend taxation 
Because capital gains are taxed at lower rates than dividends are, steady-state investment in 
the life-cycle model of the firm is financed with retained earnings, and the return is entirely 
distributed as dividends. This steady state reflects the ‘new’ view of dividend taxation.  
 
Exploring the alternative to the ‘new’ view, section 4.4.1 studies tax-arbitrage behaviour 
under the ‘traditional’ view of dividend taxation. The ‘traditional’ view is based on the 
assumptions that shareholders value dividends higher than capital gains and that newly 
issued equity is the firm’s marginal source of finance.  
Section 4.4.2 introduces a minimum-dividend constraint in Sinn’s life-cycle model of the firm. 
The analysis demonstrates that, even if dividends are valued higher than capital gains, the 
steady state of the model satisfies the ‘new’ view of dividend taxation. 
Section 4.4.3 concludes that the results of the ‘traditional’ view are strongly determined by 
the assumption that newly issued equity is the firm’s marginal source of finance. It implies an 
implicit assumption on the underlying production process and the available investment 
opportunities. 
 
  
4.4.1 The traditional view of dividend taxation 
In Sinn's life-cycle model of the firm, the firm issues a 'nucleus' of new equity, after which it 
finances investment with retained earnings. In the steady state, the firm's marginal 
investment is financed with retained earnings, and the return on the investment is distributed 
as dividends. According to this 'new' view of dividend taxation, dividends are considered to 
be the 'residual' use of profits. Because the tax burden on dividends exceeds the tax burden 
on capital gains, dividends are distributed only if no profitable investment opportunities are 
available. However, the 'traditional' view of dividend taxation (see Poterba and Summers 
(1983)) asserts that shareholders value dividends higher than capital gains (which is the first 
assumption underlying the 'traditional' view), despite the tax disadvantage of dividends9. The 
firm will distribute dividends on a regular basis. Because of the firm's high dividend payout 
rate, the firm's retained earnings are assumed to be insufficient to finance investment. 
Consequently, the 'traditional' view assumes that newly issued equity is the firm's marginal 
source of funds (which is the second assumption underlying the 'traditional' view).  
 
Due to the ‘intrinsic’ value of the distributed dividends, the ‘traditional’ view implies that firms 
with a high payout rate have to pay a lower rate of return to shareholders (Zodrow (1991)). 
For instance, Sørensen (1995) 10 assumes that the risk premium on equity p  is a convex 
function in the dividend payout rate ξ . The risk premium decreases with ξ  at a decreasing 
rate 0'',0'),( ><= pppp ξ . Given the assumptions of the 'traditional' view (the presented 
analysis follows closely Sørensen (1995)), the cost of capital )(' Kf  is the solution of 
 
                                                 
9 As noted in section 4.2, dividends may be used to signal private information in case of adverse-
selection problems. Moreover, dividends may resolve the shareholder-management and shareholder-
shareholder conflicts in case of moral hazard problems. 
10 See Poterba and Summers (1985) for a dynamic version of this analysis. 
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(4.23) )(})1(){('1 ξθθθξθξθ prKf dprcdep +=−+⋅    . 
 
The return )(' Kf  on the marginal investment financed with newly issued equity is partly 
( %ξ ) distributed as dividends and partly ( )%1( ξ− ) retained, which yields capital gains. The 
investment has to earn the shareholder's opportunity return, which equals the after-tax return 
on a risk-free investment in debt rdpθ , augmented with the risk premium on equity )(ξp . The 
cost of capital on a marginal investment financed with newly issued equity then equals 
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The firm determines ξ  such that the cost of capital is minimised. The optimal payout rate 
satisfies 
 
(4.25) d
e
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The firm will distribute dividends until the benefit of a reduction in the risk premium equals the 
tax cost of additional dividends. At the margin, the firm is indifferent between distributing 
dividends and financing investment with newly issued equity and retaining and reinvesting 
the firm's earnings. At the firm’s optimal payout rate (given that the firm possesses 1 euro of 
funds), the household is indifferent between newly issued equity and retained earnings as 
the source of finance. Moreover, because the firm’s earnings are replaced with external 
equity, the firm will invest funds until the marginal increase in the value of the firm’s equity 
amounts to 
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Kq  equals the present value (discounted at the rate )(ξθ prdp + ) of the after-tax return 
)(' Kf , which is partly distributed (taxed as dividends) and partly retained (taxed as capital 
gains). Because the marginal return )(' Kf  is presented in condition (4.24), the firm invests 
until 1=Kq  
11. 
                                                 
11 If the personal income tax is replaced with a wealth tax (as under the tax reform discussed in 
chapter 6) and if rd ττ = , the cost of capital under the ‘traditional’ view on a marginal investment 
financed with newly issued equity amounts to 
d
prKf
θ
ξ )()(' += . Because dividends and capital gains 
are taxed similarly, the 'traditional' view implies that the firm distributes all its profits as dividends 
( 1=ξ ). Investment opportunities are then financed only with newly issued equity. 
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According to the ‘new’ view of dividend taxation, the personal income tax on distributed 
dividends (dividend tax) is capitalised in the value of the firm’s equity. Moreover, dividend 
taxes do not affect the firm’s incentive to invest. The opposite is true under the ‘traditional’ 
view of dividend taxation. The dividend tax is not capitalised in the value of the firm’s equity, 
but does influence the firm’s incentive to invest (condition (4.24)). An increase in the dividend 
tax increases the cost of capital on a marginal investment financed with newly issued equity 
and decreases the optimal payout rate (as a result of the increased tax penalty of dividends 
compared to capital gains).  
 
Reconsidering the assumptions of the ‘traditional view’ 
The firm determines the optimal payout rule (condition (4.25)) and distributes dividends. The 
remaining earnings are retained and reinvested. In order to replace the distributed earnings, 
the firm issues new equity as a marginal source of finance. Under the ‘traditional’ view, the 
gains of dividends are directly linked to newly issued equity as a marginal source of finance. 
 
The above discussion implicitly assumes that the firm’s profitable investment opportunities 
are larger than the firm’s retained earnings, which are earnings optimally retained according 
to condition (4.25). In fact, the assumption that newly issued equity is the firm’s marginal 
source of finance implies that the firm’s available investment opportunities are assumed to be 
sufficiently large. 
 
However, the assumption with respect to newly issued equity as the firm’s marginal source of 
finance or, similarly, with respect to the available profitable investment opportunities, is not 
as straightforward as it might seem at first sight.  
Given the firm’s optimal payout decision (which depends on the risk premium and the tax 
differential, but not on the available investment opportunities), the firm’s earnings might be 
too high with respect to the available investment opportunities. Moreover, the firm might face 
a limited number of investment opportunities over time. For instance, if the firm distributes 
dividends according to the optimal dividend payout rule, and if the firm’s remaining retained 
earnings are high enough to finance the additional investment opportunities, the firm will 
reinvest the earnings and will not issue new equity. And even if it has too few retained 
earnings, the firm might find it profitable to postpone the investment until the next period.  
 
The following sections provide additional intuition that the results of the ‘traditional’ view’ are 
strongly determined by the implicit assumption with respect to the number of profitable 
investment opportunities available to the firm.  
 
 
4.4.2 Minimum dividend constraint 
Auerbach (2001) incorporates a minimum dividend constraint in a standard model of a 
representative firm that maximises the after-tax value of the firm’s equity. The earnings of the 
firm’s operations are exogenously given. Auerbach then derives the results of the ‘traditional’ 
view and the ‘new’ view of dividend taxation. The particular outcome depends on the level of 
the firm’s investment opportunities and its cash flow. Auerbach demonstrates that the young 
firm issues new equity because its investment needs are very large with respect to its cash 
 83 
flow. The cost of capital equals the value that reflects the ‘traditional’ view of dividend 
taxation. If the firm’s investment needs are small with respect to its cash flow, the mature firm 
will use its retained earnings to finance investment. The cost of capital then supports the 
‘new’ view of dividend taxation.  
 
Similarly to Auerbach (2001), this section incorporates a minimum dividend constraint in 
chapter 3’s dynamic life-cycle model of the firm. In every period, the firm distributes %ξ  of its 
earnings as dividends in order to signal its quality or to resolve the moral hazard problems. 
The firm's managers may find it worthwhile to signal the firm’s quality because such a signal 
enables the current shareholders to sell their shares at the correct market price and allows 
the managers to issue correctly valued new equity. Moreover, the firm’s managers may 
distribute part of the firm’s earnings as dividends in order to convince the shareholders that 
the firm is not investing in ‘empire building’ projects.  
 
The analysis demonstrates that the cost of capital on a marginal investment financed with 
newly issued equity exceeds the value that reflects the ‘traditional’ view of dividend taxation. 
Given a concave production function, the firm will not find it optimal to keep on issuing new 
equity until the cost of capital amounts to 
rcdp
prKf
θθξθξθ
θ
)1(
)('
−+
= , which is the value in 
case of the ‘traditional’ view. The firm will issue less new equity in order to take advantage of 
the cheaper retained earnings as a source of finance. Even though the firm distributes a 
minimum amount of dividends along the optimal path, the firm continues to converge to the 
'new' view's steady-state capital stock. 
 
 
• The model 
The firm maximises the initial market value of the firm )( 1tM  net of the original injected 
equity, which equals the initial capital stock )( 1tK . The model abstracts from debt as a 
source of finance. In every period, the firm distributes %ξ  of its profits, as presented in 
condition (4.32). The firm’s problem then amounts to 
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• The model’s solution if dpprc θθθθθ >>  12 
This section presents the solution of the firm’s problem if dpprc θθθθθ >> . As summarised 
in table 2, the firm’s optimal finance and investment path consists of three phases.  
 
During the initial phase, the firm issues a nucleus of new equity (see also section 3.4.1). 
Because dpprc θθθθθ >> , and given the condition presented in table 2, the cost of capital on 
investment financed with newly issued equity satisfies 
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Table 2: the optimal finance and investment path 
 
 
Phase I: start-up of the firm  NE / dividends - retentions 
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Phase III: steady state   RE / dividends 
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During the internal growth phase, the firm finances investment with retained earnings. The 
cost of capital is the solution of 
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12 The first-order conditions are presented in appendix A. The feasible phases are characterised in 
appendix B. 
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If the household realises its capital gains and invests them in the opportunity investment, it 
realises the after-tax return rprc θθθ . If the household reinvests the capital gains rcθθ , it 
realises the return as presented on the right-hand side of condition (4.34). %ξ  of the 
investment’s return is distributed as dividends, which yields 
K
dp
q
Kf
θθξ )('  13. )%1( ξ−  of the 
return is retained, which yields rcKf θθξ )(')1( − . The household realises the capital loss 
0<


 •
KK qq , because the investment financed with the retention of the return of a prior 
investment yields a return lower than the original retained return. This capital loss reduces 
the capital gains taxes that are due. Condition (4.34) can be written as  
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In the absence of a minimum-dividend constraint (see section 3.4.4), the cost of capital is 
equal to the right-hand side of (4.35). The cost of capital in (4.35) consists of an additional 
term. It takes into account that %ξ  of the return is distributed as dividends, which are taxed 
at higher rates than capital gains. Moreover, along the internal growth phase, 
dpKrc q θθθθ > .  
 
The payout rate ξ  does not affect the firm’s steady-state capital stock and the steady-state 
cost of capital (see table 2). However, the higher the amount of distributed dividends is, the 
lower are the retained earnings that are available for reinvestment and the longer it takes 
before the firm reaches the phase of maturity. The after-tax value of the firm is therefore 
decreasing in ξ .  
 
4.4.3 The underlying production process 
Newly issued equity is the firm’s marginal source of finance under the ‘traditional’ view of 
dividend taxation. Retained earnings are the firm’s marginal source of finance under the 
‘new’ view. This section concludes that both theories are correct. The firm’s underlying 
production process (and therefore the available investment opportunities) determines 
whether newly issued equity or retained earnings will be the firm’s marginal source of finance 
(in the steady-state).  
 
In the presence of a minimum-dividend constraint in the life-cycle model of the firm (section 
4.4.2), the cost of capital on investment financed with newly issued equity exceeds the cost 
of capital under the ‘traditional’ view. The firm issues only a nucleus of new equity, after 
which it finances investment with retained earnings. As a result of the assumption with 
                                                 
13 This return is weighted by the marginal increase in value of the firm's equity. The higher Kq  is, the 
higher the incentive to reinvest the profits will be, and the lower the relative value of the dividends is. 
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respect to the production process (i.e. a ‘concave’ production function), issuing additional 
new equity is not a feasible solution. If the firm has a limited number of profitable investment 
opportunities (which is an implication of the concavity), it will issue only a nucleus of new 
equity in order to finance the remaining investment opportunities with the cheaper retained 
earnings.  The firm then converges to the cost of capital on investment under the ‘new’ view 
of dividend taxation.  
 
In fact, the firm under the ‘traditional’ view of dividend taxation converges to a different 
steady state. This steady state is driven by the assumption that newly issued equity is the 
firm’s marginal source of finance. Similarly to the concavity under the ‘new’ view, this 
assumption also imposes a condition on the firm’s cash flow and investment opportunities. 
The ‘traditional’ view implies that the firm, in every period, faces a number of profitable 
investment opportunities that demand resources beyond the available retained earnings14. 
The firm must consequently issue new equity to finance the additional investment 
opportunities.  
 
This assumption on the available profitable investment opportunities is a necessary condition 
for the steady-state cost of capital to be equal to the value under the ‘traditional’ view. 
Clearly, a concave production function as assumed in the ‘nucleus’ theory of the firm does 
not satisfy this ‘traditional’ view’s condition (because the concavity implies limited profitable 
investment opportunities). Auerbach (2001) is able to derive simultaneously the ‘traditional’ 
view and the ‘new’ view from the dynamic model based on a dividend constraint because he 
does not impose a specific production function. 
 
This analysis implicitly validates the predictions of both the ‘traditional’ view and the ‘new’ 
view about the effects of a reduction in the dividend tax. The steady-state outcome depends 
on the underlying production function and the investment opportunities of the firm, the 
influence of which is typically not recognised.  
 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
The capital income tax system and financial imperfections simultaneously determine the 
firm’s optimal finance and investment decisions.  
 
This chapter focussed on adverse selection in the equity and debt markets. The lemons 
premium in the equity market increases the cost of newly issued equity. Similarly, the lemons 
premium on debt raises the cost of debt. Adverse selection consequently increases the cost 
of external sources of finance above the cost of internal sources of finance. The finance 
pecking order then strengthens the tax-arbitrage behaviour as a result of the tax pecking 
order (if dpprc θθθθθ >> ). Consequently, the newly founded firm will issue even less new 
equity and debt. Because the steady-state cost of capital and capital stock are not affected, 
                                                 
14 Otherwise, if the firm is able to finance the investment opportunities with the available retained 
earnings, the firm has an incentive to issue only a nucleus of new equity in order to take advantage of 
the cheaper retained earnings as a source of finance. 
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the length of the firm’s internal growth phase increases with the lemons premium on equity 
and debt. Moreover, if the personal income tax is replaced by a wealth tax on the 
household’s savings in corporate debt and equity, then the firm will issue only a nucleus of 
new equity as a result of adverse selection in the equity market. 
 
This chapter also studied tax-arbitrage behaviour under the ‘traditional’ view of dividend 
taxation. The analysis demonstrates that the personal income tax on dividends does affect 
the cost of capital on a marginal investment (in the steady state), as opposed to the results 
under the ‘new’ view. The dividend tax, however, is not capitalised in the value of the firm’s 
equity. 
The analysis, which incorporated a minimum dividend constraint in Sinn’s life-cycle model of 
the firm, demonstrates that the results of the ‘traditional’ view are strongly determined by the 
assumption that newly issued equity is the firm’s marginal source of finance. In fact, this 
assumption puts strong conditions on the firm’s production function. In every period, the 
value of profitable investment opportunities must be larger than the available retained 
earnings. Otherwise, the firm has an incentive to issue only a nucleus of new equity in order 
to take advantage of the cheaper retained earnings as a source of finance. The predictions of 
both the ‘traditional’ view and the ‘new’ view about the effects of a reduction in the dividend 
tax are therefore correct. The outcome depends, however, on the underlying production 
function and available investment opportunities of the firm. 
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Mathematical appendix 
A. The Hamiltonian and the first-order conditions of the model (4.27) – (4.32) 
(A.1) presents the current-value Hamiltonian and (A.2) presents the Lagrangian corresponding to the 
model (4.27) – (4.32): 
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The first-order conditions: 
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(A.11) is the firm’s initial condition, and (A.12) is the transversality condition:  
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From (A.4) and (A.5): 
 
(A.13)  QKq µ−= 1  
 
Rearranging (A.6) yields (A.14), using (A.4) yields (A.15): 
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B. Characterisation of the feasible phases of the model (4.27) – (4.32) 
Phase I:  initial issue of new equity: 1)( 1 =tqK  
Similar to the proof in appendix D of chapter 3, and under the assumption of a Cobb-Douglas 
production function, it can be demonstrated that 
d
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Chapter 5 
Tax-arbitrage Behaviour in the Netherlands 
before the Tax Reform 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the tax burden on marginal saving and investment opportunities and 
discusses the firm’s and household’s tax-arbitrage behaviour in the Netherlands before the 
tax reform of January 1, 2001.  
The analysis applies the King-Fullerton method (introduced in chapter 2). This method 
focuses on direct and indirect household savings in debt and equity of the corporate firm, on 
debt and equity-financed investment in the closely held corporation and the proprietorship, 
and on investment in owner-occupied housing. The cost of capital, the tax treatment of 
depreciation, the after-tax real rates of return and the marginal effective tax rates are derived. 
A sensitivity analysis is presented as well. 
The analysis simulates Sinn’s life-cycle model of the firm and presents the firm’s optimal 
finance and investment path (discussed in chapter 3). These simulations focus on direct 
household saving in the corporate firm. The dynamic finance and investment model is 
applied to analyse indirect household savings in the corporate firm. 
In case of direct household saving in the corporate firm, tax-arbitrage behaviour in light of 
financial market imperfections (see chapter 4) is discussed as well.  
 
The King-Fullerton method assumes that actual (physical) depreciation of investment 
projects is exponential at rate δ . The cost of capital is independent of δ  if tax depreciation 
allowances amount to declining-balance depreciation allowances at the economic rate of 
depreciation based on replacement costs (economic depreciation allowances, 0=A ). 
However, the Dutch tax code prescribes straight-line depreciation, which implies that the 
historical cost of the asset can be depreciated for tax purposes during L  years by L/1  per 
asset in each year.  
The analysis considers investment projects that, by assumption, are characterised by 
different values for δ  and L . This chapter studies investment in machinery, equipment and 
means of transportation ( 9%,5.12 == Lδ ), in buildings ( 25%,1.4 == Lδ ) and in intangible 
assets ( 1%,5.12 == Lδ ). Investment in intangible assets refers to investment in research and 
development, advertising and other marketing expenses, and company training.  
The analysis derives the cost of capital for the three types of investment projects. The 
weighted average cost of capital then assigns weights (machinery: 47%, buildings: 31%, 
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intangible assets: 22%) that reflect the relative size of that particular investment project in the 
total amount of investment (as applied in Bovenberg and ter Rele (1998)).  
 
Part of the investment is immediately deductible from the firm’s taxable corporate earnings. 
The actual tax depreciation allowances then amount to straight-line depreciation allowances 
and immediate expensing allowances.  
The degree of immediate expensing, which aims at enhancing small investments, is inversely 
related to the size of the investment in a particular year. It is assumed that an average 
investment in the corporation exceeds the size of an average investment in the closely held 
corporation. Average investments in these corporations exceed the average investment in 
the proprietorship. The degree of immediate expensing for these types of firms is 0.5%, 4% 
and 7%, respectively (see Bovenberg and ter Rele (1998)).  
 
The analysis assumes a real interest rate r  of 4% and an inflation rate π  of 2.5% (Sinn’s 
life-cycle model of the firm abstracts from inflation). The analysis studies the sensitivity of the 
results under the King-Fullerton method with respect to these parameter values.  
 
Section 5.2 presents the capital-income-tax system in the Netherlands before the tax reform. 
Section 5.3 focuses on direct household savings in the corporate firm under the King-
Fullerton method (section 5.3.1), under Sinn’s life-cycle model of the firm (section 5.3.2) and 
in light of financial market imperfections (section 5.3.3). Section 5.4 studies indirect 
household savings in the corporate firm under the King-Fullerton method (section 5.4.1) and 
under Sinn’s life-cycle model of the firm (section 5.4.2). The proprietorship and the closely 
held corporation are studied respectively in sections 5.5 and 5.6. Section 5.7 focuses on 
owner-occupied housing, and section 5.8 presents a sensitivity analysis. Section 5.9 
concludes. 
 
 
 
5.2 Capital income taxes in the Netherlands before the tax reform 
Section 5.2 presents the capital-income-tax system in the Netherlands before the tax reform 
of January 1, 2001. 
 
Before the tax reform, distributed corporate equity income was taxed twice. At the corporate 
level, dividends were taxed at the corporate tax rate. Afterwards, the after-tax profits were 
taxed at the household’s progressive personal income-tax rate. Interest payments were 
deductible from corporate earnings, but were taxed at the household level at the progressive 
personal income-tax rate. Retained earnings were taxed at the corporate tax rate as well. 
Capital gains, however, were not taxed at the household level.  
 
Table 1 presents in more detail the capital-income-tax system before the tax reform. 
Although the characterisation in different boxes was introduced only in the new tax system, a 
similar terminology was used to introduce the capital-income-tax system before the tax 
reform. 
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Table 1: capital-income-tax system before the tax reform of January 1, 2001 (a) (b)  
 
BOX   Type of income (c) (d)      Tax rates 
 
 
 
BOX I (e) - Labour income (f)       younger than 65 years: 
  - Pensions (g), capital insurances     33.9/37.95 – 50 – 60%  
- Return on capital of proprietor       
- Presumptive rental value of owner-occupied housing  older than 65 years: 
 - Distributed profits (dividends), interest and rental payments on   16/20.05 – 50 – 60% 
    invested personal wealth (h)      
 
 
BOX II  Distributed profits (dividends) and realised capital gains on shares  25% 
  that form a ‘substantial holding’ (i) 
 
 
BOX III  Personal wealth (j) (k): the value of shares, savings deposits, bonds,  0.7% 
immovable property (l), business wealth 68% or 100% (m) exempt  
from wealth taxes (n) 
 
 
BOX IV  Corporate profits (net of interest payments);     35% (o) 
profits realised by a mutual fund are taxed if not distributed 
 
 
BOX V  - Capital income realised by pension funds, insurance companies exempt (not in box IV) 
  - Tax-exempt capital insurances      exempt (not in box I) 
- Additional saving opportunities (income blocked on a savings  exempt (not in box I) 
   account for four years, return on savings taxed in box I (p))      
  - Capital gains on personal wealth     exempt (not in box I) 
 
 
  
a. This table is based on ‘Taxation in the Netherlands 2001’ of the Dutch Ministry of Finance (2001), and on 
‘Fundamental Tax Reform in the Netherlands’ of S. Cnossen and L. Bovenberg (2001). 
b. These tax rules are applicable for income and profits earned until 31/12/2000.  
c. Income can be taxed in different boxes. 
d. The tax code allows straight-line depreciation. In case of intangible assets, tax authorities allow free 
depreciation. Moreover, part of the investment can be expensed immediately. The Dutch tax system allows 
the deduction of current losses from future (carry forward) and past (carry backward) profits. 
e. Personal allowance of NLG 8 950 (if one person of a married couple does not have an income: NLG 17 473). 
If the household borrows to invest in (owner-occupied) housing (mortgage debt), the interest payments are 
deductible from the tax base of box I. 
f. Includes wages, salaries, (labour) income of the proprietors, presumptive wage income of the director-
shareholder of a closely held corporation, social security benefits and other labour income. 
g. ‘Registered-asset expenditure tax’ treatment: pension savings are deductible from taxable income in box I. 
When the individual receives the pension, it is taxed under the income tax of box I.  
h. Tax-free amount of dividends (NLG 1 000, not applicable for dividends to the controlling shareholder) and 
interest payments (NLG 1 000, also applicable for interest payments on bonds purchased by the controlling 
shareholder of the closely held corporation) 
i. A controlling shareholder holds a substantial amount (at least 5%) of shares of the closely held corporation. 
j. Wealth exemption of NLG 200 000 (NLG 250 000 for married couples), additional old-age allowance up to 
NLG 205 000 (NLG 292 000 for married couples), wealth exemption in case total taxes due (wealth and 
income taxes) > 68% of taxable income 
k. Debt can be deducted from the tax base in box III. 
l. Only 60% of the value of the house (owner-occupied housing) added to the personal wealth in box III. 
m. Business wealth is 100% exempt from wealth taxes in case < NLG 219 000. 
n. If the taxpayer has a substantial holding in a corporation, the debt claims that he holds of that corporation are 
part of the substantial holding (business wealth). 
o. Profits up to NLG 50 000 are taxed at 30%. 
p. With respect to the return: additional tax-free interest payments (NLG 1 000) and dividends (NLG 1 000)  
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5.3 Direct household savings in the corporate firm 
Households may save directly in debt and equity of the corporate firm. Section 5.3 studies 
tax-arbitrage behaviour under the King-Fullerton method, under Sinn’s life-cycle model of the 
firm and in light of financial market imperfections. 
 
5.3.1 The King-Fullerton method 
The household may finance investment in the corporate firm with debt, newly issued equity 
or retained earnings. This section determines the firm’s tax-preferred sources of finance and 
investment projects. 
 
• Direct household savings in debt of the corporate firm 
Households may invest directly in debt of the corporate firm (table 2), which is referred to as 
the traditional saving strategy. By assumption, debt-financed investment yields a before-tax 
nominal rate of return equal to =+ πr 6.5%. Interest payments are taxed under the 
progressive personal income tax. Consequently, the after-tax real rate of return s  is 
decreasing and the effective tax rate at the household level ht  is increasing in the marginal 
income-tax rate yt . Because nominal interest payments are taxed, and due to the wealth tax 
of 0.7%, s  may even become negative if =yt 60%.  
Given the assumptions, the cost of capital on debt-financed investment is 3%, which is lower 
than the real interest rate of 4%. In case of economic depreciation allowances, and if 
0== cp wt , the cost of capital equals =
−
−=
τ
τπ
1
rp 2.65%, which is lower than the real 
interest rate (as a result of the deductibility of the nominal interest payments from taxable 
corporate earnings). Because the actual tax depreciation allowances (including the 
immediate expensing allowances) are less favourable than economic depreciation 
allowances, the cost of capital exceeds 2.65%. 
 
Table 2: direct household savings in debt of the corporate firm before the tax reform (a) 
      
          te      th      tc            p  s 
 
 
 
Low income-tax rate (+65): 20.05% 10.8%   32.6%  -32.3%            3% 2.7% 
Low income-tax rate (-65): 37.95% 49.3%  61.7%  -32.3%            3% 1.5% 
Average income-tax rate: 50% 
- No wealth taxes   75.2%   81.2%  -32.3%            3% 0.75% 
- Wealth tax: 0.7%   98.3%   98.7%  -32.3%           3% 0.05% 
High income-tax rate: 60%              120%   115% (b) -32.3%           3% -0.6% 
 
 
 
a. By assumption, households with high (low) marginal income-tax rates do (not) have to pay wealth 
taxes. Both cases are studied for households with an average marginal income-tax rate. 
b. The total marginal effective tax rate et  is higher than the tax rate at the household level ht , even 
though the corporate effective tax rate ct  is negative. This peculiar result is due to the negative 
value of s . 
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Table 3 derives the cost of capital for different types of debt-financed investment projects. In 
case of investment in machinery, equipment and means of transportation, the cost of capital 
exceeds 2.65% (due to unfavourable tax depreciation). In case of investment in buildings, the 
unfavourable tax treatment of depreciation in addition to the transaction tax of 6% and the 
local property tax of 0.3% almost compensates for the deductibility of the inflation rate from 
taxable corporate earnings. The favourable tax treatment of (accelerated) depreciation in 
case of investment in intangible assets reduces the cost of capital even below 2.65%. The 
weighted average cost of capital corresponds to the value of table 2. 
 
Table 3: depreciation allowances and cost of capital on debt-financed investment  
 
        actual tax depreciation   economic depreciation              
            allowances (a)          allowances (b)        p        ct   
 
 
Machinery, equipment and  29.3%  < 30.7%       2.97%    -34.5% 
means of transportation 
 
Buildings   21.8%  < 24.6%       3.91%    -2.3% 
 
Intangible assets  34.3%  > 30.7%       1.88%    -112% 
 
Weighted average (c)  28.1%  < 28.8%       3%                 -32.3% 
 
 
a. Includes the tax gain as a result of immediate expensing. 
b. Declining-balance depreciation at the economic rate of depreciation, based on replacement costs. 
c. Weights used to calculate the average cost of capital: machinery 47%, buildings 31%, and 
intangible assets 22% (source: Bovenberg and ter Rele (1998)). 
 
 
 
• Direct household savings in equity of the corporate firm 
Table 4 presents the tax burden on direct household investment financed with newly issued 
equity or retained earnings. 
 
Newly issued equity 
Corporate firms may finance investment with newly issued equity. By assumption, the return 
on the investment is distributed as dividends, which are taxed under the progressive 
personal income tax. On the investment financed with newly issued equity, households 
require an after-tax real rate of return equal to the after-tax real (traditional) opportunity return 
that could be earned if the investment would be financed with debt. The arbitrage implies that 
the cost of capital on investment financed with newly issued equity is independent of yt .  
Compared to interest payments, which are taxed under the progressive personal income tax, 
the firm’s return on equity-financed investment is taxed at the corporate tax rate of 35%. The 
distributed dividends are taxed later at the progressive personal income-tax rate (up to 60%). 
The double taxation of dividends thus results in a high tax burden on investment financed 
with newly issued equity. In case of a marginal income-tax rate of 60%, the tax wedge even 
exceeds the cost of capital. 
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Table 4: direct household savings in equity of the corporate firm before the tax reform (a)              
 
newly issued            retained 
       equity             earnings 
 
 
Low marginal income-tax rate (+65): 20.05% p  6.3%   4.3% 
w  3.6%   1.6%  
tc       36.5%    37.7% 
  th      32.6%   0%       
      te  57.2%   37.7% 
q  1   0.7795 
 
Low marginal income-tax rate (-65): 37.95% p  6.3%   2.76% 
w  4.8%   1.26% 
tc      36.5%   44.6% 
th      61.7%     0% 
te      75.7%   44.6%  
q  1   0.6205 
 
Average marginal income-tax rate: 50%  p  6.3%   1.7% 
- No wealth taxes    w  5.55%   0.95% 
tc      36.5%   56.8% 
 th      81.2%   0% 
  te      88.1%   56.8% 
q  1   0.5 
 
- Wealth tax: 0.7% (b)   p  6.3%   1.7% 
   w  6.25%   1.65% 
tc      36.5%   56.8%  
 th      98.7%    93% 
 te      99.2%   97.1% 
q  1   0.5 
 
High marginal income-tax rate: 60% (c)  p  6.3%   0.89% 
w  6.9%   1.49%  
tc       36.5%   88.8% 
 th      115%   700% 
     te      109.5%   167%  
q  1   0.4 
 
 
a. By assumption, households that face a high (low) marginal income tax do (not) have to pay wealth 
taxes. Both cases are studied for households that face an average marginal income tax. 
b. et  on investment financed with newly issued equity or retained earnings do not differ much, even 
though the difference between p  is large. This result follows from the fact that s  is close to zero.  
c. et  on investment financed with newly issued equity is lower than on investment financed with 
retained earnings (the opposite of what we expect from p ), which follows from the negative s . 
 
 
Table 5 presents the depreciation allowances and the cost of capital for different types of 
investment projects financed with newly issued equity. The weighted average cost of capital 
equals 6.3%. If actual depreciation allowances amount to economic depreciation allowances, 
and if no additional taxes are levied, p  equals 
)1( τ−
r = 6.15%. 
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Table 5: depreciation allowances and cost of capital on investment financed with newly issued equity   
 
        actual tax depreciation   economic depreciation              
            allowances (a)          allowances (b)        p      ct   
 
 
Machinery, equipment and  26.7%  > 26.5%       6.34% 36.93% 
means of transportation 
 
Buildings   17.5%  < 17.7%       7.5% 46.71% 
 
Intangible assets  33.9%  > 26.5%       4.5% 11.33% 
 
Weighted average (c)  25.4%  > 23.8%       6.3% 36.5% 
 
 
a. Includes the tax gain as a result of immediate expensing. 
b. Declining-balance depreciation at the economic rate of depreciation, based on replacement costs. 
c. Weights used to calculate the average cost of capital: machinery 47%, buildings 31%, and 
intangible assets 22% (source: Bovenberg and ter Rele (1998)). 
 
 
Straight-line and declining-balance depreciation allowances decrease with the firm's discount 
rate bρ  (see section 2.3.2). bρ  in case of debt is =+− ))(1( πτ r 4.2%. bρ  in case of newly 
issued equity is =+ πr 6.5%. Consequently, the depreciation allowances in table 5 (newly 
issued equity) are lower than the depreciation allowances in table 3 (debt). The sensitivity to 
bρ  also influences whether or not the tax code permits accelerated depreciation (whether 
actual depreciation allowances are higher or lower than economic depreciation allowances). 
 
The tax code permits accelerated depreciation in case of investment in machinery and 
intangible assets. In case of investment in machinery, the tax on the value of the newly 
issued equity of 0.9% compensates for the accelerated depreciation. This does not occur in 
case of investment in intangible assets because actual depreciation allowances are too 
favourable. In case of investment in buildings, the cost of capital exceeds 6.15% as a result 
of the unfavourable tax treatment of depreciation and the additional taxes (the transaction tax 
of 6%, the local property tax of 0.3% and the tax on the value of the newly issued equity of 
0.9%). 
 
Retained earnings 
Instead of distributing the firm’s profits as dividends and issuing new equity or debt to finance 
the investment, the firm may defer the dividend taxes by retaining and reinvesting its profits 
(second column of table 4). In fact, the firm’s profits are locked in the firm because if they are 
distributed, the dividend tax is levied. Because the household avoids the dividend tax if the 
firm retains and reinvests the profits, the dividend tax reduces the cost of investment 
financed with retained earnings. By assumption, the return on the investment financed with 
retained earnings is again distributed as dividends. As explained in section 2.4.3, the 
dividend tax is capitalised into the value of the equity. The higher the dividend tax is, the 
lower the increase in the value of the firm’s equity q . Moreover, the household’s after-tax 
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real rate of return on investment financed with retained earnings is independent of the 
dividend tax. Because of the absence of a capital gains tax in the Netherlands, the effective 
tax rate of investment financed with retained earnings amounts to the corporate tax rate plus 
the wealth tax per unit of cost of capital. Because the household’s opportunity return of an 
investment in debt is taxed under the progressive personal income tax, the investment 
financed with retained earnings has to earn a low real rate of return. The higher the income 
tax on the household’s opportunity return, the lower the cost of capital. This low cost of 
capital also implies that the increase in value of the firm’s equity (Tobin’s q ) is lower than 
unity. The cost of capital lies between 4.3% and 0.89%.   
 
 
• Tax-arbitrage behaviour 
The cost of investment financed with retained earnings equals the dividends foregone 
(because of the absence of a capital gains tax), the amount of which is lower than the unit 
cost of investment financed with newly issued equity. Retained earnings are therefore a tax-
preferred source of finance over newly issued equity.  
The firm prefers to finance the investment with retained earnings instead of debt if the 
marginal income-tax rate yt  on the opportunity return exceeds the corporate tax rate τ  of 
35%. (It is assumed that the household is a shareholder of the corporate firm in which he 
finances investment with debt). If τ>yt , the opportunity investment in debt is taxed at a 
higher rate than the investment financed with retained earnings. In fact, the income tax on 
the opportunity return on a direct investment in debt more than compensates for the 
corporate tax rate on the profits of the investment financed with retained earnings. (By 
retaining earnings within the firm, the household effectively reduces the tax burden on its 
savings from yt  to τ ). As a result, the investment financed with retained earnings has to 
yield a lower minimum required rate of return than the direct investment in debt. This 
condition is satisfied except for households older than 65 with a low marginal income-tax 
rate. Thus: 
 
Shareholders that directly invest in the corporate firm prefer: 
- Income-tax rate = 20.05%:    NERED φφ  
- Income-tax rate = 37.95%-50%-60%:  NEDRE φφ  
 
 
Investment projects 
Because of the tax treatment of depreciation (which deviates from declining-balance 
depreciation at the economic rate of depreciation based on replacement costs), the 
transaction tax and the local property tax on buildings, the cost of capital depends on the 
type of investment project. Whether the firm finances the investment with newly issued equity 
or retained earnings, the tax code favours equity-financed investment in intangible assets 
over equity-financed investment in machinery, equipment and means of transportation. The 
latter investment opportunities, in turn, are tax-favoured compared to investment in buildings. 
The same results hold for debt as a source of finance. 
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5.3.2 Sinn’s life-cycle model of the firm 
This section simulates Sinn’s life-cycle model of the firm and presents the firm’s finance and 
investment decisions along the optimal path (table 6). Sinn’s dynamic framework takes into 
account that the newly founded firm has to attract external sources of finance because it 
does not possess earnings that can be retained and reinvested.  
 
The analysis assumes a concave production function βKKf =)( , where 3.0=β . Moreover, 
the maximum debt-capital ratio α  is equal to 60%. The real interest rate equals 4%, and the 
model abstracts from inflation. One period in the model is equal to one year. The models are 
simulated in discrete time with Gams.  
 
Because dividends are taxed at the highest rate and interest payments are taxed at a higher 
rate than capital gains (except for taxpayers older than 65 that face the lowest marginal 
income-tax rate of 20.05%), the firm prefers retained earnings over debt as a source of 
finance. Newly issued equity is the firm’s least tax-preferred source of finance.  
The simulation analysis (table 6) confirms the tax-arbitrage results of the ‘nucleus’ theory of 
the firm as derived theoretically in section 3.4. Initially, the firm issues new equity and debt. 
The firm then enters an internal growth phase, during which it finances investment with debt 
and retained earnings. The firm redeems its entire debt in phase III. Subsequently, the firm 
enters an internal growth phase, during which it finances investment with retained earnings. 
The firm no longer invests in phase V, and distributes all of its profits as dividends.  
The higher the household’s personal income tax, the larger the difference is between the 
cost of newly issued equity and retained earnings, and the stronger the firm’s incentive is to 
finance investment with retained earnings. An increase in the personal income tax then 
implies a decrease in the initially issued new equity (and therefore a decrease in the issued 
debt). Moreover, it implies an increase in the cost of capital on investment financed with 
newly issued equity. Table 6 presents the initial period’s cost of capital, which is higher than 
the cost of capital on investment financed with newly issued equity (according to King and 
Fullerton). An increase in the personal income tax then implies that the amount of capital, 
which is financed with retained earnings during the second internal growth phase, increases 
as well. 
During phase III, the firm redeems its entire debt (10.67 units). At this point, the cost of 
capital equals the interest rate of 4%. 
Retained earnings are the investment’s source of finance during phase IV. The higher the 
personal income tax, the lower the household’s after-tax opportunity return is, and the 
stronger the incentive is to accumulate additional funds within the firm. The steady-state cost 
of capital is thus decreasing, and the steady-state capital stock is increasing in the personal 
income tax. Thus, also the length of the internal growth phase is increasing in the personal 
income tax.  
During phase V, the firm distributes dividends. Given the assumptions, the cost of capital on 
marginal investment financed with retained earnings amounts to 3.82%, 3.08% or 2.46% (if 
the income-tax rate is 37.95%, 50% or 60%, respectively). The higher the steady-state 
capital stock, the more dividends that the firm will distribute. 
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Table 6: the life-cycle model of the firm before the tax reform 
 
               marginal income-tax rate 
 
37.95%   50%   60%  
 
 
Phase I: newly issued equity & debt 
Year     0   0   0  
Initial newly issued equity  0.79   0.55   0.39 
Initial newly issued debt   1.19   0.82   0.59 
Initial investment   1.98   1.37   0.98 
)(' Kf      18.6%   24%   30.4% 
et      86.6%   91.7%   94.7% 
 
Phase II: debt & retained earnings 
Year     1 →  7   1 →  7   1 →  7 
Newly issued equity   0   0   0 
Debt level    1.19 →  10.67  0.82 →  10.67  0.59 →  10.67 
Capital stock    1.98 →  17.79  1.37 →  17.79  0.98 →  17.79 
)(' Kf      18.6% →  4%  24% →  4%  30.4% →  4% 
 
Phase III: debt redemption 
Year     7 →  14  7 →  15  7 →  15 
Debt level    10.67 →  0  10.67 →  0  10.67 →  0 
Capital stock    17.79   17.79   17.79 
)(' Kf      4%   4%   4% 
et      37.95%   50%   60% 
 
Phase IV: retained earnings 
Year     14 →  15  15 →  20  15 →  25 
Debt level    0   0   0 
Capital stock    17.79 →  19.01  17.79 →  25.9  17.79 →  35.6 
)(' Kf      4% →  3.82%  4% →  3.08%  4% →  2.46% 
 
Phase V: dividends 
Year     15 →  ∞   20 →  ∞   25 →  ∞  
Investment    0   0   0 
Dividends    2.42   2.65   2.92 
Steady-state capital stock  19.01   25.9   35.6 
)(' Kf      3.82%   3.08%   2.46% 
s      2.48%   2%   1.6% 
et      35%   35%   35% 
 
 
 
This favourable tax treatment of retained earnings implies an advantage for mature firms that 
generate sufficient retained earnings to finance investment (compared to new firms). Young 
(newly founded) firms, which have not yet generated retained earnings, need to issue new 
equity as a source of finance. Investment financed by young firms must therefore yield a 
higher return than investment by mature firms. Consequently, the tax code offers mature 
firms a tax-induced competitive advantage compared to young firms. Shareholders will thus 
finance projects that earn a lower return with retained earnings instead of distributing the 
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profits and financing projects that earn a higher return with newly issued equity. The 
favourable tax treatment of retained earnings makes it more difficult for young firms to attract 
new capital. This hampers the dynamics on the equity market, misallocates resources and 
inhibits the entry of new firms. Young firms can try to limit this tax-induced competitive 
disadvantage by relying more on debt as a source of finance instead of newly issued equity.  
 
 
5.3.3 Financial market imperfections 
The capital-income-tax system and the financial market imperfections simultaneously 
determine the agents’ saving and investment decisions. This section discusses tax-arbitrage 
behaviour in light of adverse selection in the debt and equity markets and in the presence of 
a minimum dividend constraint.  
 
• Adverse selection in the debt and equity markets 
In case of adverse selection, new investors may be imperfectly informed about the value of 
the firm and its investment opportunities. The firm might have to sell under-valued new equity 
in order to finance investment. If the firm attracts debt, it might have to pay a higher interest 
rate.  
The lemons premium in the equity market increases the cost of newly issued equity. The 
lemons premium in the debt market increases the cost of debt. However, the cost of retained 
earnings is not affected. The adverse selection in the debt and equity markets therefore 
increases the difference between the cost of external and internal sources of finance. Thus, 
retained earnings become an even more preferred source of finance. 
The firm will issue less new equity and debt and will finance a larger part of the capital stock 
with retained earnings. The steady-state cost of capital on investment financed with retained 
earnings and the capital stock remain unchanged. However, the length of the internal growth 
phase increases with the adverse selection.  
Adverse selection therefore increases the advantage for mature firms that generate sufficient 
retained earnings to finance investment (compared to young, newly founded, firms). 
 
• Minimum dividend constraint 
In every period, the firm may distribute part of its earnings in order to signal its quality or to 
resolve the moral hazard problems. The firm, however, continues to issue a nucleus of new 
equity during the initial period. The payout rate does not affect the firm’s steady-state capital 
stock and cost of capital on investment financed with retained earnings. However, the length 
of the internal growth phase increases with the payout rate. Mature firms that may finance 
investment with retained earnings thus face an even stronger competitive advantage, 
compared to young firms.  
 
 
5.4 Indirect household savings in the corporate firm 
Instead of saving directly in the corporate firm, the household might save indirectly in debt 
and equity of the corporate firm through an intermediary. This section analyses indirect 
household saving under the King-Fullerton method (section 5.4.1) and under Sinn’s life-cycle 
model of the firm (section 5.4.2). 
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5.4.1 The King-Fullerton method 
In this section, the household saves indirectly in debt and equity of the corporate firm through 
a mutual fund and a pension fund (table 7).  
 
Table 7: indirect household savings in the corporate firm before the tax reform  
 
                   debt        equity 
               te      s    te        s  
 
 
Cost of capital on investment through an intermediary    p debt  =  3%  p equity  =  6.1% 
 
Mutual fund     
• Low income-tax rate (+65): 20.05%   42.9%     1.7%  71.8%     1.7% 
• Low income-tax rate (-65): 37.95%   42.9%     1.7%  71.8%     1.7% 
• Average income-tax rate: 50% 
- No wealth taxes    42.9%     1.7%  71.8%     1.7% 
- Wealth tax: 0.7%    66.1%     1%  83.2%     1% 
• High income-tax rate: 60%    66.1%     1%  83.2%     1% 
 
Pensions (a) (b)       
• Low (65-): 37.95% →  low (65+): 20.05%  -95.8%     5.9%  3%     5.9% 
• Average: 50% →  low (65+): 20.05%   -164.3%    8%  -30.8%     8% 
• Average: 50% →  average: 50%    -32.3%     4%  34.5%     4% 
• High: 60% →  average: 50%    -87.4%     5.7%  7.2%     5.7% 
• High: 60% →  high: 60%    -32.3%     4%  34.5%     4% 
 
 
a. The tax rates in front of the arrows are the marginal income-tax rates at which contributions to the 
pension fund can be deducted. The tax rates after the arrow reflect the marginal tax rates at which 
the pension is taxed. 
b. By assumption, the expected time until retirement is 15 years. 
 
 
The intermediary may finance corporate investment with debt. The cost of capital on debt-
financed investment equals 3% (similar to the result with direct household saving in 
corporate debt). The intermediary may finance corporate investment with equity as well. The 
intermediary’s return on the debt or equity-financed corporate investment is assumed to be 
taxed irrespective of how the intermediary receives the return – as interest payments, 
dividends or unrealised capital gains1. Because it is assumed that the intermediary’s capital 
gains on the corporate firm’s equity are taxed when they accrue (and not when they are 
realised), and because the tax on the value of the newly issued equity is not considered, 
newly issued equity and retained earnings are taxed similarly. The cost of capital on the 
equity-financed investment amounts to 6.1%.  
Instead of directly buying debt and equity, the household may buy a share of a mutual fund 
that invests in debt and equity of the corporate firm. This firm can distribute (to the fund) the 
return on the investment as dividends or interest payments, or it can retain and reinvest the 
earnings such that the firm’s equity, which is controlled by the fund, increases. In order to 
circumvent the income tax on dividends for the household, the mutual fund retains its 
                                                          
1 This assumption is explained in footnote 12, chapter 2. 
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earnings instead of distributing them (to the household) as dividends. As a result, the mutual 
fund’s earnings are taxed at a corporate tax rate of 35%. No additional taxes are levied when 
the household sells its participation in the fund. Because of the absence of a capital gains tax 
in the Netherlands, the household realises its capital gains tax-free. The differences in s  are 
due to the wealth tax at the household level on the value of the savings. This innovative 
saving strategy2 yields a higher s  than direct household savings in corporate debt and equity 
if the household’s marginal income-tax rate exceeds the mutual fund’s corporate tax rate.   
Pension savings are exempt from wealth taxes, and pension funds are not taxed on their 
earnings. Consequently, the household's after-tax real rate of return on savings for a pension 
amounts to the real interest rate of 4%. The household realises an additional gain, however, 
if the household's marginal income-tax rate (at which the pension is taxed) is lower than the 
rate at which contributions have been deducted. The higher this difference is, the higher is s  
and the lower is et .  
 
Tax-arbitrage behaviour 
Households that maximise the after-tax real rate of return on their savings face incentives to 
save through a mutual fund instead of controlling the savings themselves. However, 
households that face a marginal income-tax rate that is lower than the corporate tax rate on 
the fund’s return prefer direct household saving over saving through a mutual fund. The 
pension fund is the household’s most tax-preferred saving vehicle. The pension fund and the 
mutual fund face an incentive to invest in debt instead of equity of the corporate firm. Thus: 
 
 Shareholders that invest in the corporate firm through an intermediary prefer: 
     equitydebt φ      
 
 
5.4.2 Sinn’s life-cycle model of the firm 
The King – Fullerton framework studies mutual funds whose earnings are taxed at the mutual 
fund’s corporate tax rate. However, this corporate tax is not levied if the fund immediately 
distributes the dividends and interest payments it receives from the firm. The mutual fund’s 
capital gains on the corporate firm’s equity are not taxed, either. However, the firm’s 
distributed dividends and interest payments, which are immediately distributed by the mutual 
fund, are taxed at the household level under the progressive income tax. The household thus 
obtains no tax advantage from saving through this type of mutual fund.  
Households face an incentive to invest in the mutual fund whose return is taxed at the fund’s 
corporate tax rate if the household wants to invest (through the mutual fund) in debt or in 
mature firms that distribute dividends. This saving strategy reduces the tax burden from the 
household’s income-tax rate to the mutual fund’s corporate tax rate. Households face an 
incentive to invest in the mutual fund whose return is not taxed if the household wants to 
invest in young firms with large investment opportunities, as capital gains are not taxed at the 
level of this fund. 
                                                          
2 The household’s innovative opportunity return refers to the return on the indirect investment in debt 
of the corporate firm through a mutual fund. 
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Section 3.5 analyses tax-arbitrage behaviour if the firm that distributes dividends and interest 
payments is controlled by a mutual fund that does not distribute the corporate investment’s 
return. This return is therefore taxed at the mutual fund’s corporate tax rate. The analysis 
also assumes that any firm that finances investment with retained earnings is controlled by a 
mutual fund that would immediately distribute the dividends and interest payments. The 
capital gains are therefore not taxed at the level of the mutual fund. 
The firm then determines its optimal finance and investment behaviour on behalf of the 
household that invests indirectly in the firm through a mutual fund. The firm is indifferent 
between retained earnings and debt. Newly issued equity is the least tax-preferred source of 
finance.  
If the debt-capital ratio is less than unity, the firm’s life cycle consists of three successive 
phases. First, the firm issues a nucleus of new equity and debt. The firm then enters an 
internal growth phase, during which investment is financed with debt and retained earnings. 
The firm stops investing when the cost of capital equals the interest rate of 4%. If the firm can 
finance the entire investment with debt, then it immediately issues the optimal debt-financed 
capital stock. The steady-state cost of capital equals the interest rate of 4%. 
 
The favourable tax treatment of retained earnings implies a tax-induced advantage for 
mature firms compared to young firms. Even if the firm’s equity is controlled by a mutual 
fund, investment financed by young firms must yield a higher return than investment by 
mature firms. Young firms can resolve this tax-induced competitive disadvantage by relying 
on debt as a source of finance. 
 
 
5.5 The proprietorship 
Section 5.5 studies the tax burden on debt and equity-financed investment in the 
proprietorship, and discusses the traditional and innovative proprietor’s tax-arbitrage 
behaviour.  
 
• Debt-financed investment in the proprietorship 
The proprietor may finance the investment in the proprietorship with borrowed money. By 
assumption, the proprietor borrows money from another household that requires the nominal 
interest rate on its investment. This lender realises a traditional or innovative return on its 
investment in debt. The proprietor then invests its personal wealth in corporate debt, which 
yields the traditional or innovative opportunity return as well. The analysis differentiates 
between the marginal income-tax rate on the proprietor's business income and the marginal 
income-tax rate on the income of the household that lends money (in case of a traditional 
saving strategy).  
 
If the proprietor’s marginal income-tax rate equals 50% (60%), then debt-financed investment 
in the proprietorship must yield a before-tax real rate of return of 1.9% (1.3%), which is lower 
than the cost of capital on debt-financed investment in the corporate firm. The household that 
provides the debt earns the traditional or innovative after-tax real rate of return (table 2 and 
table 7). Consequently, the marginal effective tax rates on debt-financed investment in the 
proprietorship (table 8) are lower than on debt-financed investment in the corporate firm. 
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Table 8: debt-financed investment in the proprietorship before the tax reform (a) 
 
        marginal income tax on the proprietor’s business income 
           50%                      60%  
    
   
      p 1.9% (1.9%)         1.3% (1.3%) 
The lender’s marginal income tax:   
• Low marginal income-tax rate: 37.95% te 20.3% (10.4%) -17.7% (-32.4%) 
 
• Average marginal income-tax rate: 50% 
- No wealth taxes   te 61% (10.4%) 42.4% (-32.4%) 
- Wealth tax: 0.7%   te 97.4% (46.7%) 96.1% (21.3%) 
 
• High marginal income-tax rate: 60%  te 131% (46.7%) 146% (21.3%) 
 
 
a. The table presents the results for the lender’s traditional saving strategy. The results presented in 
parentheses indicate the lender who follows an innovative saving strategy.  
 
 
In case of economic depreciation allowances, and if no additional taxes are levied, p  equals 
s
y
s
y
t
t
r
−
−
1
π
. The cost of capital equals the real interest rate net of the gain of the deduction of 
the inflation rate from taxable earnings. This implicit subsidy increases with the rate at which 
interest payments can be deducted. Consequently, the cost of capital on debt-financed 
investment in the proprietorship (deduction at 50% or 60%) is lower than the cost of capital 
on debt-financed investment in the corporate firm (deduction at 35%).  
 
Table 9: depreciation allowances/cost of capital on debt-financed investment in the proprietorship (a) 
 
           actual tax depreciation        economic depreciation            
    allowances (b) (d)  allowances (c) (d)     p     
 
 
Machinery, equipment and  46.85% (57.7%)     < (<) 47.2% (59.5%)          1.58% (0.82%) 
means of transportation 
 
Buildings   37.7% (48.3%)      < (<) 42.3% (58.6%)          3.12% (2.7%) 
 
Intangible assets  49.2% (59.2%)      > (<) 47.2% (59.5%)          0.96% (0.34%) 
 
Weighted average (e)       44.5% (55.13%)     < (<) 45.6% (59.23%)         1.9% (1.3%) 
 
 
a. The proprietor’s marginal income-tax rate syt  equals 50% (the results when the proprietor’s 
marginal income-tax rate is 60% are presented in parentheses). 
b. Includes the tax gain as a result of immediate expensing, which (by assumption) exceeds the tax 
gain in case of a corporate firm. 
c. Declining-balance depreciation at the economic rate of depreciation, based on replacement costs. 
d. Actual and economic depreciation allowances are increasing in syt .  
e. Weights used to calculate the average cost of capital: machinery 47%, buildings 31%, and 
intangible assets 22% (source: Bovenberg and ter Rele (1998)). 
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Table 9 presents the depreciation allowances and cost of capital for different types of debt-
financed investment projects. The tax code permits accelerated depreciation only in case of 
investment in intangible assets (and if =syt 50%). The local property tax, the transaction tax 
(in case of investment in buildings) and the unfavourable depreciation allowances then 
increase the investment’s cost of capital (above p  if 0=A ).  
 
 
• Equity-financed investment in the proprietorship 
This section discusses the tax burden on equity-financed investment in the proprietorship. 
Profits are taxed only once under the proprietor’s personal income tax, which implies that 
newly issued equity and retained earnings are taxed similarly. The proprietor may invest his 
personal wealth traditionally or innovatively in debt.  
 
Traditional proprietor 
If the proprietor requires a traditional after-tax real rate of return, then the equity-financed 
investment must yield a low minimum required real rate of return, as presented in table 10. 
The cost of capital equals 
)1(
)1(
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y
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tttrt
−
+−−− π
 if 0== BA . p  decreases with the 
proprietor’s income tax on the traditional opportunity return, but increases with the 
proprietor’s marginal income tax on business income. The inflation rate is not taxed in the 
proprietorship, but is taxed as part of the opportunity return, which lowers the cost of capital. 
Moreover, p  decreases with the wealth tax on personal wealth, but increases with the 
wealth tax on business wealth. Table 11 presents the depreciation allowances and the cost 
of capital for different types of investment projects.  
 
Table 10: equity-financed investment in the proprietorship before the tax reform (a), (b)  
 
                     w           te                   p 
 
      
Low marginal income-tax rate (-65): 37.95% 1.08% (1.1%)       40.5% (39.2%) 2.58% (2.8%) 
 
Average marginal income-tax rate: 50% 
- No wealth taxes    1.15% (1.7%)        61%    (49.5%) 1.9%   (3.4%) 
- Wealth tax 0.7% 
• business wealth 100% tax-exempt  0.83% (1.3%)        94.3% (56.2%)  0.88% (2.3%) 
• business wealth 68% tax-exempt  1.15% (1.7%)       95.9% (61.8%)  1.2%   (2.7%) 
 
High marginal income-tax rate: 60% 
Wealth tax 0.7%  
• business wealth 100% tax-exempt  0.74% (1.9%)        524% (64.7%)  0.14% (2.9%) 
• business wealth 68% tax-exempt   1.1% (2.3%)       218% (68.9%) 0.5%   (3.3%) 
 
 
a. The proprietor’s marginal income tax on personal income equals the marginal income tax on 
business income. 
b. The table presents the results in case of a traditional opportunity return. The results in case of an 
innovative opportunity return are presented in parentheses. 
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Innovative proprietor 
Table 10 presents in parentheses the tax burden if the proprietor requires an innovative 
opportunity return. As a result of this higher opportunity return, the cost of capital3 and the tax 
wedge exceed the values obtained in case of a traditional opportunity return. Table 11 
studies the depreciation allowances and cost of capital for different types of investment 
projects.  
 
Table 11: depreciation allowances and cost of capital on equity-financed investment in the   
     proprietorship (a) 
 
         actual tax depreciation      economic depreciation 
 allowances (b)               allowances (c)                  p   
 
 
Machinery, equipment and  48.2% (46.3%)         < (>) 49.8% (46.2%)  0.51% (2%) 
means of transportation 
 
Buildings   40.5% (36.7%)         < (<) 49.4% (40%)  1.94% (3.6%) 
 
Intangible assets  49.4% (49.1%)         < (>) 49.8% (46.2%)  0.21% (1.3%) 
 
Weighted average (d)       46.8% (43.98%)       < (<) 49.7% (44.3%)  0.88% (2.3%) 
 
 
a. Proprietor’s business income taxed at 50%, wealth taxes due on personal wealth but not on 
business wealth. Proprietor’s personal income taxed at a marginal income-tax rate of 50% in case 
of traditional opportunity return, and taxed at the corporate tax rate of 35% in case of an innovative 
opportunity return (the latter results are presented in parentheses).  
b. Includes the tax gain as a result of immediate expensing, which, by assumption, exceeds the tax 
gain in case of a corporate firm. 
c. Declining-balance depreciation at the economic rate of depreciation, based on replacement costs. 
d. Weights used to calculate the average cost of capital: machinery 47%, buildings 31%, and 
intangible assets 22% (source: Bovenberg and ter Rele (1998)). 
 
 
• Traditional proprietor’s tax-arbitrage behaviour 
If the wealth tax on personal wealth is 0%, the proprietor that requires a traditional 
opportunity return is indifferent between debt and equity (newly issued equity and retained 
earnings are taxed similarly). If the wealth tax on personal wealth is positive (and because 
business wealth is (partly) exempt from wealth taxes), then the proprietor prefers equity over 
debt as a source of finance.   
In case of debt financing, the nominal interest payments are deducted from the 
proprietorship’s taxable earnings. However, nominal interest payments are taxed at the 
household level (both the proprietor and the household that lends the funds realise the 
traditional opportunity return). Given that syy tt = , the marginal effective rate on debt-financed 
investment in the proprietorship then depends only on the taxes at the household level: 
                                                          
3 If 0=A  and 0=B , the cost of capital amounts to 
)1(
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p
t
tt wye += . If the proprietor finances investment with equity, then his business profits are 
taxed only at the proprietor’s marginal income-tax rate. et  then amounts to 
s
yt  plus the wealth 
tax on the proprietor’s business wealth per unit cost of capital: 
p
t
tt
s
ws
ye += . Thus: 
 
  The proprietor that requires a traditional opportunity return prefers: 
  - Wealth tax = 0%    debtequity ~  
- Wealth tax = 0.7%, business wealth  debtequity φ  
68% or 100% tax exempt 
 
 
Investment projects 
The tax code favours the proprietor’s debt and equity-financed investment in intangible 
assets more than investment in machinery, equipment and means of transportation. These 
investments are more attractive, from a tax point of view, than investment in buildings.  
 
Investment in the proprietorship versus personal savings in the corporate firm 
In order for the proprietor to earn the traditional after-tax real rate of return, the equity-
financed investment in the proprietorship has to yield a minimum required real rate of return 
that is lower than the cost of capital on corporate investment in debt and newly issued equity. 
Consequently, the proprietor faces a tax incentive to accumulate his funds within the 
proprietorship instead of saving in newly issued equity and debt of the corporate firm.  
In fact, the proprietor even prefers that the corporate firm distributes its retained earnings 
such that he can invest these earnings as equity in the proprietorship. Except under an 
average marginal income-tax rate and no wealth tax, the cost of capital on equity-financed 
investment in the proprietorship is lower than the cost of capital on corporate investment 
financed with retained earnings.  
 
• Innovative proprietor’s tax-arbitrage behaviour 
The proprietor that requires an innovative opportunity return prefers debt over equity as a 
source of finance (as can be concluded from the cost of capital in table 8 and table 10). The 
proprietor’s personal funds will be invested in a mutual fund that invests in corporate debt. 
Hence, the innovative proprietor does not face a tax incentive to invest his funds within the 
proprietorship. Thus: 
 
The proprietor that requires an innovative opportunity return prefers: 
     equitydebt φ  
 
 
5.6 The closely held corporation 
Section 5.6 studies the tax burden on debt and equity-financed investment in the closely held 
corporation and discusses the controlling shareholder’s tax-arbitrage behaviour. 
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• Debt-financed investment in the closely held corporation 
Investment in the closely held corporation may be financed with debt. By assumption, the 
controlling shareholder provides the debt (directly or indirectly through a mutual fund). For 
simplicity’s sake, we ignore the fact that the controlling shareholder’s debt claims on his closely 
held corporation are part of his substantial holding (business wealth) and are therefore (partly) 
exempt from wealth taxes. Because the size of the investment in the closely held corporation is 
lower than in the corporate firm, the degree of immediate expensing is assumed to be 4%. The 
cost of capital on the debt-financed investment then equals 2.86%.  
 
 
• Equity-financed investment in the closely held corporation 
This section discusses the tax burden on equity-financed investment (newly issued equity 
and retained earnings as the source of finance) in the closely held corporation. The return on 
the equity-financed investment is distributed as dividends, which are not taxed at the 
progressive personal income-tax rate, but at a special rate of 25%. Realised capital gains are 
also taxed at 25%. The controlling shareholder requires either the traditional or the innovative 
opportunity return. The results are presented in table 12.  
 
 
‘Traditional’ controlling shareholder 
The controlling shareholder’s traditional opportunity return is taxed under the progressive 
income tax. The cost of capital on investment financed with newly issued equity or retained 
earnings is then decreasing in the marginal income tax. The household’s personal wealth is 
taxed under the wealth tax. However, the controlling shareholder’s business wealth (which is 
the value of his substantial amount of shares in the closely held corporation) may be (partly) 
exempt from wealth taxes. The higher the exemption of business wealth from wealth taxes, 
the lower is the cost of capital. 
Because dividends are taxed at a rate of only 25%, the cost of capital on investment financed 
with newly issued equity in the closely held corporation is lower than in the publicly held 
corporate firm. 
Because the capital gains tax of 25% is levied only if the capital gains are realised, the cost 
of capital on investment financed with retained earnings is lower than on investment financed 
with newly issued equity. Because of this capital gains tax, the cost of capital on investment 
financed with retained earnings in the closely held corporation exceeds the corresponding 
cost of capital in the publicly held corporate firm. However, the opposite occurs if the 
controlling shareholder’s business wealth is entirely exempt from wealth taxes. 
 
 
‘Innovative’ controlling shareholder 
In case of an innovative controlling shareholder, the wealth tax and the exemption of 
business wealth from wealth taxes explain the differences in the cost of capital and the tax 
wedge for a particular source of finance. Because the capital gains tax is levied only if the 
capital gains are realised, the cost of capital on investment financed with retained earnings is 
lower than on investment financed with newly issued equity. 
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Table 12: equity-financed investment in the closely held corporation before the tax reform  (a) (b)              
 
  
         newly issued equity        retained earnings    
 
 
 
Low marginal income-tax rate (-65): 37.95% 
  p 4.6%  (4.9%)  3.9%  (4.3%) 
w 3.1%  (3.2%)  2.4%  (2.6%)  
te 66.5%  (64.9%) 61.3%  (59.5%) 
q 1  (1)  0.939  (0.937) 
 
Average marginal income-tax rate: 50% 
- No wealth taxes   p 3.2% (4.9%)  2.7% (4.3%) 
      w 2.45% (3.2%)  1.95% (2.6%) 
      te 76.3% (64.9%) 72.3% (59.5%) 
    q 1 (1)  0.948 (0.937) 
     
- Wealth tax: 0.7%    p 1.9% (3.7%)  1.6% (3.1%) 
business wealth 100% tax-exempt w 1.85% (2.7%)  1.55% (2.1%) 
      te 97.4% (72%)  96.9% (67.5%)  
      q 1 (1)  0.957 (0.945) 
 
- Wealth tax: 0.7%   p 2.3% (4.1%)  2% (3.5%) 
business wealth 68% tax-exempt w  2.25% (3.1%)  1.95% (2.5%) 
      te 97.8% (74.8%) 97.5% (70.9%) 
      q 1 (1)  0.957 (0.945) 
 
High marginal income-tax rate: 60% (c) 
- Wealth tax: 0.7%    p 0.81% (3.7%)  0.57% (3.1%) 
business wealth 100% tax-exempt w 1.41% (2.7%)  1.17% (2.1%) 
      te 174% (72%)  205% (67.5%) 
      q 1 (1)  0.967 (0.945) 
 
- Wealth tax: 0.7%   p 1.2% (4.1%)  0.9% (3.5%) 
business wealth 68% tax-exempt w  1.8% (3.1%)  1.5% (2.5%) 
      te 150% (74.8%) 164% (70.9%) 
      q 1 (1)  0.967 (0.945) 
 
 
a. By assumption, households that face a high (low) marginal income-tax rate do (not) have to pay 
wealth taxes. Both cases are studied for households that face an average marginal income-tax 
rate. 
b. The table presents the results in case of a traditional opportunity return. The results in case of an 
innovative opportunity return are presented in parentheses. 
c. et  under newly issued equity is lower than under retained earnings (the opposite from what we 
expect from p ), which follows from the negative s . 
 
 
• Traditional controlling shareholder’s tax-arbitrage behaviour 
This section studies the tax-arbitrage behaviour of the controlling shareholder who requires a 
traditional opportunity return on his investment in the closely held corporation.  
Retained earnings are tax-preferred over newly issued equity because the capital gains tax is 
levied only if the capital gains are realised. However, the capital gains tax reduces the 
incentives to finance investment with retained earnings.  
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Debt is the most tax-preferred source of finance for the controlling shareholder who faces a 
marginal income-tax rate of 37.95% on personal income. The gain as a result of the 
deduction of the interest payments from the firm’s taxable earnings compensates for the 
personal income tax on the interest payments, which is only a little higher than the tax on 
business income of 25%. Moreover, the wealth tax is zero for low-income households (by 
assumption), which implies that the advantage of business wealth being partly exempt from 
wealth taxes (as opposed to personal wealth) is absent. In case of a marginal income-tax 
rate of 50% (and if the controlling shareholder’s personal and business wealth is not taxed 
under the wealth tax), retained earnings are preferred over debt, and newly issued equity is 
the least tax-preferred source of finance. In the other cases, debt is the least tax-preferred 
source of finance (as a result of the high income tax on the interest payments and the wealth 
tax on the personal wealth). Thus: 
 
The controlling shareholder who requires a traditional opportunity return prefers: 
-  Income-tax rate = 37.95%:              NERED φφ  
-  Income-tax rate = 50%, wealth tax = 0%:     NEDRE φφ  
-  Income-tax rate = 50% or 60%, wealth tax = 0.7%:  DNERE φφ     
   business wealth 68% or 100% exempt from wealth taxes)    
 
 
Investment in the closely held corporation or personal savings in the corporate firm 
Retained earnings are the closely held corporation’s most tax-preferred source of finance 
(except in case of a controlling shareholder who faces a marginal personal income-tax rate of 
37.95%). The controlling shareholder prefers the earnings to be retained and reinvested 
instead of distributed, such that he can invest these earnings in debt or newly issued equity 
of the corporate firm. The controlling shareholder therefore faces a tax incentive, which is 
increasing in the personal income-tax rate, to accumulate his funds in the closely held 
corporation instead of saving in newly issued equity (under the assumption that the return on 
this investment is distributed as dividends) or debt of the corporate firm. However, the 
controlling shareholder does not face a tax incentive to accumulate his funds in the closely 
held corporation if they can be invested in the equity of a growing firm or in a mutual fund. 
 
Investment in the closely held corporation or in the proprietorship 
The closely held corporation is tax-preferred over the proprietorship because the closely held 
corporation offers the opportunity to transform highly taxed labour income into lower taxed 
capital income.  
However, on the basis of the capital income taxes as discussed in this dissertation, and 
because it is assumed that the controlling shareholder realises its capital gains already after 
6 years, the tax code favours the proprietorship over the closely held corporation. The cost of 
capital on equity-financed investment in the proprietorship is lower than the cost of capital on 
equity-financed investment (newly issued equity and retained earnings as a source of 
finance) in the closely held corporation. The cost of capital on debt-financed investment in 
the proprietorship is lower than in the closely held corporation as well. 
However, the closely held corporation is tax-preferred over the proprietorship if it takes more 
than 6 years before the controlling shareholder realises the capital gains on his shares. 
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Sinn’s life-cycle model of the closely held corporation 
Because retained earnings are tax-preferred over newly issued equity, Sinn’s dynamic life-
cycle model of the firm implies that the closely held corporation issues only a nucleus of new 
equity. Afterwards, the closely held corporation finances investment with retained earnings 
until the corporation reaches the phase of maturity. If no more profitable investment 
opportunities are available, the corporation starts to distribute dividends. 
 
 
• Innovative controlling shareholder’s tax-arbitrage behaviour 
This section studies the tax-arbitrage behaviour of the controlling shareholder that requires 
an innovative opportunity return on its investment in the closely held corporation. Again, 
retained earnings are tax-preferred over newly issued equity. Debt, however, is the most tax-
preferred source of finance. Thus: 
 
The controlling shareholder that requires an innovative opportunity return prefers: 
    NERED φφ  
 
 
Investment in the closely held corporation or personal savings in the corporate firm 
The controlling shareholder faces a tax incentive to invest indirectly in debt of the closely 
held corporation. However, if not the controlling shareholder but another household finances 
the investment with debt, the controlling shareholder faces a tax incentive to invest his funds 
indirectly in corporate debt, which yields the innovative opportunity return, and not to invest 
the funds in the closely held corporation.   
 
Investment in the closely held corporation or in the proprietorship 
In case of an innovative saving strategy, the capital-income-tax system favours the 
proprietorship over the closely held corporation (similarly to the outcome in case of a 
traditional opportunity return). Equity-financed investment in the proprietorship is preferred 
over investment financed with newly issued equity and retained earnings in the closely held 
corporation. Again, this result reverses if it takes more than 6 years before the controlling 
shareholder realises the capital gains on his shares (of the closely held corporation). 
 
 
5.7 Owner-occupied housing 
This section studies investment in owner-occupied housing. The household may require a 
traditional opportunity return. Part of the value of the investment (1.25%) is added to the 
household’s taxable income. However, the imputed rental value is lower than the 
household’s before-tax opportunity return (nominal interest rate of 6.5%) on the invested 
funds (transaction tax inclusive). Both returns are taxed under the marginal income tax. 
Hence, the household receives a subsidy on owner-occupied housing that is increasing in yt . 
As presented in table 13, the cost of capital is then decreasing in yt . The value of the 
opportunity investment is taxed under the wealth tax. However, only 60% of the value of the 
owner-occupied housing is taxed under the wealth tax. The cost of capital in the presence of 
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the wealth taxes is consequently lower than in the absence of the wealth taxes. As explained 
in section 2.9, the traditional household is indifferent between a debt-financed and an equity-
financed investment in owner-occupied housing. 
 
The household may require an innovative opportunity return on the funds invested in owner-
occupied housing. The cost of capital on an equity-financed investment in owner-occupied 
housing increases if the household requires the innovative instead of the traditional 
opportunity return on the invested funds. However, instead of investing its funds in owner-
occupied housing, the household has an incentive to invest its funds innovatively in market 
debt and to borrow in order to finance the investment in housing. This strategy yields a 
finance gain, which is increasing in the marginal income tax.  
 
Table 13: owner-occupied housing before the tax reform: traditional and innovative opportunity return    
 
      traditional opportunity return          innovative opportunity return  
 
   equity  /  debt          equity                        debt  
  
    te     p                 te             p        F           te   p 
 
 
Low income-tax rate: 37.95% 
- No wealth taxes        45.1%    2.8%             42.5% 3%  2.8% 37.2% 2.7% 
- Wealth tax: 0.7%  66.3%    2.5%             61.7% 2.7%  3.2% 57.6% 2.4% 
 
Average income-tax rate: 50%  
- No wealth taxes        64.6%    2.1%             45.2% 3.1%  14.5% 7.8% 1.9% 
- Wealth tax: 0.7%  97.2%    1.8%             63.7% 2.8%  16.2% 32.5% 1.5% 
 
High income-tax rate: 60% 
- No wealth taxes        93.6%    1.5%             47.3% 3.3%  24.2% -51% 1.1% 
- Wealth tax: 0.7%  148.8%    1.2%             65.3% 2.9%  27% -32.7% 0.8% 
 
 
 
Tax-arbitrage behaviour 
The tax code favours investment in owner-occupied housing. The traditional household 
prefers a debt or an equity-financed investment in owner-occupied housing over investment 
in the corporate firm financed with debt or newly issued equity. However, the traditional 
shareholder prefers corporate investment financed with retained earnings over investment in 
owner-occupied housing. 
The household that requires an innovative opportunity return prefers debt-financed 
investment in owner-occupied housing over investment in debt and equity of the corporate 
firm through a mutual fund. 
 
 
5.8 Sensitivity analysis 
The numerical results of the King-Fullerton type of analysis are determined by the value of 
the interest rate and the inflation rate. Thus far, the analysis has assumed a real interest rate 
of 4% and an inflation rate of 2.5%. This section performs a sensitivity analysis and studies 
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the effects of a change in r  and π  on corporate investment financed with newly issued 
equity, retained earnings or debt. The analysis focuses on the effects on p , A , s  and et .  
If 0=A , the cost of capital on a debt-financed corporate investment 
τ
τπ
−
−=
= 10
rp A  amounts 
to the real interest rate net of the tax gain as a result of the deduction of nominal interest 
payments from taxable corporate earnings. This implicit subsidy is increasing in π . 
Consequently, 0=Ap  is decreasing in the inflation rate (see table 14). If 0=A , then the cost 
of capital on a corporate investment financed with newly issued equity (‘traditional’ 
shareholder) 
τ−
=
= 10
rp A  increases with the real interest rate, and is independent of the 
inflation rate. If 0=A , then the cost of capital on a corporate investment financed with 
retained earnings (‘traditional’ shareholder) amounts to 
)1(
)1(
0 τ
π
−
−−
=
=
yy
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trt
p . The rate of 
return on an investment financed with retained earnings is not taxed at the household level 
(because there is no capital gains tax). However, the nominal opportunity rate of return on a 
direct investment in debt is taxed under the household’s marginal income tax. The cost of 
capital consequently decreases with the inflation rate, as presented in table 14. 
 
Table 14: sensitivity analysis in case of a (weighted) corporate investment  (a), (b) 
   
    debt    newly issued equity            retained earnings 
 
 
r       π  
 
    A  
 
 0=Ap  
 
p  
 
  A  
 
 
0=Ap  
 
p  
 
  A  
 
0=Ap  
 
p  
          
r = 4%          
 
0% 
  
  
 0.0375 
 
4% 
 
3.64% 
 
0.046 
 
6.15% 
 
5.7% 
 
 0.032 
 
3.1% 
 
2.8% 
2.5% 
 
  -0.008 2.65% 3.02% 0.016 6.15% 6.3% -0.026 1.15% 1.7% 
5% 
 
  -0.055 1.3% 2.3% -0.007 6.15% 6.7% -0.098 -0.77% 0.5% 
7.5%   -0.11 -0.04% 1.5% -0.026 6.15% 7.1% -0.21 -2.7% -0.74% 
   
 
       
r = 8%          
 
0% 
 
2.5% 
 
5% 
 
7.5% 
   
 0.05 
 
 0.0185 
 
-0.0126 
 
-0.0445 
 
8% 
 
6.65% 
 
5.3% 
 
3.96% 
 
7.22% 
 
6.56% 
 
5.8% 
 
4.99% 
 
0.055 
 
0.035 
 
0.019 
 
0.005 
 
12.3% 
 
12.3% 
 
12.3% 
 
12.3% 
 
11.4% 
 
11.96% 
 
12.4% 
 
12.8% 
 
0.046 
 
0.005 
 
-0.041 
 
-0.097 
 
6.15% 
 
4.23% 
 
2.3% 
 
0.38% 
 
5.5% 
 
4.4% 
 
3.2% 
 
1.86% 
 
a. The household requires a traditional opportunity return of a direct investment in debt. The marginal 
income tax equals 50%; the wealth tax is 0.7%. 
b. Weights used to calculate the average cost of capital: machinery 47%, buildings 31%, and 
intangible assets 22% (source: Bovenberg and ter Rele (1998)). 
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Actual (straight-line) tax depreciation allowances are not indexed for inflation. Economic 
depreciation allowances, however, are adjusted for inflation. Even though actual tax 
depreciation allowances do not directly depend on the inflation rate, an increase in the 
inflation rate raises the firm’s discount rate bρ , which decreases the straight-line 
depreciation allowances. A similar decrease occurs in case of the economic depreciation 
allowances. As a result of the increased inflation rate, however, this decrease does not 
exceed the direct increase. Economic depreciation allowances are thus not decreasing in π . 
Consequently, A  decreases with π , as demonstrated in table 14. 
 
 
Table 15: sensitivity analysis in case of a (weighted) corporate investment  (a), (b) 
   
       debt    newly issued equity           retained earnings 
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 3.02%  0.05% 98.3% 6.3%  0.05% 99.2%  1.7%  0.05% 97.1% 
5% 
 
 2.3% -1.2% 152% 6.7% -1.2% 118%  0.5% -1.2% 340% 
7.5%  1.5% -2.45% 263% 7.1% -2.45% 134% -0.74% -2.45%   - 
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 3.3% 
 
 2.05% 
 
 0.8% 
 
-0.45% 
 
54.3% 
 
68.7% 
 
86.2% 
 
109% 
 
11.4% 
 
11.96% 
 
12.4% 
 
12.8% 
 
 3.3% 
 
 2.05% 
 
 0.8% 
 
-0.45% 
 
71.1% 
 
82.9% 
 
93.5% 
 
103% 
 
 5.5% 
 
 4.4% 
 
 3.2% 
 
 1.86% 
 
 
 
 3.3% 
 
 2.05% 
 
 0.8% 
 
-0.45% 
 
40% 
 
53.4% 
 
75% 
 
124% 
 
a. The household requires a traditional opportunity return of a direct investment in debt. The marginal 
income tax equals 50%; the wealth tax equals 0.7%. 
b. Weights used to calculate the average cost of capital: machinery 47%, buildings 31%, and 
intangible assets 22% (source: Bovenberg and ter Rele (1998)). 
 
 
As discussed in section 2.8, a decrease in A  (for instance, as a result of an increase in π ) 
increases p  (ceteris paribus). Table 14 demonstrates this result for corporate investment 
financed with newly issued equity. However, in case of debt and retained earnings as a 
source of finance, p  decreases with π . In these cases, the effect of an increase in the 
inflation rate through A  is lower than the effect as a result of the direct deduction of the 
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inflation rate from the cost of capital (deduction at the corporate tax rate in case of debt and 
at the marginal income-tax rate in case of retained earnings).  
As derived in section 2.8, p  is lower than 0=Ap  if 0>A . However, this result is based on 
the assumption that 0== cwB . If the additional taxes are positive, p  may exceed 0=Ap  
even if actual depreciation allowances are more favourable than economic depreciation 
allowances, as demonstrated in table 14.  
 
The household’s after-tax real rate of return ππ −−+−= wy trts ))(1(  is decreasing in the 
inflation rate and is increasing in the real interest rate. Table 15 presents a sensitivity 
analysis with respect to the after-tax real rate of return and the marginal effective tax rate. 
 
 
5.9 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the tax burden and the household’s and firm’s tax-arbitrage 
behaviour before the tax reform of January 1, 2001.  
Shareholders that directly invest in the corporate firm prefer retained earnings over debt (if 
>yt 35%), while newly issued equity is the least tax-preferred source of finance. This 
favourable tax treatment of retained earnings implies a tax-induced advantage for mature 
firms, which generate sufficient retained earnings to finance investment (compared to new 
firms). Financial market imperfections increase the mature firm’s competitive advantage even 
further. Young firms can try to limit this competitive disadvantage by relying more on debt as 
the source of finance instead of newly issued equity. Even if the firm’s equity is controlled by 
a mutual fund, investment financed by young firms must yield a higher return than investment 
by mature firms.  
Households face incentives to save through a mutual fund instead of controlling the savings 
themselves. The pension fund is the household’s most tax-preferred saving vehicle. 
As result of the tax treatment of depreciation, the Dutch capital-income-tax system favours 
investment in intangible assets over investment in machinery, equipment and means of 
transportation. The latter investment opportunities, in turn, are tax-favoured compared to 
investment in buildings. 
If the wealth tax on personal wealth is positive, then the traditional proprietor prefers equity 
over debt as the source of finance. Newly issued equity and retained earnings are taxed 
similarly because profits are taxed only once under the proprietor’s personal income tax. The 
traditional proprietor faces a tax incentive to accumulate funds inside the proprietorship 
instead of saving in the equity or debt of the corporate firm. The innovative proprietor, in 
contrast, prefers debt over equity as the source of finance. 
Controlling shareholders that require a traditional opportunity return prefer to finance 
investment with retained earnings instead of newly issued equity. In most cases, debt is the 
least tax-preferred source of finance. This controlling shareholder faces a tax incentive to 
accumulate his funds in the closely held corporation instead of saving in newly issued equity 
or debt of the corporate firm. The proprietorship is tax-preferred over the closely held 
corporation if the controlling shareholder realises its capital gains rather quickly. Otherwise, 
the opposite is true. The innovative controlling shareholder prefers debt over retained 
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earnings. Newly issued equity is the least tax-preferred source of finance. Whether the 
proprietorship is tax-preferred over the closely held corporation depends again on how 
quickly the controlling shareholder realises the capital gains on his shares. 
The Dutch tax code taxes investment in owner-occupied housing favourably. Households 
that require a traditional opportunity return are indifferent between debt and equity-financed 
investment. However, innovative households face an incentive to borrow in order to finance 
the investment in owner-occupied housing.  
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Chapter 6 
Tax-arbitrage Behaviour in the Netherlands 
after the Tax Reform 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter 6 presents the tax burden on marginal saving and investment opportunities in the 
Netherlands after the tax reform of January 1, 2001. The analysis discusses the firm’s and 
household’s tax-arbitrage behaviour and evaluates the tax reform. This chapter applies the 
King-Fullerton method, simulates Sinn’s dynamic life-cycle model of the firm, and focuses on 
financial market imperfections.  
 
Similarly to chapter 5, the analysis considers investment projects that, by assumption, are 
characterised by different values for the depreciation rate δ  and the asset’s tax lifetime L  
(investment in machinery, equipment and means of transportation )9%,5.12( == Lδ , in 
buildings )25%,1.4( == Lδ  and in intangible assets )1%,5.12( == Lδ ). The analysis derives 
the cost of capital for the three types of investment projects. The weighted average cost of 
capital then applies the following weights: machinery 47%, buildings 31%, and intangible 
assets 22%. The degree of immediate expensing is 0.5% (corporate firm), 4% (closely held 
corporation) and 7% (proprietorship), as applied in Bovenberg and ter Rele (1998). The 
analysis assumes a real interest rate of 4% and an inflation rate of 2.5% (Sinn’s life-cycle 
model of the firm abstracts from inflation). 
 
Section 6.2 presents the capital-income-tax system in the Netherlands after the tax reform. 
Section 6.3 focuses on direct household savings in the corporate firm under the King-
Fullerton method (section 6.3.1), under Sinn’s life-cycle model of the firm (section 6.3.2) and 
in light of financial market imperfections (section 6.3.3). Section 6.4 studies indirect 
household savings in the corporate firm. The proprietorship and the closely held corporation 
are studied respectively in sections 6.5 and 6.6. Section 6.7 focuses on owner-occupied 
housing, and section 6.8 presents a sensitivity analysis. Section 6.9 concludes. 
 
 
6.2 Capital income taxes in the Netherlands after the tax reform 
The main characteristic of the capital-income-tax system in the Netherlands after the tax 
reform of January 1, 2001 is that the actual return on personal wealth no longer falls under 
the personal income tax, and that the old wealth tax is abolished. These capital income taxes 
have been replaced by a presumptive capital income tax. All personal wealth, except owner-
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occupied property, is assumed to earn a return of 4%, which is taxed at a proportional tax 
rate of 30%. Thus, the presumptive capital income tax is in fact a wealth tax of 1.2%. More 
details of the new capital-income-tax system are presented in table 1. 
 
Table 1:  capital-income-tax system after the tax reform of January 1, 2001   (a) (b) 
 
BOX   Type of income (c) (d)      Tax rates 
 
  
BOX I (e) - Labour income (f)       younger than 65 years: 
  - Pensions (g)       32.35/37.6-42-52% 
  - Return on capital of proprietor      
  - Interest, rental income and capital gains on assets put at the  older than 65 years: 
    disposal of closely held companies by controlling shareholders 14.45/19.7-42-52% 
- Net presumptive rental value of owner-occupied housing (minus  
  interest) 
 
BOX II  Distributed profits (dividends) and realised capital gains on shares 25% 
  that belong to a ‘substantial holding’ (h) 
 
BOX III  Personal wealth (i) (j): 4% presumptive return on the value of  30% 
  shares, savings deposits, bonds, immovable property (k) and  
  (not tax-exempt) capital insurances 
 
BOX IV  Corporate profits (net of interest payments)    35% (l) 
 
BOX V  - Capital income realised by pension funds, insurance companies exempt (not in box IV) 
  - Tax-exempt capital insurances (linked to owner-occupied housing) exempt (not in box III) 
- Additional saving opportunities (income blocked on a savings  exempt (not in box I) 
    account for four years, return on savings taxed in box III)    
 
 
a. This table is based on ‘Taxation in the Netherlands 2001’ of the Dutch Ministry of Finance (2001), and on 
‘Fundamental Tax Reform in the Netherlands’ of S. Cnossen and L. Bovenberg (2001). 
b. These tax rules are applicable for income and profits earned after 01/01/2001. 
c. Income can be taxed in different boxes. 
d. The tax treatment of depreciation does not change. The tax code allows straight-line depreciation. In case of 
intangible assets, tax authorities allow free depreciation. Moreover, part of the investment can immediately be 
expensed. The Dutch tax system allows the deduction of current losses from future (carry forward) and past 
(carry backward) profits. 
e. General tax credit of euro 1 576. Plus maximum labour income tax credit of euro 920. Additional tax credits 
for children, singles and elderly 
f. Includes wages, salaries, (labour) income of proprietors, presumptive wage income of the director-
shareholder of a closely held corporation, social security benefits and other labour income 
g. ‘Registered-asset expenditure tax’ treatment: pension savings are deductible from taxable income in box I. 
When the individual receives the pension, it is taxed under the income tax of box I. 
h. A controlling shareholder holds at least 5% of the shares of a (closely held) corporation. 
i. Personal wealth exemption of euro 17 600 (euro 35 200 for married couples); debt exceeding euro 2 500 is 
deductible from the tax base in box III. 
j. Mortgage loans on owner-occupied property are not deductible from the tax base in box III. (Only) the interest 
paid on home mortgage loans is deductible in box I. 
k. The value of the owner-occupied house is not added to the tax base in box III. 
l. Profits up to euro 22 686 are taxed at 30%. 
 
 
6.3 Direct household savings in the corporate firm 
Households may save directly in the debt and equity of the corporate firm. Section 6.3 
studies tax-arbitrage behaviour under the King-Fullerton method, under Sinn’s life-cycle 
model of the firm, and in light of financial market imperfections. 
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6.3.1 The King-Fullerton method 
The household may finance investment in the corporate firm with debt, newly issued equity 
or retained earnings. This section determines the firm’s tax-preferred sources of finance and 
investment projects and evaluates the tax reform.  
 
• Direct household savings in debt of the corporate firm 
The tax reform replaces the personal income tax with the presumptive capital income tax on 
personal wealth wt . The household realises an after-tax real rate of return wts −= %4  on 
direct investment in the corporate firm. s  is independent of the inflation rate.  
The tax reform increases the after-tax real rate of return on direct investment in the corporate 
firm. As a result, the required yields on other investment opportunities increase as well. 
Wealthy traditional households that have high incomes from capital gain the most. 
 
Table 2: direct household savings in debt of the corporate firm after the tax reform (a) (b)  
     
         te   th     tc            p s 
 
 
• Low income-tax rate (+65): 19.7%             -32.3 %  0%     -32.3%           3% 4% 
• Low income-tax rate (-65): 37.6%   -32.3 %  0%     -32.3%           3% 4% 
• Average income-tax rate: 42% 
- No wealth taxes   -32.3 %  0%  -32.3%           3% 4% 
- Wealth tax: 1.2%      7.4  %  30% -32.3%           3% 2.8% 
• High income-tax rate: 52%      7.4  %  30%      -32.3%           3% 2.8% 
 
 
a. By assumption, households that face a high (low) marginal income tax (do not) possess a 
substantial amount of wealth, which implies that their wealth is (not) taxed under the presumptive 
capital income tax. Both cases are studied for households with an average marginal income tax.  
b. The tax reform strongly reduces the personal wealth exemption. As a result, more individuals will 
be taxed under the ‘wealth’ tax.  
 
 
The tax reform does not change the tax treatment at the firm level. As a result of the nominal 
deductibility of interest payments from taxable earnings, the cost of capital on debt-financed 
investment continues to be lower than the real interest rate. The depreciation allowances are 
presented in table 3 of chapter 5. The increase in s  strongly reduces the marginal effective 
tax rates on debt-financed investment (table 2) compared to the tax burden before the tax 
reform (see table 2 of chapter 5). 
 
• Direct household savings in equity of the corporate firm 
This section discusses the tax burden on direct household investment financed with newly 
issued equity or retained earnings, as presented in table 3. 
 
Newly issued equity 
By assumption, the return on the investment financed with newly issued equity is distributed 
as dividends, which are no longer taxed under the progressive personal income tax. At the 
household level, equity is taxed under the presumptive capital income tax.  
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At the firm level, the tax reform affects only the tax on the value of the newly issued equity, 
which decreases from 0.9% to 0.55%. The tax reform does not change the value of the 
depreciation allowances (see table 5, chapter 5). As a result, the cost of capital decreases 
only slightly (from 6.3% to 6.2%)1.  
 
Table 3: direct household savings in equity of the corporate firm after the tax reform               
 
newly issued           retained 
       equity            earnings 
 
 
Low marginal income-tax rate (+65): 19.7% p  6.2%   6.1% 
w  2.2%   2.1%  
tc       35.7%    34.5% 
  th      0%   0%       
      te  35.7%   34.5% 
q  1   1 
 
Low marginal income-tax rate (-65): 37.6% p  6.2%   6.1% 
w  2.2%   2.1% 
tc      35.7%   34.5% 
th      0%     0% 
te      35.7%   34.5%  
q  1   1 
 
Average marginal income-tax rate: 42%  p  6.2%   6.1% 
- No wealth taxes   w  2.2%   2.1% 
tc      35.7%   34.5% 
 th      0%   0% 
  te      35.7%   34.5% 
q  1   1 
 
- Wealth tax: 1.2%   p  6.2%   6.1% 
   w  3.4%   3.3% 
tc      35.7%   34.5%  
 th      30%    30% 
 te      55%   54.1% 
q  1   1 
 
High marginal income-tax rate: 52%   p  6.2%   6.1% 
w  3.4%   3.3%  
tc       35.7%   34.5% 
 th      30%   30% 
     te      55%   54.1%  
q  1   1 
 
 
a. By assumption, households that face a high (low) marginal income-tax rate (do not) possess a 
substantial amount of wealth, which implies that their wealth is (not) taxed under the presumptive 
capital income tax. Both cases are studied for households with an average marginal income-tax 
rate. 
                                                          
1 The household realises an after-tax real rate of return πρ −−= wts . Because the household requires 
the opportunity return on a direct investment in corporate debt, the equity-financed investment has to 
yield a nominal rate of return before household taxes ρ  equal to the nominal interest rate of 6.5%. 
The arbitrage implies that the cost of capital is independent of wt . 
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Retained earnings 
Because the equity-financed investment is taxed under the presumptive capital income tax, 
investment financed with newly issued equity or with retained earnings is taxed similarly. The 
difference between newly issued equity and retained earnings in table 3 is attributable only to 
the tax on the value of the newly issued equity, which is not due if the investment is financed 
with retained earnings. 
The corporate tax discrimination of equity at the firm level (in contrast to debt, because 
interest payments are deductible from taxable earnings) is no longer compensated by a tax 
advantage of capital gains at the household level (the absence of a capital gains tax in 
contrast to the personal income tax on interest payments before the tax reform). Similarly to 
newly issued equity, the investment financed with retained earnings is taxed twice. Profits 
are taxed at the corporate tax rate, and the investment is taxed under the presumptive capital 
income tax.  
The required return on investment financed with retained earnings no longer depends on the 
labour income of the investor and on the taxes at the household level. As a result, the cost of 
capital strongly increases. By implication, the increase in the value of the firm’s equity, as a 
result of the investment financed with retained earnings, is no longer below unity. 
 
 
• Tax-arbitrage behaviour 
Because equity-financed and debt-financed investment are taxed under the presumptive 
capital income tax, and because only interest payments are deductible from taxable 
corporate earnings, debt is the tax-preferred source of finance. The tax code thus induces 
firms to finance investment with debt. A slight difference exists between newly issued equity 
and retained earnings, which is attributable to the tax on the value of the newly issued equity. 
This difference, however, is negligible. Thus: 
 
Shareholders that directly invest in the corporate firm prefer: 
    RED φ ~ NE  
 
Although the household is indifferent between newly issued equity and retained earnings as 
a source of finance, and dividends and capital gains as use of profits, the household prefers 
to receive dividends instead of capital gains (for a given amount of investment opportunities) 
such that these funds can be invested in corporate debt. 
 
Investment projects 
Due to the unchanged tax treatment of depreciation, the Dutch capital-income-tax system 
continues to favour investment in intangible assets over investment in machinery, equipment 
and means of transportation. The latter investment opportunities are more attractive, from a 
tax point of view, than investment in buildings. 
 
 
• Evaluation of the tax reform 
The tax reform does not affect the cost of capital on investment financed with newly issued 
equity or on investment financed with debt. The most important effect of the tax reform is the 
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equal tax treatment of newly issued equity and retained earnings (ignoring the minor impact 
of the tax on the value of the newly issued equity). As a result, the cost of capital on 
investment financed with retained earnings strongly increases.  
Before the tax reform, the firm preferred retained earnings over debt (if >yt 35%). In fact, the 
household that earned a substantial labour income faced a stronger incentive to reinvest the 
retained earnings instead of financing the investment with debt than did the household that 
earned a lower labour income. However, even though retained earnings were tax-preferred, 
the firm faced an incentive to attract debt as long as the investment’s return was higher than 
the interest rate. After the tax reform, debt is unambiguously the tax-preferred source of 
finance. The tax reform thus results in an even stronger preference for debt as the source of 
finance. Moreover, the preference for these sources of finance no longer depends on the 
household’s labour income. 
The tax reform raises the marginal steady-state cost of capital. The cost of capital on debt-
financed investment after the tax reform exceeds the cost of capital on investment financed 
with retained earnings before the tax reform. After the tax reform, firms are thus 
characterised by a lower steady-state capital stock.  
Because the cost of capital on investment financed with retained earnings increases, equity-
financed firms reduce their capital stock. 
 
 
6.3.2 Sinn’s life-cycle model of the firm 
Abstracting from the tax on the value of the newly issued equity, we derived that retained 
earnings and newly issued equity are taxed similarly. Sinn’s dynamic life-cycle model then 
demonstrates that the firm immediately attracts the optimal amount of capital, after which it 
starts distributing dividends and interest payments. The steady-state capital stock is financed 
partly with debt and partly with newly issued equity. (If the debt-capital ratio is not restricted, 
the firm finances the steady-state capital stock entirely with debt). The cost of capital on 
debt-financed investment equals the interest rate of 4%, which is lower than the cost of 
capital on equity-financed investment (which amounts to 6.1%). The steady-state cost of 
capital then equals 4.86%. The household realises an after-tax real rate of return of 2.8%. 
The marginal investment is characterised by a marginal effective tax rate of 42.4%.  
 
Evaluation of the tax reform 
The tax burden on external equity no longer exceeds that on internal equity. Consequently, it 
no longer is attractive to defer dividend taxes for tax purposes. The corporate firm thus does 
not pass through an internal growth phase, but immediately attracts the optimal amount of 
steady-state capital. Consequently, the tax code no longer offers mature firms (which 
possess earnings that can be retained and reinvested) a tax-induced competitive advantage 
compared to young, newly founded firms.  
The tax reform removes the tax barrier on the transfer of equity capital, which enhances the 
dynamics on the equity market. Resources are no longer misallocated, and the tax code no 
longer discourages the entry of new firms. However, because debt becomes the most tax-
preferred source of finance, firms that cannot attract debt suffer a tax-induced competitive 
disadvantage compared to firms that face no borrowing constraints. 
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6.3.3 Financial market imperfections 
This section discusses the agents’ tax-arbitrage behaviour and evaluates the tax reform in 
light of adverse selection in the debt and equity markets and in the presence of a minimum 
dividend constraint. 
 
• Adverse selection in the debt and equity markets 
In light of adverse selection in the equity market, the lemons premium on newly issued equity 
drives again a wedge between the cost of newly issued equity and the cost of retained 
earnings. Because retained earnings become a cheaper source of finance, the firm will issue 
only a nucleus of new equity. 
Adverse selection in the debt market increases the cost of debt-financed investment. If the 
lemons premium on debt dΩ  is lower than the corporate tax advantage of debt, the firm 
prefers debt over retained earnings. The firm then issues new equity and debt during the 
initial phase. The firm then enters an internal growth phase during which it finances 
investment with debt and retained earnings. In the steady state, the firm finances investment 
partly with debt (cost of capital equals ⋅Ω+ )1( d 4%) and partly with retained earnings (cost of 
capital equals 6.1%). If the debt-capital ratio is not restricted, the firm finances the steady-
state capital stock entirely (and immediately) with debt. 
If the lemons premium on debt exceeds the corporate tax advantage of debt, the firm prefers 
retained earnings over debt. The firm issues new equity and debt during the initial phase. 
Afterwards, the firm enters an internal growth phase during which it finances investment with 
debt and retained earnings. When the cost of capital equals ⋅Ω+ )1( d 4%, the firm redeems 
its debt. Additional investment is financed only with retained earnings. The steady-state cost 
of capital on investment financed with retained earnings equals 6.1%. 
 
Evaluation of the tax reform 
The tax reform eliminates the tax differential between newly issued equity and retained 
earnings. In light of adverse selection in the equity market, however, the cost of newly issued 
equity exceeds the cost of retained earnings. The firm thus continues to issue only a nucleus 
of new equity and, as before the tax reform, the firm passes through an internal growth 
phase.  
The capital-income-tax system after the tax reform yields a strong incentive to finance 
investment with debt. However, in case of adverse selection in the debt market, this strong 
preference for debt might be tempered or even reversed. As before the tax reform, retained 
earnings might become the firm’s preferred source of finance.  
In the presence of severe adverse selection after the tax reform, firms that must attract 
external sources of finance face a competitive disadvantage compared to mature firms. This 
conclusion is similar to the outcome before the tax reform. The competitive disadvantage of 
these firms increases even further if they are restricted in the amount of debt financing. 
 
 
• Minimum dividend constraint 
Before the tax reform, the minimum dividend constraint increased the tax-induced 
competitive advantage of mature firms compared to young firms. Sinn’s dynamic model 
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demonstrates that after the tax reform the firm (in the absence of adverse selection) 
immediately attracts the steady-state capital stock, after which it begins to distribute 
dividends and interest payments. Consequently, the incentive to distribute dividends in every 
period (in order to signal the firm’s quality or to resolve the moral hazard problems) no longer 
affects the firm’s finance and investment decisions. 
 
 
6.4 Indirect household savings in the corporate firm 
The household might save indirectly in the debt and equity of the corporate firm through an 
intermediary. Table 4 focuses on savings through a pension fund and a mutual fund.  
The cost of capital on the debt-financed investment equals 3%. Because the tax on the value 
of the newly issued equity is not considered, newly issued equity and retained earnings are 
taxed similarly. The cost of capital on the equity-financed investment equals 6.1%. 
 
Table 4: indirect household savings in the corporate firm after the tax reform  
 
              debt         equity 
          te     s     te   s  
 
 
Cost of capital on investment through an intermediary   p debt = 3%   p equity = 6.1% 
 
 
Pensions       
• Low (65-): 37.6% →  low (65+): 19.7%  -95.5%    5.9%  3.2%  5.9% 
• Average: 42% →  low (65+): 19.7%   -117 %    6.6%  -7.5%  6.6% 
• Average: 42% →  average: 42%    -32.3%    4%  34.5%  4% 
• High: 52% →  average: 42%    -78.2%    5.4%  11.8%  5.4% 
• High: 52% →  high: 52%    -32.3%    4%  34.5%  4% 
 
Mutual fund (earnings are NOT distributed) 
• No wealth taxes     42.5%    1.7%  71.7%  1.7%  
• Wealth tax: 1.2%     82.5%    0.5%  91.4%  0.5% 
 
Mutual fund (earnings are distributed) 
• No wealth taxes     -32.3%    4%  34.5%  4%  
• Wealth tax: 1.2%     7.4%    2.8%  54.1%  2.8% 
 
 
 
 
Except for the changes in the statutory marginal income-tax rates, the tax reform does not 
change the favourable tax treatment of pensions.  
The household may buy a share of a mutual fund. If this mutual fund retains its earnings 
instead of distributing them (to the household) as dividends, the fund’s earnings are taxed at 
a corporate tax rate of 35%. At the household level, the savings are taxed at the presumptive 
capital income-tax rate as well. These savings yield an after-tax real rate of return that is 
lower than the s  on direct savings in the corporate firm. If the mutual fund distributes its 
earnings, they are not taxed at the tax rate of 35%. These household savings are taxed, 
however, under the presumptive capital income tax.  
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Tax-arbitrage behaviour 
Households face an incentive to save for a pension through a pension fund. Saving through 
a mutual fund that does not distribute its earnings becomes a less attractive saving strategy 
than direct household savings. The household gains no tax advantage from saving through a 
mutual fund that distributes its earnings. The mutual fund after the tax reform is thus no 
longer a tax-favoured saving vehicle. The pension fund and the mutual fund face an incentive 
to invest in the debt rather than the equity of the corporate firm. Thus: 
 
 Shareholders that invest in the corporate firm through an intermediary prefer: 
     equitydebt φ  
 
 
Evaluation of the tax reform 
The innovative strategy of a debt or equity-financed investment in the corporate firm through 
a mutual fund is no longer a more attractive saving strategy than direct household savings. 
The tax reform therefore reduces the tax-arbitrage opportunities at the household level, 
thereby levelling the playing field. Less ‘active’ households no longer pay more taxes than 
households who know how to minimise their tax liabilities. As a result of the increase in the 
after-tax real rate of return on direct savings in corporate debt, direct household saving is no 
longer less attractive than saving through (certain types of) intermediaries. The tax treatment 
of pension savings, however, remains very attractive. 
If the household borrows funds after the tax reform, the interest payments are not deductible 
from taxable income in box I. The household no longer faces a tax-incentive to borrow funds 
and use them to buy (directly or indirectly) shares of the corporate firm. These tax-arbitrage 
transactions no longer erode the tax base as well. 
 
 
 
6.5 The proprietorship 
This section studies the tax burden on investment in the proprietorship. The analysis 
explores the proprietor’s tax-arbitrage behaviour and evaluates the tax reform. 
 
• Debt-financed investment in the proprietorship 
The proprietor may finance investment in the proprietorship with borrowed money. By 
assumption, the proprietor borrows money from another household. The proprietor invests 
his personal wealth in corporate debt. 
If the proprietor’s marginal income-tax rate equals 42% (52%), then debt-financed investment 
in the proprietorship must yield a before-tax real rate of return of 2.4% (1.8%). As a result of 
the nominal interest deductibility at the marginal income-tax rate, the cost of capital is lower 
than the real interest rate. The required return rises slightly (compared to the cost of capital 
before the tax reform), due to the lower personal income tax rates. The lender’s investment is 
taxed under the presumptive capital income tax (see table 2). Because p  is lower than s , 
the marginal tax burden on debt-financed investment in the proprietorship is negative, as 
presented in table 5. 
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Table 5: debt-financed investment in the proprietorship after the tax reform 
 
marginal income tax on the proprietor’s business income 
      
  42%          52%  
         te   p       te    p 
 
 
Taxes at household level (lender): 
- No wealth taxes  -68.9%  2.4%   -121.4% 1.8% 
- Wealth tax: 1.2%  -18.2%  2.4%     -55%  1.8% 
 
 
 
• Equity-financed investment in the proprietorship 
Table 6 presents the tax burden on equity-financed investment in the proprietorship. Profits 
are taxed only once under the proprietor’s personal income tax. This implies that newly 
issued equity and retained earnings are taxed similarly. 
 
If actual depreciation allowances are equal to economic depreciation allowances, and if no 
additional taxes are levied, the cost of capital equals 
)1( sy
w
t
tr
p
−
−
= . p  decreases with the 
presumptive capital income tax on the opportunity investment in corporate debt, and 
increases with the proprietor’s marginal income tax on business income. p  is independent of 
the inflation rate. 
 
Table 6: equity-financed investment in the proprietorship after the tax reform   
 
              w     te        p 
 
      
Low marginal income-tax rate (-65): 37.6%  1.9 %  32.5 %       5.9 % 
 
Average marginal income-tax rate: 42% 
- No wealth taxes     2.3 %   36.2 %       6.3 % 
- Wealth tax: 1.2% on opportunity return  1.7 %   38.2 %       4.5 % 
 
High marginal income-tax rate: 52% 
- Wealth tax: 1.2% on opportunity return  2.5 %   47 %       5.3 % 
 
 
 
• Tax-arbitrage behaviour 
Nominal interest payments are tax deductible, but the lender’s investment in the debt of the 
proprietorship and the proprietor’s investment in corporate debt are taxed under the 
presumptive capital income tax. The return on the equity-financed investment is taxed under 
the proprietor’s marginal business income tax. The results in table 5 and table 6 then 
demonstrate that the tax burden on equity-financed investment exceeds the tax burden on 
debt-financed investment. Thus: 
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  The proprietor prefers: equitydebt φ  
 
The proprietor faces no tax incentive to invest his funds inside of the proprietorship. Those 
proprietors who are subject to high marginal tax rates in box I face substantial tax incentives 
to finance their business with debt and to invest their personal wealth in assets assigned to 
box III (for instance, in corporate debt). 
 
Investment projects 
Similarly to the situation before the tax reform, the tax code favours the proprietor’s debt and 
equity-financed investment in intangible assets more than investment in machinery, 
equipment and means of transportation. These investment opportunities are, from a tax point 
of view, more attractive than investment in buildings. 
 
 
• Evaluation of the tax reform 
Even though interest payments are deductible at the lower marginal business income-tax 
rates, the tax reform reduces the tax burden on debt-financed investment in the 
proprietorship because the personal income tax on the interest payments is replaced by the 
lower presumptive capital income tax. Since the return on equity-financed investment is 
taxed at the lower marginal business income-tax rates, and because business wealth is no 
longer taxed under the wealth tax, the tax reform also reduces the tax burden on equity-
financed investment in the proprietorship. 
Because of the greater opportunity return, the tax reform increases the cost of capital on 
equity-financed investment in the proprietorship (the increase exceeds the reduction in p , 
since business wealth is no longer taxed under the wealth tax and because the business 
income-tax rates are reduced). As a direct consequence, the traditional proprietor’s tax-
preferred source of finance changes from equity to debt. The proprietor thus has an incentive 
to withdraw his funds from the proprietorship. Moreover, the tax reform reduces the optimal 
steady-state capital stock. The reform has less influence on the innovative proprietor (except 
for the small increase in the cost of capital on debt-financed investment) because debt 
remains his most tax-preferred source of finance. 
 
 
6.6 The closely held corporation 
This section explores the tax burden on debt and equity-financed investment in the closely 
held corporation, discusses the controlling shareholder’s tax-arbitrage behaviour and 
evaluates the tax reform. 
 
• Debt-financed investment in the closely held corporation 
Investment in the closely held corporation may be financed with debt. This analysis assumes 
that the controlling shareholder buys the debt of the closely held corporation. The controlling 
shareholder’s debt-financed investment is not taxed under the presumptive capital income 
tax of box III. The interest payments are taxed under the income tax of box I. This anti-
avoidance provision prevents the controlling shareholders from shifting their taxable income 
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out of box I into box III and, as such, prevents large differences in the tax burden on debt and 
equity-financed investment. 
Because 4% of the cost of the investment in the closely held corporation is immediately 
expensed, the cost of capital reduces to 2.86%. 
 
 
Table 7: the controlling shareholder’s debt-financed investment in the closely held corporation 
              after the tax reform  
     
      te         p            s 
    
 
• Low income-tax rate (+65): 19.7%                5%      2.86%        2.72% 
• Low income-tax rate (-65): 37.6%   45.7%      2.86%        1.56% 
• Average income-tax rate: 42%  55.7%       2.86%        1.27% 
• High income-tax rate: 52%   78.4%      2.86%        0.62% 
 
 
 
The interest payments are taxed under the income tax (box I), as is the case for interest 
payments before the tax reform. Hence, the investment yields a real after-tax rate of return 
that is decreasing in yt . This after-tax rate of return is lower than the s  of savings that are 
taxed under the presumptive capital income tax. Consequently, the marginal effective tax 
rates in table 7 exceed the tax rates in table 2. 
 
 
• Equity-financed investment in the closely held corporation 
Investment in the closely held corporation may be financed with newly issued equity or 
retained earnings. Dividends and realised capital gains are taxed at a rate of 25%. Since the 
capital gains tax of 25% is levied if the capital gains are realised, and because dividends are 
directly taxed at 25%, the cost of capital on investment financed with retained earnings is 
lower than in case of newly issued equity as a source of finance. 
The controlling shareholder requires an opportunity return of a direct investment in corporate 
debt. Table 8 then demonstrates that the cost of capital is decreasing in the presumptive 
capital income tax.  
 
 
• Tax-arbitrage behaviour 
Internal equity (retained earnings) is tax-preferred over external equity (newly issued equity) 
because the capital gains tax can be delayed until the shares are sold, which hampers the 
dynamics on the equity market. Debt is the most tax-preferred source of finance because the 
tax burden on equity-financed investment exceeds the tax burden on debt-financed 
investment. The tax burden on equity-financed investment consists of the corporate tax and 
the tax on dividends or realised capital gains of 25%. The tax burden on debt-financed 
investment equals the taxes at the household level on the interest payments, minus the gain 
of the deductibility of the nominal interest payments from taxable corporate earnings.  
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Table 8: equity-financed investment in the closely held corporation after the tax reform               
 
newly issued           retained 
       equity            earnings 
 
 
Low marginal income-tax rate (-65): 37.6%    p  9%   7.9% 
No wealth taxes:         w  5%   3.9% 
   te      55.7%   49.2%  
   q  1   0.914 
 
 
Average marginal income-tax rate: 42% 
- No wealth taxes      p  9%   7.9% 
   w  5%   3.9% 
   te      55.7%   49.2% 
   q  1   0.914 
 
- Wealth tax: 1.2% on           p  6.8%   6% 
   opportunity return      w  4%   3.2% 
   te      58.9%   53.1% 
   q  1   0.925 
 
 
High marginal income-tax rate: 52%      p  6.8%   6% 
Wealth tax: 1.2% on opportunity return       w  4%   3.2%  
   te      58.9%   53.1%  
   q  1   0.925 
 
 
 
 
The controlling shareholder may buy debt of the closely held corporation. However, the after-
tax real rate of return on the controlling shareholder’s debt-financed investment in the closely 
held corporation (table 7) is lower than the s  on debt-financed investment in the corporate 
firm (table 2). The controlling shareholder thus faces an incentive to invest his own funds in 
corporate debt (and does not face a tax incentive to invest his funds in the closely held 
corporation). Investment in the closely held corporation will be financed with funds that are 
borrowed from another household. Thus: 
 
  The controlling shareholder prefers:  NERED φφ  
 
 
Investment in the closely held corporation or in the proprietorship  
On the basis of the capital income taxes as discussed in this dissertation, and because it is 
assumed that the controlling shareholder realises the capital gains on his shares already 
after 6 years, the tax code favours the proprietorship over the closely held corporation. The 
cost of capital on equity-financed investment in the proprietorship is lower than the cost of 
capital on equity-financed investment (newly issued equity and retained earnings as the 
source of finance) in the closely held corporation. Moreover, the cost of capital on debt-
financed investment in the proprietorship is lower than in the closely held corporation. 
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• Evaluation of the tax reform 
Because of the greater opportunity return, the tax reform increases the cost of capital on 
investment in the closely held corporation financed with newly issued equity or retained 
earnings. As a direct consequence, the tax-preferred source of finance of the traditional 
controlling shareholder changes from equity to debt. This reduces the optimal steady-state 
capital stock. The tax reform has less impact on the innovative controlling shareholder 
because debt remains his most tax-preferred source of finance. 
As a result of the tax reform, the controlling shareholder has an incentive to withdraw his 
funds from the closely held corporation and to invest these funds in corporate debt. The 
controlling shareholder no longer faces an incentive to invest his funds in the debt and equity 
of the closely held corporation. The debt of the closely held corporation will be bought by 
another household. 
After the tax reform, the proprietorship might be tax-preferred over the closely held 
corporation. The difference in the cost of capital on debt-financed investment (which is the 
tax-preferred source of finance in the proprietorship and in the closely held corporation) is 
small. However, the tax reform reduces the tax burden on equity-financed investment in the 
proprietorship. The entrepreneur might therefore prefer the proprietorship over the closely 
held corporation as legal form. This might result in a renewed interest for the proprietorship, 
as pointed out by Cnossen and Bovenberg (1999). Moreover, in the presence of large 
inframarginal returns after the tax reform, the ordinary corporation is also tax-preferred over 
the closely held corporation as legal form. 
 
 
6.7 Owner-occupied housing 
Table 9 presents the tax burden on investment in owner-occupied housing. The tax code 
continues to subsidise investment in owner-occupied housing because the income tax on the 
imputed rental value is lower than the presumptive capital income tax on the household’s 
invested funds (transaction tax inclusive). The imputed rental value decreases from 1.25% to 
0.8%. After the tax reform, this implicit subsidy no longer depends on the marginal income-
tax rate. In fact, p  for equity-financed investment increases with yt .  
The value of the house is no longer taxed under the wealth tax. Of course, the elimination of 
personal wealth taxation implies that investment in owner-occupied housing no longer 
benefits from its favourable treatment under the wealth tax (only 60% of the value was 
taxed). However, p  decreases with the presumptive capital income tax wt  on the opportunity 
investment.  
 
The tax code taxes debt-financed investment in owner-occupied housing favourably, 
compared to other saving vehicles. The nominal interest costs remain deductible at the 
progressive personal income-tax rates (box I). However, the alternative investment of the 
household’s personal funds in corporate debt is taxed under the presumptive capital income 
tax (box III). As a result, the household realises a financial gain2 if the investment in owner-
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 (See section 2.9.2; 0=dwt  because the wealth tax of the capital income-tax system  
 133 
occupied housing is financed with debt. This ‘finance gain’ is increasing in the marginal 
income-tax rate at which the borrowing costs can be deducted from taxable income, and is 
decreasing in the presumptive capital income tax on the household’s opportunity investment. 
The higher this ‘finance gain’, the lower is the cost of capital. Especially households with high 
labour income face an incentive to finance investments in owner-occupied housing with debt. 
 
Table 9: owner-occupied housing after the tax reform   
 
                debt          equity  
 
        F             te                   p       te       p 
 
 
 
Low marginal income-tax rate: 37.6% 
-  No wealth tax on opportunity return       27.2%      -83% 2.2%  23.6%      5.24% 
-  Wealth tax on opportunity return: 1.2%     15.9%      -17.9% 2.4%  29.4%     3.96% 
 
 
Average marginal income-tax rate: 42% 
-  No wealth tax on opportunity return       30.3%      -114% 1.9%  24.1%     5.27% 
-  Wealth tax on opportunity return: 1.2%     19.6%      -36.9% 2%  30%     4% 
 
 
High marginal income-tax rate: 52% 
-  No wealth tax on opportunity return       37.6%      -253% 1.1%  25.3%     5.35% 
-  Wealth tax on opportunity return: 1.2%     27.9%      -116% 1.3%  31.4%     4.1% 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of the tax reform 
Before and after the tax reform, a debt-financed owner-occupied property remains an 
attractive saving vehicle.  
Before the tax reform, innovative households already realised a financial gain on their debt-
financed investment in owner-occupied housing. Because of the increase in the ‘finance 
gain’, the tax reform makes it even more attractive to shift income from box I to box III.  
On the one hand, the tax reform decreases the cost of capital on investment in owner-
occupied housing as a result of the decrease in the income tax rates and the decrease in the 
imputed rental value, and because the value of the house is no longer taxed under the 
wealth tax. On the other hand, the tax reform increases the cost of capital as a result of the 
increase in the household’s opportunity return.  
Comparing the cost of capital before (table 9) and after the tax reform (table 13 of chapter 5) 
then reveals an increase in the cost of capital on equity-financed investment in owner-
occupied housing. In case of a positive presumptive capital income tax, the tax reform only 
slightly increases the cost of capital on debt-financed investment.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
before the tax reform is no longer operational). 
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6.8 Sensitivity analysis 
The King-Fullerton type of analysis assumed a real interest rate of 4% and an inflation rate of 
2.5%. This section performs a sensitivity analysis and studies the effects of a change in r  
and π  on corporate investment financed with debt, newly issued equity or retained earnings. 
The analysis focuses on the effects on p , s  and et , as presented in table 10.  
 
 
Table 10: sensitivity analysis in case of a (weighted) corporate investment   (a) (b) 
     
       debt      newly issued equity          retained earnings 
 
r       π  
 
    p  
 
    s  
 
   et  
 
  p  
 
 
   s  
 
    et  
 
   p  
 
   s  
 
   et  
          
r = 4%  
 
        
0% 
  
 3.64% 2.8% 23.1% 5.7% 2.8% 50.6% 5.55% 2.8% 49.6% 
2.5% 
 
 3.02% 2.8% 7.4% 6.2% 2.8% 55% 6.1% 2.8% 54.1% 
5% 
 
 2.3% 2.8% -21.6% 6.7% 2.8% 58.1% 6.56% 2.8% 57.3% 
7.5%  1.5% 2.8% -86.6% 7% 2.8% 60.3% 6.9% 2.8% 59.6% 
 
 
         
r = 8%  
 
        
0% 
 
2.5% 
 
5% 
 
7.5% 
 7.22% 
 
 6 .56% 
 
 5.8% 
 
 4.99% 
 
6.8% 
 
6.8% 
 
6.8% 
 
6.8% 
5.8% 
 
-3.8% 
 
-17% 
 
-36% 
11.3% 
 
11.9% 
 
12.3% 
 
12.7% 
6.8% 
 
6.8% 
 
6.8% 
 
6.8% 
40% 
 
42.7% 
 
44.7% 
 
46.4% 
11.2% 
 
11.7% 
 
12.16% 
 
12.5% 
 
 
6.8% 
 
6.8% 
 
6.8% 
 
6.8% 
39.2% 
 
41.9% 
 
44.1% 
 
45.7% 
 
a. The presumptive capital income tax equals 1.2%. 
b. Weights used to calculate the average cost of capital: machinery 47%, buildings 31%, intangible 
assets 22%, (source: Bovenberg and ter Rele (1998)). 
 
 
As opposed to the situation before the tax reform, s  is independent of π . The cost of capital 
on debt-financed investment is decreasing in π  as a result of the deductibility of nominal 
interest payments. If π  is high, this may even result in a negative value of et . The sensitivity 
analysis in section 5.8 already pointed out that the cost of capital on investment financed with 
newly issued equity increases with π . The only difference between the cost of capital in case 
of newly issued equity and retained earnings is the tax on the value of the newly issued 
equity, which is absent in case of retained earnings. A higher inflation rate then increases the 
gap between the cost of capital on debt-financed investment and the cost of capital on 
equity-financed investment. As a result, the preference for debt over equity as a source of 
finance is increasing in the inflation rate. 
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6.9 Conclusion 
The tax reform in the Netherlands of January 1, 2001 replaces the personal income tax and 
the wealth tax with the presumptive capital income tax. All personal wealth, except owner-
occupied property, is assumed to earn a return of 4%, which is taxed at a rate of 30% in box 
III. The presumptive capital income tax is therefore in fact a wealth tax of 1.2%.  
 
The tax reform increases the after-tax real rate of return on direct investment in corporate 
debt, which no longer depends on the household’s labour income and marginal income-tax 
rate. As a result, the required yield on other investment opportunities also increases. 
Moreover, this increase in s  implies that indirect household saving through a mutual fund is 
no longer an attractive saving vehicle. Pension savings, however, are still taxed favourably.  
 
Because the equity-financed investment is taxed under the presumptive capital income tax, 
investment financed with newly issued equity or retained earnings is taxed similarly (in 
addition to the minor effect of the tax on the value of the newly issued equity). The tax reform 
strongly increases the cost of capital on investment financed with retained earnings. 
Moreover, p  no longer depends on the personal income tax in box I.  
Because the tax burden on external equity does not exceed that on internal equity, mature 
firms no longer face a tax-induced competitive advantage compared to young, newly founded 
firms. The tax reform removes the tax barrier on the transfer of equity capital and restores 
the dynamics on the equity market.  
 
At the household level, corporate investment is taxed under the presumptive capital income 
tax, irrespective of whether the household receives the return as interest payments, 
dividends, or capital gains. Only interest payments, however, are deductible from the 
corporate firm’s taxable earnings. Consequently, debt becomes unambiguously the most tax-
preferred source of finance. Firms that cannot attract debt thus suffer a tax-induced 
competitive disadvantage, compared to firms that face no borrowing constraints. 
In light of adverse selection in the equity market, the cost of newly issued equity exceeds the 
cost of retained earnings. After the tax reform, the strong preference for debt might be 
reversed in the presence of severe adverse selection in the debt market. Retained earnings 
might still be the most preferred source of finance. Similarly to the outcome before the tax 
reform, firms that have to attract external sources of finance then face a competitive 
disadvantage compared to mature firms. 
 
The Dutch capital-income-tax system continues to favour investment in intangible assets 
over investment in machinery, equipment and means of transportation. The latter investment 
opportunities are more attractive, from a tax point of view, than investment in buildings. 
 
The tax reform increases the cost of capital on equity-financed investment in the 
proprietorship. As a direct consequence, the traditional proprietor’s tax-preferred source of 
finance changes from equity to debt. Debt remains the most attractive source of finance for 
the innovative proprietor. As a result, the proprietor no longer faces a tax incentive to 
accumulate his funds inside the proprietorship.   
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As result of the tax reform, the controlling shareholder faces the same incentives as the 
proprietor. Debt becomes the tax-preferred source of finance, which implies that the 
controlling shareholder faces no tax incentive to accumulate his funds inside the closely held 
corporation. Moreover, the entrepreneur might prefer the proprietorship over the closely held 
corporation as a result of the tax reform. 
 
Except in the case of mortgage debt, the household’s interest payments on borrowed funds 
are not deductible from taxable income in box I. As a result, the household faces no incentive 
to borrow and to invest the funds directly or indirectly in the corporate firm. However, similar 
to the innovative household before the tax reform, the household does face an incentive after 
the tax reform to finance investment in owner-occupied housing with borrowed funds. In fact, 
debt-financed investment in owner-occupied housing is taxed favourably, especially for 
households that face a high marginal income-tax rate (and therefore have a substantial 
amount of income in box I).  
 
Evaluation of the tax reform in the presence of adjustment costs 
In the presence of adjustment costs, the nucleus theory of the firm allows for dividends to be 
paid while the firm invests. Too great investment in the same period might be too costly (as a 
result of the adjustment costs). Moreover, the firm might not issue initially the optimal amount 
of new equity, but might rather spread out the issue of new equity over different phases (see 
section 3.7). 
After the tax reform, the cost of external equity equals the cost of internal equity. As a result 
of the adjustment costs, however, young firms continue to issue only a nucleus of new 
equity. In the presence of adjustment costs, young firms suffer a competitive disadvantage 
compared to mature firms – even after the tax reform.  
 
Evaluation of the tax reform and share repurchases  
In order to prevent firms from transforming highly taxed dividends into lower taxed capital 
gains, the tax authorities before the tax reform treated and taxed share repurchases as 
dividends. Capital income, after the tax reform, is taxed under the presumptive capital 
income tax. The household is thus indifferent between dividends and share repurchases. A 
first glance would suggest that tax authorities no longer have to prevent firms from 
repurchasing their shares. If the Dutch tax authorities would allow for share repurchases, 
however, firms would strongly increase their debt-equity ratio. Share repurchases allow the 
firm to replace highly taxed equity (which the firm accumulated before the tax reform) with 
lower taxed debt. This tax-arbitrage behaviour might provide an incentive for the Dutch tax 
authorities to proceed carefully in allowing firms to repurchase shares, even after the tax 
reform.  
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
 
7.1   Introduction 
Prior to the tax reform of January 1, 2001, taxpayers in the Netherlands faced considerable 
incentives and opportunities to engage in tax-arbitrage behaviour. In fact, these opportunities 
existed mainly because the Dutch tax code only partially implemented the fiscal-neutrality tax 
principle. Interest payments and dividends were taxed together with labour income at 
progressive marginal income-tax rates, which satisfied the ability-to-pay tax principle. Capital 
gains, however, were not taxed. Moreover, only the return on equity-financed investment was 
taxed under the corporate tax, and pensions, savings through a mutual fund and owner-
occupied property were taxed favourably.  
These tax-arbitrage opportunities caused efficiency losses because taxpayers were making 
saving and investment decisions which, in the absence of capital income taxes, would be 
considered inferior. Their tax-arbitrage behaviour also violated the horizontal equity tax 
principle, which states that agents who have the same ability to bear the tax burden should 
pay the same amount of taxes. Tax arbitrage then produced differences in taxes paid, not on 
the basis of the taxpayers’ ability to pay, but because some taxpayers possessed less 
knowledge about the legal tax-avoidance possibilities or because they possessed fewer 
financial resources to pay for the legal and financial tax-avoidance assistance. As a result of 
the tax-arbitrage behaviour, higher incomes did not necessarily pay a higher proportion of 
their income as taxes (vertical equity tax principle). Tax-arbitrage behaviour thus undermined 
the progressivity of the Dutch capital-income-tax system. Tax-arbitrage behaviour hindered 
the enforcement ability of the Dutch tax authorities and limited the possibilities for the 
authorities to raise tax revenues.  
 
Because the agents’ tax-arbitrage behaviour before the Dutch tax reform strongly violated 
the general principles of sound tax policy, the Dutch tax authorities decided to change the tax 
treatment of (personal) capital income in a fundamental way. 
Starting from January 1, 2001, all personally held assets, such as deposits, stocks, bonds 
and real estate (except owner-occupied property) are assumed to earn a return of 4%. This 
return is taxed at a proportional tax rate of 30%. The assets’ actual income is therefore no 
longer relevant under the new capital-income-tax system. The presumptive capital income 
tax is then in fact a net wealth tax of 1.2%. 
 
This thesis studied the incentives provided by the Dutch capital-income-tax system to 
engage in tax-arbitrage behaviour. The analysis discussed the tax-arbitrage behaviour of 
firms, households and intermediaries (mutual funds and pension funds) before and after the 
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Dutch tax reform of January 1, 2001. Did the capital-income-tax reform reduce distortions or 
did it create additional distortions? The conclusions of this analysis are presented in section 
7.3, which evaluates the tax reform in terms of the general principles of sound tax policy. 
 
In addition to carrying out the tax analysis, this thesis adjusted and extended the models that 
are typically used to study tax-arbitrage behaviour. Thus, the analysis extended the King – 
Fullerton (1984) method for deriving marginal effective tax rates. Sinn’s (1991a) dynamic 
finance and investment model of the firm, which is used to derive the agents’ optimal tax-
arbitrage behaviour, was also extended. The main contributions with respect to these 
methods are summarised in section 7.2. 
 
Section 7.4 presents alternative tax reforms. The analysis focuses on the consumption type 
of tax reform and the income type of tax reform. Finally, section 7.5 presents ideas for further 
research. 
 
 
7.2   Extending the methods to study tax-arbitrage behaviour 
Tax-arbitrage behaviour can be studied by deriving the tax burden on savings and 
investments without taking into account the agents’ optimal response to the capital-income-
tax system. Agents, who are assumed to minimise their tax liabilities, will save and invest in 
the opportunities with the lowest tax burden. A comparison of the tax burdens across the 
saving and investment opportunities permits inference of the agents’ tax-arbitrage behaviour. 
The King – Fullerton (1984) method determines the tax burden by deriving marginal effective 
tax rates, which measure the tax burdens on marginal saving and investment opportunities.  
 
The analysis in chapter 2 extends the King – Fullerton (1984) method by explicitly modelling 
the stream of benefits and costs of the household’s investments over time. This approach 
permits the detailed study of the effect of capital income taxes, particularly the taxes that 
have to be paid only once (e.g., the transaction tax and the capital gains tax). The extended 
method clearly distinguishes between the investment’s source of finance and the use of the 
investment’s earnings. Moreover, this approach permits the derivation of the increase in the 
value of the firm’s equity (Tobin’s q). In case of retained earnings as the source of finance, 
for instance, the extended method demonstrates that dividend taxes are capitalised in share 
values. This method also permits calculation of the return on savings that are reinvested for a 
number of periods. Finally, the method is used to derive expressions for the cost of capital if 
households face a tax incentive to borrow funds instead of financing investment out of their 
own funds. 
 
The extended King – Fullerton method suffers from a number of shortcomings, however. The 
method deals only with dividends and interest payments as uses of the earnings. Moreover, 
firms do not always have sufficient retained earnings to finance investment. In particular, 
young (newly founded) firms have to either issue new equity or attract debt. Finally, the 
model does not explicitly derive the impact of capital income taxes on either the agents’ 
saving and investment (tax-arbitrage) behaviour or the firm’s capital accumulation. These 
shortcomings require a dynamic model. 
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In order to derive the agents’ tax-arbitrage behaviour, the analysis in chapter 3 solves Sinn’s 
(1991a) (partial equilibrium) dynamic framework of a young, newly founded firm that invests 
until it becomes a mature firm. In Sinn’s model, investment is financed only with equity. 
Chapter 3 introduces debt financing and share repurchases in Sinn’s dynamic life-cycle 
model of the firm. The firm can thus finance investment with debt, newly issued equity or 
retained earnings. The firm’s earnings may be distributed as dividends or as interest 
payments, or they may be retained and reinvested or used to repurchase shares or redeem 
debt. The analysis in chapter 3 then determines the firm’s optimal source of finance and use 
of earnings, and derives the cost of capital and the marginal effective tax rates along the 
entire optimal path. 
The firm issues new equity and debt during the initial period. On the one hand, the firm is 
discouraged from issuing new equity by the prospect of using the cheaper retained earnings 
as the source of finance. This opportunity cost might increase the cost of capital on 
investment financed with newly issued equity above the value of King and Fullerton, as 
demonstrated by Sinn. On the other hand, the firm faces an incentive to issue a sufficiently 
large amount of new equity so that it can invest as quickly as possible. This gain of newly 
issued equity might reduce the cost of capital below the value of King and Fullerton. 
These results do not extend to debt financing. As long as the investment’s return exceeds 
the interest rate, the firm wants to attract as much debt financing as possible.  
Share repurchases increase the cost of an additional unit of debt, which is a weighted 
average of the present value of foregone dividends and foregone share repurchases. The 
firm might even prefer newly issued equity to debt in the steady state. In the initial period, the 
firm continues to issue a nucleus of new equity. Because the cost of capital on newly issued 
equity is decreasing in the amount of share repurchases, the firm might prefer to forego 
entirely financing investment with debt. Moreover, an increase in the amount of share 
repurchases shortens the firm’s internal growth phase. 
 
In reality, capital markets do not function perfectly. The firm’s finance and investment 
behaviour and its distribution policy are influenced by financial market imperfections as a 
result of adverse selection and moral hazard. In order to analyse the effects of financial 
market imperfections on the agents’ tax-arbitrage behaviour, chapter 4 incorporates some of 
the financial market imperfections in Sinn’s (extended) life-cycle model of the firm. 
Adverse selection in the debt and equity markets gives rise to an implicit tax wedge between 
the cost of internal and external sources of finance, which implies a ‘finance pecking order’. 
This finance pecking order then strengthens the tax-arbitrage behaviour as a result of the tax 
pecking order (if capital gains are taxed at lower rates than interest payments and dividends). 
The newly founded firm will thus issue even less new equity and will attract less debt. 
Because the steady-state cost of capital and capital stock are not affected, the firm’s internal 
growth phase will lengthen with adverse selection. 
Chapter 4 also analyses the ‘traditional’ view (as opposed to the ‘new’ view) of dividend 
taxation, and incorporates a minimum dividend constraint in Sinn’s life-cycle model of the 
firm. The analysis demonstrates that the results of the traditional view are strongly 
determined by its assumption that newly issued equity is the firm’s marginal source of 
finance. This imposes strong conditions on the firm’s production function. The amount of 
profitable investment opportunities in every period must be larger than the available retained 
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earnings. Otherwise, the firm has an incentive to issue only a nucleus of new equity in order 
to take advantage of the cheaper retained earnings as the source of finance, which yields the 
new view of dividend taxation. Consequently, the predictions of both the traditional and the 
new view are correct regarding the effects of a reduction in the dividend tax. The outcome 
depends, however, on the underlying production function and the available investment 
opportunities of the firm. 
 
 
 
7.3   Evaluating the Dutch tax reform 
The most significant component of the Dutch tax reform of January 1, 2001 is the change in 
the tax levied on income from savings and investments. The household’s actual return on 
personal wealth (except owner-occupied property), which is received as dividends or as 
interest payments, no longer falls under the progressive personal income tax. The old wealth 
tax is gone. These taxes have been replaced by the presumptive capital income tax. 
 
 
• The effects of the tax reform 
The tax reform increases the after-tax real rate of return on direct corporate investment, 
which no longer depends on the household’s labour income and marginal income-tax rate. 
As a result, also the required yield on other investment opportunities increases.  
 
Internal versus external equity 
Since equity-financed investment is taxed under the presumptive capital income tax, the tax 
reform strongly increases the cost of capital on corporate investment financed with retained 
earnings. In fact, the tax burden on external equity no longer exceeds the tax burden on 
internal equity. The firm’s (retained) earnings are then no longer locked within the firm and 
invested in projects that yield a lower before-tax real rate of return than can be obtained 
elsewhere. Consequently, resources are no longer misallocated. The absence of tax-induced 
incentives to defer dividend taxes implies that the firm no longer passes through an internal 
growth phase. The firm will directly attract the optimal steady-state capital stock. The tax 
code then no longer inhibits the entry of new firms. The Dutch tax reform actually puts an end 
to the tax-induced competitive disadvantage of firms that do not possess enough earnings to 
finance the available investment opportunities (for instance young, newly founded firms). 
 
Debt versus equity 
After the tax reform, the corporate tax discrimination of equity at the firm level (in contrast to 
debt, because interest payments are deductible from taxable earnings) is no longer 
compensated by a tax advantage of capital gains at the household level (the absence of a 
capital gains tax in contrast to the progressive personal income tax on interest payments 
before the tax reform). Debt therefore becomes unambiguously the corporate firm’s most tax-
preferred source of finance.  
Corporate firms that cannot attract debt thus suffer a tax-induced competitive disadvantage 
compared to corporate firms that face no borrowing costs. (Firms may find it difficult to 
borrow because, for instance, they lack a high credit rating, own firm-specific assets against 
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which it is difficult to borrow, or have insufficient taxable earnings to be able to deduct all 
interest (Cnossen (1996))). After the tax reform, young newly founded corporate firms that 
cannot attract debt thus continue to face a tax-induced competitive disadvantage. 
The tax reform raises the corporate firm’s marginal steady-state cost of capital. Corporate 
firms after the tax reform are thus characterised by a lower steady-state capital stock. 
 
Adverse selection in the corporate debt and equity markets 
In light of adverse selection in the equity market, the cost of newly issued equity exceeds the 
cost of retained earnings. After the tax reform, the presence of adverse selection in the debt 
market might reverse the strong preference for debt. Consequently, even after the tax 
reform, retained earnings might be the corporate firm’s most preferred source of finance. 
Similarly to the outcome before the tax reform, corporate firms that have to attract external 
sources of finance then face a competitive disadvantage compared to mature firms with 
earnings from old capital. 
 
Investment projects 
As a result of the (unchanged) tax treatment of depreciation, the Dutch capital-income-tax 
system before and after the tax reform of January 1, 2001 favours investment in intangible 
assets over investment in machinery, equipment and means of transportation. The latter 
investment opportunities, in turn, are tax-favoured compared to investment in buildings. 
 
Household saving strategies 
Indirect household saving through a mutual fund is no longer an attractive saving vehicle. 
Pension savings are still taxed favourably, however. Moreover, the tax reform does not affect 
the incentive of intermediaries to invest in the debt instead of the equity of the corporate firm. 
Investment in owner-occupied property continues to be taxed favourably as well. In fact, after 
the tax reform, the household faces an even stronger incentive to finance investment in 
owner-occupied housing with borrowed funds.  
 
The proprietorship 
The Dutch tax reform has increased the cost of capital on equity-financed investment in the 
proprietorship. As a direct consequence, the tax-preferred source of finance for the traditional 
proprietor changes from equity to debt. Debt remains the most attractive source of finance for 
the innovative proprietor. As a result, proprietors no longer face a tax incentive to accumulate 
their funds inside the proprietorship. Instead, they borrow to finance the investment in the 
proprietorship. The proprietor’s funds will then be invested as personal wealth in, for 
instance, corporate debt. 
 
The closely held corporation 
Debt becomes the controlling shareholder’s most tax-preferred source of finance. 
Consequently, the controlling shareholder no longer faces a tax incentive to accumulate his 
funds inside the closely held corporation.  
Because the tax reform reduces the tax burden on equity-financed investment in the 
proprietorship, the entrepreneur after the tax reform might prefer the proprietorship over the 
closely held corporation as legal form. 
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• Evaluating the tax reform in terms of the general principles of sound tax policy 
As a result of the Dutch tax reform of January 1, 2001, (publicly held) corporate firms have 
become indifferent between newly issued equity and retained earnings as the source of 
finance (ignoring both the minor impact of the tax on the value of the newly issued equity and 
the effects of adverse selection in the equity market). Moreover, households are now 
indifferent between dividends and capital gains as use of profits. Because households, under 
the new capital-income-tax system, have no longer an incentive to transform (highly taxed) 
dividends and interest payments into (untaxed) capital gains, saving through a mutual fund, 
for instance, is no longer a tax-favoured saving vehicle. The tax reform thus diminishes the 
tax-arbitrage opportunities at the household level, thereby strengthening the tax code’s 
horizontal equity. The capital-income-tax reform levels the playing field. Households that 
engage less actively in tax-arbitrage behaviour no longer pay more taxes than households 
who actively attempt to minimise their tax liabilities.  
By limiting the tax-arbitrage opportunities at the household level, the Dutch tax authorities 
ensure that the government raises more revenues from taxing capital income at the 
household level. 
 
However, the tax reform has certain drawbacks. Because the presumptive capital income tax 
is levied irrespective of the savings’ actual return, the capital-income-tax system after the 
reform is no longer able to implement (even only partly) the vertical equity tax principle. 
Moreover, even after the tax reform, the Dutch capital-income-tax system continues to cause 
substantial efficiency losses. 
 
The tax code still distorts how businesses determine their sources of finance. Because only 
interest payments are deductible from a corporate firm’s taxable earnings, debt has 
unambiguously become the corporate firm’s most tax-preferred source of finance. The 
controlling shareholder and the proprietor, moreover, no longer face a tax incentive to 
accumulate their funds inside their business. They will rather finance investment with debt.  
The Dutch tax code continues to distort how businesses choose their legal form and type of 
investment projects. The tax code also continues to distort the household’s choices regarding 
saving vehicles. Pension savings and debt-financed investment in owner-occupied property 
are still taxed favourably.  
 
 
• Fundamental tax reform: the next round 
The Dutch tax authorities opted for a tax reform that restores neutrality with respect to newly 
issued equity and retained earnings as the source of finance (in the absence of adverse 
selection in the equity market). Yet, after the tax reform, the firm’s choice between debt and 
equity as the source of finance is even more distorted. It could therefore be argued that the 
Dutch tax authorities, when designing the tax reform, ignored to implement the required 
neutrality between debt and equity. They also seemed to have ignored neutrality between the 
businesses’ legal forms. Consequently, this tax analysis of the Dutch tax reform of January 1, 
2001 illustrates that fundamental tax reform is rarely successful if the distortions arising from 
the capital-income- tax system are solved only partly. The analysis in this thesis therefore 
suggests the need for a further reform of the Dutch capital-income-tax system.  
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Section 7.4 therefore presents alternative tax reforms. These would restore neutrality 
between the firm’s sources of finance. 
 
 
 
7.4   Alternative tax reforms 
In attempting to deal with the distortions arising from the Dutch capital-income-tax system, 
the tax literature considers two approaches: the consumption-tax approach and the income-
tax approach.  
The consumption type of tax reform no longer taxes the normal return to capital (i.e. the 
inflation- and risk-adjusted market interest rate) (Cnossen (2001)). The income type of tax 
reform continues to tax the normal return to capital as well as the economic rents. 
As opposed to the presumptive capital income tax, these tax reforms restore neutrality, not 
only between newly issued equity and retained earnings, but also between equity and debt. 
 
 
• Consumption type of tax reform 
Bradford (1986) suggests that the tension in the capital-income-tax system could be resolved 
by placing the system on a consistent consumption basis. This type of tax reform might be 
considered in the Netherlands because saving vehicles such as pensions, life insurance 
policies (before the Dutch tax reform) and employee and premium saving schemes already 
fall under the consumption tax, as will be explained below.  
This section briefly discusses the Cash-Flow Tax, the Allowance for Corporate Equity (ACE) 
tax system, the Flat Tax, and the Personal Expenditure Tax.  
 
Cash-Flow Tax 
Under the Cash-Flow Tax (which no longer taxes the normal return to capital) only economic 
rents and entrepreneurial risk premiums are taxed at the business level (Cnossen (2001)). 
Tax authorities allow no deduction of interest payments from taxable corporate earnings. 
Firms are allowed, however, an immediate write-off of the cost of business assets. Because 
of this immediate expensing, the marginal return that the firm realises on its funds is 
effectively not taxed under the corporate tax (Cnossen (1996)). Moreover, savings are not 
taxed at the household level under a full consumption tax. In that case, the marginal 
(corporate) effective tax rate is zero. The firm is then indifferent between debt, newly issued 
equity or retained earnings as the source of finance. The cost of capital (for all sources of 
finance) equals the real interest rate. 
 
Allowance for Corporate Equity ACE 
Under the Dutch capital-income-tax system (before and after the tax reform), interest 
payments are deductible from taxable corporate earnings. The return on equity-financed 
investment, however, is taxed under the corporate tax.  
The ACE tax system (IFS Capital Tax Group (1991)) corrects for this differential tax 
treatment by providing a deductible allowance for corporate equity in computing taxable 
profits. This allowance equals the product of shareholders’ funds and an appropriate nominal 
interest rate, and therefore approximates normal profits. The corporate tax is thus confined to 
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pure profits from inframarginal investments (Cnossen (2001)). Corporate equity in excess of 
the ACE remains subject to corporate tax. Savings are not taxed at the household level 
under a full consumption tax. 
If the nominal interest rate that is applied to calculate the ACE equals the nominal interest 
rate that is paid as a reward for the debt, then the firm is indifferent between debt, newly 
issued equity or retained earnings as the marginal source of finance. In all cases, the cost of 
capital equals the real interest rate net of the gain because the inflation rate can be deducted 
from taxable corporate earnings as well (it is assumed that actual depreciation occurs at the 
economic rate of depreciation based on replacement costs (see section 2.3.2)). 
 
Flat Tax 
The Flat Tax, introduced by Hall and Rabushka, consists of a business tax and an individual 
compensation tax (Bradford (1986)). This tax (also referred to as the Two-Tiered Cash-Flow 
Tax) replaces both the individual and corporate income taxes. 
In fact, the Cash-Flow Tax and the ACE tax system both form the business cash-flow 
component of the flat tax (Cnossen (2001)). The business tax is levied on value added (total 
revenues from sales less purchases of inputs from other firms and purchases of plant and 
equipment) (Hall and Rabushka (1996)), less payments to employees (wages, salaries and 
pensions) (Bradford (1986)). The business cash-flow is then taxed at a flat rate, without basic 
exemption.  
The individual compensation tax is levied on wages, salaries and pensions (at retirement; 
pension contributions are not part of wages). Only those earnings above a personal or family 
allowance are taxed, which makes the tax system progressive (Hall and Rabushka (1995)).  
Because the business tax does not tax the normal return to capital, and because households 
are not taxed on interest, dividends and capital gains, the marginal effective tax rates on the 
firm’s marginal investments equal zero. The firm is then indifferent between debt, newly 
issued equity or retained earnings as the source of finance.  
 
Personal Expenditure Tax 
Under the Personal Expenditure Tax (or Personal Cash-Flow Tax), the household’s net 
savings can be deducted from the household’s taxable income (Escolano (1995)). In fact, the 
treatment of savings distinguishes this tax from the conventional income tax. The Personal 
Expenditure Tax makes no use at all of a company-level tax (Bradford (1986)). 
The current Dutch tax treatment of pension savings is a good example of this consumption 
tax approach. Because households postpone their consumption, contributions to the pension 
fund are not taxed. Also the return on the fund’s investments is not taxed. However, the 
retirement benefits (consisting of the original savings and the accumulated return on these 
savings) become available for consumption and are therefore included in the household’s 
consumption-tax base.  
In the absence of a corporate tax, and because the current tax treatment of pension savings 
is extended to all savings, the marginal effective tax rates on the firm’s marginal investments 
are equal to zero (if the household’s marginal income-tax rate at which savings can be 
deducted from taxable income equals the marginal income-tax rate at which savings, which 
become available for consumption, are taxed). Again, the firm is indifferent between debt, 
newly issued equity or retained earnings as the source of finance. 
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• Income type of tax reform 
The second type of tax reform treats the return of saving and investment opportunities as 
taxable income, but attempts to integrate capital income taxes at the firm and household 
level. The Comprehensive Business Income Tax (CBIT) and the Dual Income Tax (DIT) are 
two variants of such a tax system. 
 
Comprehensive business income tax CBIT 
The U.S. Treasury Department’s (1992) Comprehensive Business Income Tax (CBIT) taxes 
the return to capital of businesses only once. Under the CBIT, which is a business-level tax 
(Hubbard (2002)), tax authorities allow no deduction of either interest payments or the return 
on equity from taxable corporate earnings. Interest payments, dividends and capital gains 
are no longer taxed at the household level.  
Tax treatment of depreciation is similar to the tax treatment under the Dutch capital-income-
tax system (before and after the tax reform of January 1, 2001). However, under the CBIT, 
depreciation allowances follow economic depreciation as closely as possible (Hubbard 
(2002)). 
Under the CBIT, the marginal effective tax rate on investment financed with debt, newly 
issued equity or retained earnings is equal to the business tax rate. Firms are thus indifferent 
between debt, newly issued equity and retained earnings as the source of finance.  
 
Dual income tax DIT 
Under a Dual Income Tax (DIT), all income is separated into either capital income or labour 
income. Capital income is taxed at a (low) uniform rate, while labour income continues to be 
taxed at progressive rates. In fact, the proportional capital-income-tax rate is aligned with the 
basic marginal tax rate on labour income (Sørensen (2001)). 
Under a DIT, the taxable earnings of businesses should correspond to true economic profits. 
This implies that depreciation allowances follow economic depreciation as closely as 
possible. Accelerated deprecation schemes and other special deductions from taxable 
earnings should thus be avoided (Sørensen (2001)). 
The return on equity is taxed under the corporate tax, while interest payments are tax 
deductible. At the household level, interest and dividends are taxed under the capital income 
tax. Double taxation of distributed profits is prevented through a full imputation system 
(shareholders are permitted a tax credit against the capital income tax for the corporate tax 
that can be imputed to the dividends which they received (Cnossen (1993)). Alternatively, 
double taxation can be avoided by exempting dividend income at the shareholder level 
(Cnossen (2003)).  
Double taxation of retained profits (under the corporate tax and the capital income tax on 
realised capital gains) is prevented as well. Shareholders are permitted to write up the basis 
of their shares by retained profits net of corporate tax. As a result, the capital income tax is 
levied only on capital gains in excess of retained profits that already have borne corporate 
tax (Sørensen (2001)). Similarly, the taxable basis is written down if the business incurs 
losses or if the business distributes dividends out of previously accumulated earnings 
(Cnossen (2003)). 
Under a DIT in its most perfect form (and in the absence of inflation and in the presence of 
economic depreciation allowances based on replacement costs), the marginal effective tax 
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rate on investment financed with debt, newly issued equity or retained earnings is equal to 
the (proportional) capital income-tax rate. In this case, firms are indifferent between debt, 
newly issued equity and retained earnings as the source of finance.  
 
 
 
7.5   Further research 
This section presents some ideas for further research. It would be interesting to extend the 
tax analysis in order to measure the tax burden on savings and investments by foreign firms 
and foreign households. Moreover, the analysis might focus on the tax-induced incentives for 
Dutch firms and households to save and invest abroad. The tax analysis might be extended 
with taxes on labour income and social security contributions as well. This extension would 
permit a more detailed evaluation of the tax burden (after the tax reform) on the 
proprietorship and the closely held corporation. 
Sinn’s dynamic finance and investment model assumed a (continuous) concave production 
function. However, different investment processes (e.g., discrete investment decisions, 
irreversible investment processes, technology shocks) might be incorporated as well. Sinn’s 
model might also be extended with uncertainty about the investment’s return. 
Finally, the literature has already studied profoundly the effects of the alternative tax reforms. 
Introduction of (one of) these tax reforms in the Netherlands, however, would require further 
research.  
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Glossary 
 
 
 
Ability-to-pay principle: taxes should be the same for people in the same economic 
position (horizontal equity) and different for people in different economic positions (vertical 
equity).  
 
Accelerated depreciation allowances: (actual tax) depreciation allowances that are more 
favourable than economic depreciation allowances. 
 
Actual tax depreciation allowances: the deprecation allowances prescribed by the tax 
code. (The Dutch tax code prescribes straight-line tax depreciation). 
 
Capital-income-tax system: the rules defined in the tax code concerning the tax treatment 
of capital income. 
 
Closely held corporation: the corporate firm that is owned by controlling shareholders. 
 
Controlling shareholder: a shareholder who holds a controlling amount of shares (at least 
5%) of the corporate firm. 
 
Corporation: the publicly held corporate firm that is owned by ordinary shareholders. 
 
Cost of capital: the minimum required real rate of return an investment must earn in order to 
be profitable. 
 
Declining-balance depreciation: if the cost of the asset is written down for tax purposes by 
an amount that declines exponentially over time. 
 
Deferral of tax: a tax strategy whereby income may be deferred or postponed for some 
period of time. 
 
Depreciation (tax depreciation) allowances: the gain that arises when the firm deducts the 
depreciation of the investment, computed in one way or another, from taxable earnings. 
 
Direct household savings: savings that are controlled directly by the household. 
 
Economic depreciation: the actual (physical) fall in value of the asset in a given period. 
(The analysis assumes that the value of the investment project declines exponentially over 
time).  
 
Economic depreciation allowances: the depreciation allowances that compensate for the 
actual (physical) fall in value of the asset in a given period. (In the analysis: declining-balance 
depreciation at the economic rate of depreciation, based on replacement costs). 
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Efficiency: the principle that states that taxes should distort the agents’ economic decisions 
as little as possible. 
 
Excess burden (efficiency loss, deadweight loss) of a tax: the reduction in the taxpayers’ 
welfare above the welfare loss as a result of the income reduction due to payment of the tax. 
 
Horizontal equity: the principle that states that taxpayers in ‘similar circumstances’ should 
pay the same amount of taxes. 
 
Immediate expensing (free depreciation): if the cost of the investment can immediately be 
deducted from taxable earnings. 
 
Imputed income: income which is not in money form, such as the rental value of owner-
occupied housing. 
 
Indirect household savings: household savings that are controlled by intermediaries 
(mutual funds, pension funds). 
 
Innovative opportunity return: the after-tax return on an indirect investment in corporate 
debt through a mutual fund. 
 
Intangible assets: assets belonging to a business which are not material. Investment in 
intangible assets refers to investment in research and development, advertising and other 
marketing expenses, and company training. 
 
Lock-in effects and capital gains taxation: because capital gains are taxed only when 
realised, the capital gains tax discourages the realisation of capital gains. Agents induced to 
hold appreciated assets because of capital gains tax when they otherwise would sell are said 
to be ‘locked in’. 
 
Marginal income tax rate: the additional income tax payable when income increases 
marginally divided by the marginal increase in income. 
 
Marginal effective tax rate: the additional tax that has to be paid if the tax base increases 
marginally. Marginal effective tax rates measure the tax burden on marginal saving and 
investment opportunities.  
The corporate marginal effective tax rate measures the tax burden on a marginal investment 
opportunity (only) at the corporate level.  
The marginal effective tax rate at the household level measures the tax burden on a marginal 
saving opportunity (only) at the household level. 
 
Marginal saving and investment opportunities: saving and investment opportunities that 
yield a return equal to the investor’s opportunity cost, which is the return the agent could 
realise if he would invest in an alternative project. 
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Mutual fund: the intermediary that reinvests the household’s savings for a number of 
periods. 
 
Neutral taxes: taxes that have no excess burden. 
 
Pension fund: the intermediary through which the household saves for a pension. 
 
Presumptive capital income tax: a proportional tax levied on a predetermined return, 
irrespective of the savings’ and investments’ actual return. 
 
Progressive income tax: a tax under which the average rate of tax increases with income. 
 
Proportional income tax: a tax under which the average rate of tax is constant. 
 
Proprietor: the self-employed individual. 
 
Proprietorship: a firm owned and operated by a single individual or family. 
 
Regressive income tax: a tax under which the average rate of tax decreases with income.  
 
Straight-line depreciation: if the historical cost of the asset is written down for tax purposes 
by a fixed percentage per unit of investment in each year. 
 
Tax-arbitrage behaviour: when economic agents change their saving and investment 
behaviour in order to minimise their tax liabilities (to maximise the tax advantages offered by 
the tax authorities). 
 
Tax burden: the claim on consumption, income or wealth resulting from the imposition of a 
tax. 
 
Tax compliance: the extent to which taxpayers comply with tax laws. 
 
Tax enforcement: the extent to which tax authorities make sure that tax rules are obeyed.  
 
Tobin’s q: the (marginal) increase in value of the firm’s equity as a result of a marginal unit 
of investment. 
 
Traditional opportunity return: the after-tax return on a direct investment in corporate debt. 
 
Vertical equity: the principle that states that taxpayers with ‘the better circumstances’ should 
bear more of the tax burden. 
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Chapter 2 list of symbols 
 
 
 
 
General symbols 
 
et  marginal effective tax rate 
ct  corporate marginal effective tax rate 
ht  marginal effective tax rate at the 
household level 
V  net present value of a saving/ invest-
ment possibility 
p  cost of capital/before-tax real rate of 
return  
δ  economic rate of depreciation 
r  real interest rate 
s  after-tax real rate of return 
w  sp −  
π  inflation rate 
t  time index 
n  time index 
λ/1  expected holding period of the savings 
 
 
 
 
 
      
The firm level 
 
bρ  nominal return after taxes at the firm 
level / the firm’s discount rate 
τ  corporate tax rate 
cw  local property tax on the value of the 
asset 
A  present discounted value of grants and 
tax allowances 
1f  proportion of the cost of an asset 
entitled to depreciation allowances 
2f  proportion of the cost of the project 
qualifying for immediate expensing 
3f  proportion of the cost of the project 
qualifying for investment subsidies 
g  rate of the investment subsidy 
dA  present value of tax savings as a result 
of depreciation allowances 
L  lifetime tax of the asset 
a  tax (fiscal) depreciation rate 
B  additional taxes that increase the 
investment’s cost  
sft  tax on the value of the newly issued 
source of finance  
pt  transaction tax (property transfer tax) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The household level 
 
mfτ  tax on the mutual fund 
pfτ  tax on the pension fund 
ρ  household’s before-tax nominal rate of 
return 
Hρ  household’s after-tax nominal rate of 
return 
yt  personal income tax 
dt  personal income tax (at which 
contributions to pension fund can be 
deducted) 
wt  wealth tax (on the household’s wealth) 
ct  capital gains tax 
q  increase in the value of the firm’s 
equity 
H
c
c
tT
ρλ
λ
+
=   
H
y
y
t
T
ρλ
λ
+
=  
 
 
 
 
Controlling shareholder/proprietor 
 
c
yt  controlling shareholder’s personal 
income tax 
c
ct  controlling shareholder’s capital gains 
tax 
c
wt  wealth tax on the controlling 
shareholder’s business wealth 
s
yt  proprietor’s income tax 
s
wt  wealth tax on the proprietor’s business 
wealth 
 
 
 
 
Owner-occupied housing 
 
pt  transaction tax (property transfer tax) 
irv  imputed rental values 
h
wt  wealth tax on owner-occupied housing 
cw  local property tax 
FC  financing costs 
d
wt  wealth tax on debt  
F  finance gain (loss) 
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List of symbols 
Chapter 3 – Chapter 4  
 
 
 
 
General symbols 
 
r  interest rate 
t  time index 
v  time index 
1t  initial period 
et  marginal effective tax rate 
SS  steady state 
 
 
 
      
The firm level 
 
K  capital 
)(Kf  production function 
)(' Kf  cost of capital 
I  investment level 
Q  newly issued equity 
fS  newly issued debt 
fD  total debt  
dτ  corporate tax on distributed profits 
rτ  corporate tax on retained profits 
dθ  dτ−1  
rθ  rτ−1  
M  market value of the shares 
m  correct value (price) per share 
m  expected value per share 
z  number of outstanding shares 
dπ  gross dividends 
)(tqK  )(
)(
tK
tM
∂
∂ , the marginal increase in value 
of the firm’s equity as a result of an 
additional unit of capital 
)(tqD  )(
)(
tD
tM
f∂
∂ , the marginal increase in value 
of the firm’s equity as a result of  an 
additional unit of debt 
α  maximum debt-capital ratio 
β  partial production elasticity of capital 
ω  hidden factor’s partial production 
elasticity 
σ  Hicksian elasticity of substitution 
between capital and the hidden 
production factor  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
mfτ  tax on the dividends and the interest 
payments that the mutual fund 
receives  
R  share repurchases 
X  )(1)( IQSrDKf f
r
f −++−= θ
 
γ  restriction on the allowed share 
repurchases  
eΩ  lemons premium because of adverse 
selection in the equity market 
dΩ  lemons premium because of adverse 
selection in the credit market 
p  risk premium on equity 
ξ  dividend payout rate 
 
 
 
 
The household level 
 
pτ  personal income tax on dividends and 
interest income 
e
pτ  personal income tax on dividends  
d
pτ  personal income tax on interest 
income 
cτ  capital gains tax (on accrual) 
wt  wealth tax 
pθ  pτ−1  
e
pθ  epτ−1  
d
pθ  dpτ−1  
cθ  cτ−1  
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Chapter 5 – Chapter 6  tax rates and parameters 
 
A. TAX RATES AND PARAMETERS BEFORE THE TAX REFORM of 01/01/2001 
Opportunity return:   traditional household: income taxed as personal income 
   innovative household: income taxed at: mfτ = 35%  
 
   
personal business       personal wealth       business wealth 
   income  income  
       dividends, rents,     marginal wealth tax  
   labour income, pensions 
  and imputed rental value 
 
Low marginal income tax  
Ordinary shareholder    
  - 65  37.95%  -   0%  - 
  +65  20.05%  -   0%  - 
  
Proprietor   37.95%  debt  37.95%  0%  0% 
      equity 37.95 %  0%  0% 
 
Controlling shareholder  37.95%  debt 37.95%  0%  0% 
      equity 25%  0%  0% 
      (dividends and 
      capital gains) 
 
Average marginal income tax 
Ordinary shareholder  50%  -   0%   - 
         0.7%  - 
 
Proprietor   50%  debt 50%  0%  0%  
         0.7%  0.7% 
  
equity 50%  0%   0%  
         0.7%            %7.0%)1001( ⋅−  
         0.7%             %7.0%)681( ⋅−  
 
Controlling shareholder  50%  debt 50%  0%   0%  
         0.7%  0.7% 
            
equity 25%  0%   0%   
     (dividends and  0.7%            %7.0%)1001( ⋅−
      capital gains)  0.7%                 %7.0%)681( ⋅−
   
 
High marginal income tax 
Ordinary shareholder  60%  -   0.7%  - 
 
Proprietor   60%  debt 60%  0.7%  0.7% 
          
equity 60%  0.7%            %7.0%)1001( ⋅−  
         0.7%            %7.0%)681( ⋅−
  
Controlling shareholder  60%  debt  60%  0.7%  0.7% 
            
      equity  25%   
     (dividends and   0.7%            %7.0%)1001( ⋅−
      capital gains)  0.7%            %7.0%)681( ⋅−  
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Additional Taxes 
Capital gains tax       ct  = 0% Local property tax           %3.0=cw  
Tax on the pension fund                                %0=pfτ            Wealth tax on owner-occupied housing  wt⋅%60  
Tax on the mutual fund                                  %35=mfτ  Property transfer (transaction) tax          %6=pt  
Tax on the value of the newly issued equity  %9.0=sft   Imputed rental values       %25.1=irv  
  
 
 
B. TAX RATES AND PARAMETERS AFTER THE TAX REFORM of 01/01/2001 
 
Opportunity return: investment in market debt taxed at the presumptive capital income tax  
=wt 1.2%. 
 
 
  
      personal             business        personal wealth       business wealth 
      income  income    
dividends/rents   labour                   marginal wealth tax 
      capital gains   pensions 
              BOX III   BOX I 
 
 
Low marginal income tax  
Ordinary shareholder    
  + 65       0%   19.7%         -  0%  - 
  - 65       0%   37.6%         -  0%  - 
  
Proprietor        0%      37.6%  0%  0% 
 
Controlling shareholder       0%   37.6%        debt   37.6%  0%  0% 
 
           equity    25%  0%  0% 
          (dividends and 
          capital gains) 
 
 
Average marginal income tax 
Ordinary shareholder  0%   42%      -  0%   - 
         1.2%  - 
 
Proprietor   0%       42%  0%   0%  
         1.2%  0% 
         
Controlling shareholder  0%   42%         debt   42%  0%   0%  
         1.2%  0% 
            
      equity 25%  0%   0%   
           (dividends and 1.2%  0%  
           capital gains)              
 
      
High marginal income tax 
Ordinary shareholder  0%   52%         -  1.2%   - 
          
Proprietor   0%         52%  1.2%  0% 
             
Controlling shareholder  0%   52%            debt   52% 1.2%  0% 
             
                equity 25%  1.2%  0%  
           (dividends and  
            capital gains)   
 
 156 
Additional Taxes 
Capital gains tax    ct     = 0%,      Local property tax    %3.0=cw  
Tax on the pension fund  %0=pfτ      Imputed rental values                 %8.0=irv  
Property transfer (transaction) tax   %6=pt      Tax on the value of newly issued equity %55.0=sft  
Wealth tax on owner-occupied housing     %0      Presumptive capital income tax  %2.1=wt
  
 
 
 
 
C. TAXES AT THE FIRM LEVEL BEFORE AND AFTER THE TAX REFORM of 01/01/2001 
 
 
Corporate tax rate τ     35% 
1f       1 
λ  owner-occupied housing   1/40 
λ  pensions     1/15 
λ  capital gains of the closely-held corporation 1/6 
 
 
 
 
                      type of asset 
 
            machinery          buildings free depreciable assets 
 
 
 
Tax (straight-line) depreciation in years L    9  25  1  
Source: Bovenberg and ter Rele (1998) 
 
Economic depreciation δ      12.5%  4.1%  12.5% 
Source: Bovenberg and ter Rele (1998) 
 
Transaction (property transfer) tax pt     0  6%  0  
 
Local property tax (wealth tax cw  on firms)   0  0.3%  0  
 
Percentage immediate expensing 2f  
Source: Bovenberg and ter Rele (1998) 
• ordinary shareholder   0.5%  0.5%  0 
• controlling shareholder  4%            4%  0  
• proprietor    7%            7%   0 
 
Weights used to determine (average) cost of capital  47%  31%  22%  
Source: Bovenberg and ter Rele (1998) 
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Nederlandse Samenvatting 
(Summary in Dutch) 
 
De spaar- en investeringsbeslissingen van gezinnen en bedrijven worden beïnvloed door de 
belastingen op kapitaalinkomen. Naast de invloed op de totale hoeveelheid hebben deze 
belastingen ook een invloed op de allocatie van de besparingen en de investeringen. Spaar- 
en investeringsmogelijkheden worden vaak gekenmerkt door een verschillende 
belastingdruk. Belastingbetalers die de door hen verschuldigde belastingen willen minimeren 
hebben daarom een prikkel om hun spaar- en investeringsgedrag aan deze verschillen in 
belastingdruk aan te passen. Deze belastingminimerende verschuivingen in besparingen en 
investeringen noemen we belastingarbitrage. 
 
Dit proefschrift analyseert de prikkels tot belastingarbitrage voor gezinnen, bedrijven en 
intermediairs ten gevolge van de Nederlandse belastingen op kapitaalinkomen vóór en na de 
belastinghervorming van 1 januari 2001. De analyse bestudeert of deze belastinghervorming 
de prikkels tot belastingarbitrage heeft beperkt of versterkt.  
Naast deze belastinganalyse past dit proefschrift de methodes aan die vaak worden 
toegepast in de analyse van het belastingarbitrage gedrag. De analyse breidt de King – 
Fullerton (1984) methode uit die wordt gebruikt bij het berekenen van marginale effectieve 
belastingvoeten. Ook Sinn’s (1991a) dynamisch financierings- en investeringsmodel van het 
bedrijf, dat wordt gebruikt bij de afleiding van het optimale arbitrage gedrag, wordt in dit 
proefschrift uitgebreid.  
 
 
Uitbreiding van de toegepaste methodes 
Belastingbetalers, die worden verondersteld de door hen verschuldigde belastingen te 
minimeren, maken gebruik van de spaar- en investeringsmogelijkheden die onderworpen zijn 
aan de laagste belastingdruk. Het vergelijken van de belastingdruk op verschillende spaar- 
en investeringsmogelijkheden laat toe om het belastingarbitrage gedrag van 
belastingbetalers impliciet af te leiden. De King – Fullerton (1984) methode bepaalt de 
belastingdruk door het berekenen van marginale effectieve belastingvoeten die de 
belastingdruk meten op marginale spaar- en investeringsmogelijkheden. 
Hoofdstuk 2 breidt de methode van King – Fullerton (1984) uit door de stroom van 
ontvangsten en investeringskosten expliciet te modelleren over de tijd. Deze aanpak laat een 
gedetailleerde analyse toe van de impact van alle belastingen, ook deze die slechts eenmaal 
moeten worden betaald zoals transactiebelastingen en vermogenswinstbelastingen. De 
uitbreiding maakt een duidelijk onderscheid tussen de financieringskosten van de investering 
en de investeringsopbrengsten. Bovendien kan de waardestijging in de aandelen van het 
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bedrijf worden berekend (Tobin’s q). Zo wordt er bijvoorbeeld aangetoond dat, wanneer het 
bedrijf de investering financiert met ingehouden winsten, de dividendbelasting in de waarde 
van de aandelen gekapitaliseerd zit. De uitbreiding laat ook toe om de return op besparingen 
te berekenen die gedurende een aantal jaren worden geherinvesteerd. Tot slot kan deze 
extensie worden gebruikt bij het berekenen van de kapitaalkost wanneer een gezin een 
prikkel heeft om de investering te financieren met geleend geld in plaats van het eigen 
spaargeld aan te wenden. 
 
De uitgebreide King – Fullerton (1984) methode heeft echter een aantal tekortkomingen. De 
methode focust enkel op dividenden en rentebetalingen als gebruik van de bedrijfs-
opbrengsten. In de King – Fullerton methode kunnen bedrijven investeringen financieren met 
schuld, nieuwe aandelen of ingehouden winsten. Bedrijven beschikken echter niet steeds 
over voldoende ingehouden winsten om de investeringen te financieren. Zo moeten, in het 
bijzonder, nieuw opgerichte bedrijven nieuwe aandelen uitgeven of schuld aantrekken. 
Bovendien leidt het model niet expliciet de impact van de belastingen af op het spaar- en 
investeringsgedrag van bedrijven en gezinnen en op de totale kapitaalaccumulatie van het 
bedrijf. Het tegemoetkomen aan deze tekortkomingen vereist een dynamisch model. 
 
Hoofdstuk 3 analyseert daarom Sinn’s (1991a) dynamisch partieelevenwichtsmodel waarin 
een jong, nieuw opgericht bedrijf investeert tot het bedrijf volwassen wordt. In Sinn’s model 
worden investeringen echter enkel gefinancierd met aandelen. Hoofdstuk 3 introduceert 
daarom schuldfinanciering in Sinn’s dynamisch levenscyclus model van het bedrijf en 
introduceert ook de inkoop van eigen aandelen. Het bedrijf kan investeringen dan financieren 
met schuld, nieuw uitgegeven aandelen of ingehouden winsten. De bedrijfsopbrengsten 
kunnen worden uitgekeerd als dividenden of rentebetalingen. De opbrengsten kunnen echter 
ook worden ingehouden voor de financiering van extra investeringen, om aandelen terug te 
kopen of om schuld af te lossen. De analyse in hoofdstuk 3 bepaalt de optimale 
financieringsbron voor investeringen en de wijze waarop de bedrijfsopbrengsten optimaal 
kunnen worden aangewend. De analyse leidt de kapitaalkost en de marginale effectieve 
belastingvoeten af over heel de levenscyclus van het bedrijf. 
Indien vermogenswinsten minder zwaar worden belast dan rentebetalingen en indien 
dividenden het zwaarst worden belast (zoals vóór de belastinghervorming) zal de 
levenscyclus van het bedrijf bestaan uit vijf fases (indien er abstractie wordt gemaakt van de 
mogelijkheid tot inkoop van eigen aandelen). In de eerste fase geeft het bedrijf bij de 
oprichting nieuwe aandelen en schuld uit. Tijdens de tweede fase financiert het bedrijf de 
investeringen met schuld en ingehouden winsten. Tijdens de derde fase, wanneer de return 
op de extra investering gelijk is aan de interestvoet, lost het bedrijf al de uitstaande schuld af. 
Tijdens de vierde fase worden aanvullende investeringen enkel gefinancierd met ingehouden 
winsten. En ten slotte, tijdens de vijfde fase, stopt het bedrijf met investeren en keert het alle 
winsten uit in de vorm van dividenden. 
Zoals reeds aangegeven, worden er nieuwe aandelen en schuld uitgegeven bij de oprichting 
van het bedrijf. Enerzijds heeft het bedrijf een prikkel om zo weinig mogelijk nieuwe aandelen 
uit te geven zodat het de investeringen kan financieren met goedkopere ingehouden winsten. 
Deze opportuniteitskost, zoals aangetoond door Sinn, kan leiden tot een kapitaalkost van 
investeringen gefinancierd met nieuwe aandelen die hoger is dan de waarde volgens King – 
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Fullerton. Anderzijds heeft het bedrijf een prikkel om een voldoende groot aantal nieuwe 
aandelen uit te geven zodat het onmiddellijk de investeringen kan financieren, en dus snel 
opbrengsten kan genereren en dividenden kan uitkeren. Dit voordeel van nieuwe aandelen 
kan resulteren in een kapitaalkost die lager is dan de waarde die werd afgeleid door King – 
Fullerton.  
Een soortgelijke redenering geldt echter niet voor schuld als financieringsbron. Het bedrijf zal 
zoveel mogelijk schuld willen aantrekken zolang de return op de investering hoger is dan de 
interestvoet.   
De inkoop van aandelen verhoogt de kost van schuldfinanciering. Deze kost is, ten gevolge 
van de te betalen interesten, gelijk aan het gewogen gemiddelde van de contante waarde 
van de niet uitgekeerde dividenden en van de niet ingekochte aandelen. In het evenwicht 
kan het bedrijf zelfs nieuwe aandelen verkiezen boven schuld. Bij de opstart van het bedrijf 
zal nog steeds een beperkt aantal aandelen en schuld worden uitgegeven. Het kan echter 
zelfs optimaal zijn om helemaal geen investeringen te financieren met schuld omdat de 
kapitaalkost van investeringen gefinancierd met nieuwe aandelen daalt met de mogelijkheid 
tot inkoop van de eigen aandelen. Een stijging in de mogelijkheid tot inkoop van eigen 
aandelen impliceert bovendien dat de duur van de interne groeifase van het bedrijf verkort.  
 
In werkelijkheid zijn de kapitaalmarkten echter niet perfect. De financierings- en 
investeringsbeslissingen en de aanwending van de bedrijfsopbrengsten worden beïnvloed 
door financiële marktimperfecties ten gevolge van ‘adverse selection’ en ‘moral hazard’ 
problemen. Hoofdstuk 4 incorporeert een aantal van deze financiële marktimperfecties in 
Sinn’s levenscyclus model van het bedrijf. De uitbreiding analyseert de effecten van deze 
financiële marktimperfecties op het belastingarbitrage gedrag. 
‘Adverse selection’ in de markten voor aandelen en voor schuld impliceert een impliciete 
belastingwig tussen de kost van interne en externe financieringsbronnen. Dit kostverschil 
geeft aanleiding tot een rangorde in de door het bedrijf geprefereerde financieringsbronnen. 
Deze rangorde versterkt het belastingarbitrage gedrag ten gevolge van de soortgelijke 
rangorde in de financieringsbronnen ten gevolge van de belastingen (indien vermogens-
winsten minder worden belast dan rentebetalingen en dividenden het zwaarst worden 
belast). Het nieuw opgerichte bedrijf zal nog minder nieuwe aandelen uitgeven en zal minder 
schuld aantrekken. Omdat het lange termijn evenwicht niet wordt beïnvloed (lange termijn 
kapitaalkost en kapitaalstock blijven onveranderd) impliceren de ‘adverse selection’ 
problemen dat de duur van de interne groeifase van het bedrijf zal toenemen. 
Hoofdstuk 4 analyseert ook de ‘traditionele’ visie op dividendbelastingen en voegt in Sinn’s 
levenscyclus model een extra randvoorwaarde in, die het bedrijf verplicht tot distributie van 
een minimum aantal dividenden in elke periode. De analyse toont aan dat de resultaten van 
de traditionele visie sterk worden bepaald door de onderliggende assumptie dat nieuw 
uitgegeven aandelen de marginale financieringsbron van het bedrijf zijn. Deze assumptie 
impliceert dat de winstgevende investeringsmogelijkheden in elke periode groter moeten zijn 
dan de ingehouden winsten. Anders heeft het bedrijf een prikkel om een beperkt aantal 
nieuwe aandelen uit te geven om zo gebruik te maken van de goedkopere ingehouden 
winsten als financieringsbron (deze strategie impliceert de ‘nieuwe’ visie op dividend-
belastingen). Deze analyse impliceert dat de voorspellingen van zowel de traditionele visie 
als van de nieuwe visie met betrekking tot een daling van de dividendbelasting correct zijn. 
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De impact van de belastingdaling is echter afhankelijk van het aantal winstgevende 
investeringsopportuniteiten (in elke periode) voor het bedrijf. 
 
 
Distorsies vóór de belastinghervorming van 1 januari 2001 
Het Nederlandse belastingstelsel vóór de hervorming van 1 januari 2001 belastte bedrijfs-
opbrengsten min rentebetalingen onder de vennootschapsbelasting. Dividenden en 
rentebetalingen werden op gezinsniveau belast onder de progressieve inkomensbelasting. 
Gerealiseerde vermogenswinsten werden op gezinsniveau niet extra belast.   
Door deze verschillen in de fiscale behandeling van rentebetalingen, dividenden en 
vermogenswinsten verstoorde het Nederlandse belastingstelsel de financieringsbeslissingen 
van vennootschappen en verstoorde het de aanwending van de bedrijfsopbrengsten. 
Bovendien had het belastingstelsel een impact op de marktintrede van het aantal nieuwe 
ondernemers en op de marktdynamiek. 
 
Ook bij een aanmerkelijk belanghouder (er is sprake van een ‘aanmerkelijk belang’ wanneer 
een aandeelhouder minstens 5% van de aandelen van de vennootschap bezit) worden de 
bedrijfsopbrengsten min de rentebetalingen belast onder de vennootschapsbelasting. De 
dividenden en de gerealiseerde vermogenswinsten worden vervolgens belast onder het 
speciale tarief van 25%. De rentebetalingen worden enkel belast onder het progressieve 
inkomensbelastingtarief. Opbrengsten van investeringen door de zelfstandige worden belast 
onder de progressieve inkomensbelasting. Rentebetalingen zijn echter ook hier fiscaal 
aftrekbaar.  
Door deze verschillen in de fiscale regelgeving verstoorde het Nederlandse belastingstelsel 
de financieringsbeslissingen van zowel besloten vennootschappen als van éénmanszaken. 
Het belastingstelsel verstoorde ook de manier waarop deze bedrijven hun opbrengsten 
gebruikten. Bovendien beïnvloedde het Nederlandse belastingstelsel de legale vorm die door 
bedrijven werd verkozen. 
 
Gezinnen kunnen rechtstreeks sparen in schuld en aandelen van vennootschappen. 
Gezinnen die echter de progressieve inkomensbelasting op dividenden en rentebetalingen 
willen vermijden, kunnen sparen via een vermogensgroeifonds of een pensioenfonds. Het 
groeifonds wordt belast op de opbrengst van de beleggingen, die worden ingehouden en 
geherinvesteerd, met een laag proportioneel tarief. De belastingbetaler wordt echter niet 
meer belast op de vermogenswinsten wanneer het de aandelen van het groeifonds verkoopt. 
Gezinnen kunnen ook sparen voor een pensioen via een pensioenfonds. Deze besparingen 
zijn aftrekbaar van het belastbare inkomen. Het pensioen wordt echter volledig belast onder 
de progressieve inkomensbelasting, maar het pensioenfonds wordt niet belast. Bovendien 
worden ook investeringen in de eigen zelfbewoonde woning gunstig belast. 
Vóór de belastinghervorming verstoorde het Nederlandse belastingstelsel de 
spaarbeslissingen van gezinnen. En dit tengevolge van de verschillen in de fiscale 
regelgeving met betrekking tot directe gezinsbesparingen, besparingen via een 
vermogensgroeifonds of een pensioenfonds en investeringen in de eigen zelfbewoonde 
woning.  
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Belastingbetalers kunnen besparingen financieren met geleend geld. Vóór de 
belastinghervorming waren de interestbetalingen vaak aftrekbaar van het belastbare 
inkomen aan het progressieve inkomensbelastingtarief. Het belastingstelsel verstoorde 
bijgevolg de beslissing om besparingen te financieren met eigen of geleend geld. 
 
 
De belastinghervorming van 1 januari 2001 
Vóór de belastinghervorming van 1 januari 2001 hadden belastingbetalers dus heel wat 
prikkels om over te gaan tot belastingarbitrage. De hierboven besproken distorsies leidden 
tot de hervorming van de belastingen op kapitaalinkomen. 
 
De belangrijkste component van de hervorming van de belastingen op kapitaalinkomen is de 
verandering in de belasting op dividenden en rentebetalingen op het gezinsniveau. Deze 
worden niet meer belast onder de progressieve inkomensbelasting. De fiscus veronderstelt 
dat het persoonlijk vermogen van de belastingbetaler een opbrengst genereert van 4%. Deze 
opbrengst wordt vervolgens belast aan een proportioneel tarief van 30%. Het werkelijk 
genoten inkomen wordt bijgevolg niet meer belast. Bovendien wordt ook de oude 
vermogensbelasting afgeschaft. De nieuwe vermogensrendementsheffing kan echter worden 
beschouwd als een impliciete vermogensbelasting van 1.2%. 
Belastingbetalers kunnen besparingen financieren met geleend geld. Het geleende geld, 
behalve de hypothecaire leningen voor de investering in de eigen zelfbewoonde woning, is 
aftrekbaar van het persoonlijk vermogen dat wordt belast onder de vermogens-
rendementsheffing. Enkel de interestbetalingen tengevolge van schuldgefinancierde 
investeringen in de eigen zelfbewoonde woning zijn nog aftrekbaar van het inkomen dat 
wordt belast onder de progressieve inkomensbelasting. 
 
De belastinghervorming heeft geen impact op de fiscale behandeling van schuld en 
aandelen op het bedrijfsniveau, zowel bij vennootschappen als bij eenmanszaken (behalve 
dan de daling in de marginale inkomensbelastingtarieven). Pensioenen en investeringen in 
de eigen woning blijven genieten van een gunstige fiscale behandeling. 
 
 
Evaluatie van de belastinghervorming 
De belastinghervorming verhoogt de reële return na belastingen van directe investeringen in 
de vennootschap. Deze return is niet langer afhankelijk van de hoogte van het 
arbeidsinkomen en van het marginale inkomensbelastingtarief van het gezin. Deze stijging 
impliceert dan ook een stijging van de door de belastingbetaler geëiste opbrengst in andere 
investeringsopportuniteiten. 
 
Interne versus externe aandelenfinanciering 
De belastinghervorming verhoogt de kapitaalkost van investeringen gefinancierd met 
ingehouden winsten; ook deze investeringen worden belast met de vermogens-
rendementsheffing. De belastingdruk op investeringen gefinancierd met nieuwe aandelen is 
niet meer hoger dan de belastingdruk op investeringen gefinancierd met ingehouden 
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winsten. Bijgevolg zitten deze ingehouden winsten niet meer vast in de vennootschap en 
worden zij niet langer meer in projecten met een lage opbrengst geïnvesteerd (vóór de 
hervorming had de vennootschap een prikkel om winsten te herinvesteren zodat de 
dividendbelasting zolang mogelijk kon worden uitgesteld). Het belastingstelsel verstoort 
bijgevolg niet langer de allocatie van de bedrijfsopbrengsten. De afwezigheid van 
belastingprikkels om de dividendbelasting uit te stellen impliceert dat de vennootschap 
onmiddellijk de optimale kapitaalstock zal aantrekken. De vennootschap zal dus niet langer 
meer gekenmerkt worden door interne groeifases. Dit impliceert dat de markttoegang voor 
jonge, nieuw opgerichte bedrijven niet langer meer wordt belemmerd door het 
belastingstelsel. De belastinghervorming zorgt er dus voor dat vennootschappen die niet 
over voldoende winsten beschikken om investeringen te financieren niet langer meer worden 
benadeeld door het belastingstelsel. 
 
Schuld versus aandelen 
Na de belastinghervorming wordt de belastingdiscriminatie van aandelen op het 
bedrijfsniveau (ten opzichte van schuld, want enkel interesten zijn aftrekbaar onder de 
vennootschapsbelasting) niet langer meer gecompenseerd door een belastingvoordeel op 
het gezinsniveau (de afwezigheid van een vermogenswinstbelasting in tegenstelling tot de 
progressieve inkomensbelasting op rentebetalingen vóór de hervorming). Het 
belastingstelsel zorgt er daarom eenduidig voor, dat schuld de meest verkozen 
financieringsbron wordt. Bijgevolg worden vennootschappen die geen schuld kunnen 
aantrekken door het belastingstelsel benadeeld. Jonge, nieuw opgerichte bedrijven die 
beperkt zijn in het aantrekken van schuld hebben dus ook na de belastinghervorming een 
concurrentieel nadeel (ten opzichte van bedrijven die geen kredietbeperkingen kennen).  
De belastinghervorming zorgt voor een stijging van de kapitaalkost (van met ingehouden 
winsten gefinancierde investeringen). Daarom wordt het lange termijn evenwicht van 
volwassen vennootschappen na de belastinghervorming gekenmerkt door een lagere 
kapitaalstock.  
 
‘Adverse selection’ in de schuld en aandelenmarkten 
‘Adverse selection’ in de aandelenmarkt impliceert dat de kost van nieuw uitgegeven 
aandelen hoger is dan de kost van ingehouden winsten. ‘Adverse selection’ in de markt voor 
schuld kan er zelfs voor zorgen dat niet schuld maar ingehouden winsten de meest 
geprefereerde financieringsbron is na de belastinghervorming. Net zoals vóór de 
belastinghervorming hebben vennootschappen die externe financiering moeten aantrekken 
dan een concurrentieel nadeel ten opzichte van bedrijven die voldoende opbrengsten 
genereren om de investeringen te financieren. 
 
Investeringsprojecten 
De belastinghervorming verandert de fiscale behandeling van afschrijvingen niet. Het 
Nederlandse belastingstelsel, vóór en na de hervorming, begunstigt investeringen in 
immateriële activa ten opzichte van investeringen in machines, uitrustingen en 
transportmiddelen. Investeringen in gebouwen worden door het belastingstelsel het minst 
gunstig behandeld. 
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Spaarstrategieën voor het gezin 
Besparingen via een vermogensgroeifonds verliezen door de belastinghervorming hun 
fiscale aantrekkingskracht. Sparen voor een pensioen en investeringen in de eigen 
zelfbewoonde woning blijven echter ook na de hervorming fiscaal aantrekkelijk. De 
belastinghervorming geeft de belastingbetalers zelfs een grotere prikkel om investeringen in 
de eigen woning te financieren met geleend geld dan vóór de hervorming. Intermediairs 
blijven schuld boven aandelen verkiezen. 
 
De eenmanszaak 
De belastinghervorming verhoogt de kapitaalkost van investeringen in de eenmanszaak die 
worden gefinancierd met eigen vermogen. Dit impliceert dat zelfstandigen na de hervorming 
schuld beginnen verkiezen boven eigen vermogen als financieringsbron van investeringen in 
de eenmanszaak.  
 
De aanmerkelijk belanghouder 
Ook de aanmerkelijk belanghouder verkiest na de belastinghervorming schuld boven 
aandelen als financieringsbron (ingehouden winsten blijven verkozen boven nieuwe 
aandelen). De aanmerkelijk belanghouder heeft na de belastinghervorming dus geen prikkel 
meer om de eigen fondsen in de besloten vennootschap te investeren.  
Omdat de belastinghervorming de belastingdruk op investeringen in de eenmanszaak 
gefinancierd met eigen vermogen verlaagt, heeft de ondernemer na de belastinghervorming 
eventueel zelfs een prikkel om de eenmanszaak te verkiezen boven de besloten 
vennootschap als ondernemingsvorm. 
 
 
Belastinghervorming: de volgende ronde 
Het belangrijkste gevolg van de Nederlandse hervorming van de belastingen op 
kapitaalinkomen van 1 januari 2001 is dat vennootschappen indifferent zijn tussen nieuwe 
aandelen en ingehouden winsten als financieringsbron (we maken abstractie van eventuele 
‘adverse selection’ problemen), en dat gezinnen indifferent zijn tussen dividenden en 
vermogenswinsten. Aangezien gezinnen geen prikkel meer hebben om zwaar belaste 
dividenden om te zetten in onbelaste vermogenswinsten, verliezen besparingen via een 
vermogensgroeifonds hun fiscale aantrekkingskracht. De belastinghervorming vermindert 
daarom de prikkels tot belastingarbitrage.  
 
Er zijn echter ook na de hervorming nog heel wat distorsies en mogelijkheden tot 
belastingarbitrage, zowel op het bedrijfsniveau als op het gezinsniveau. Zo blijft het 
belastingstelsel de financieringsbeslissingen van bedrijven verstoren. Omdat enkel 
interestbetalingen aftrekbaar zijn van de vennootschapsbelasting wordt schuld de 
geprefereerde financieringsbron voor alle ondernemingen (vennootschappen, besloten 
vennootschappen en eenmanszaken). Bovendien blijft het belastingstelsel de 
ondernemingsvorm van bedrijven en het type van investeringsproject verstoren. Tenslotte 
blijven ook besparingen voor een pensioen en met schuld gefinancierde investeringen in de 
eigen zelfbewoonde woning genieten van een gunstige fiscale wetgeving. 
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De Nederlandse fiscus heeft voor een belastinghervorming gekozen die de neutraliteit tussen 
nieuw uitgegeven aandelen en ingehouden winsten als financieringsbron herstelt (in de 
afwezigheid van ‘adverse selection’ problemen). Na de hervorming wordt de keuze tussen 
schuld en aandelen echter nog sterker verstoord dan vóór de hervorming. Er kan daarom 
worden geargumenteerd dat de Nederlandse fiscus de vereiste neutraliteit tussen aandelen 
en schuld uit het oog heeft verloren. Net hetzelfde kan worden gezegd over de gewenste 
neutraliteit tussen de verschillende ondernemingsvormen. 
 
De Nederlandse belastinghervorming van 1 januari 2001 toont daarom aan dat fundamentele 
belastinghervormingen zelden succesvol zijn indien de distorsies ten gevolge van de 
belastingen op kapitaalinkomen slechts partieel worden opgelost. De analyse in deze thesis 
suggereert daarom de noodzaak van een volgende ronde in de hervorming van de 
belastingen op kapitaalinkomen in Nederland. 
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